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Southeast Asia Report



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6 July 1984

SOUTHEAST ASIA REPORT

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CHINESE INDONESIANS ATTEND COURSES ON PANCASILA

Jakarta HARIAN UMUM AB in Indonesian 9 May 84 p 5

[Text] As of the end of April a total of 5,193 Indonesians of Chinese descent had completed the course on the application of the principles of the Pancasila (P-4 course). The course is being given at the request of the Surabaya municipal branch of the Bakom PKB [Badan Komunikasi Penghayatan Kesatuan Bangsa/ Board for the Promotion of National Unity], and it is estimated that the number of persons attending the course will increase in May.

Dr Wibiksana, the chairman of the Surabaya municipal Bakom PKB, said on Thursday of last week [3 May] that the P-4 course was introduced in 1982/83 and that 916 people attended the course that year. The number of persons attending the course increased sharply in 1983/84 to 3,728, and he is optimistic that the target of 5,000 participants for 1984/85 will be achieved.

He declared that the Bakom PKB is not what it is made out to be by some people who are against Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent, that is, it is not a replacement for the banned BAPERKI [an organization allied with the Indonesian Communist Party and oriented toward Chinese Indonesians]. On the contrary, he said, the function of the Surabaya Bakom PKB is to make recommendations regarding the promotion of national unity in this area and therefore he always cooperates with local social organizations.

Study Groups

Dr Wibiksana was accompanied by Teguh Suyono, SH, the chairman of the Management Board for Courses on the Application of the Principles of the Pancasila (BP-7) of Surabaya municipality. In commenting on the P-4 courses given in Surabaya municipality Teguh Suyono said that [as of the end of the fiscal year] in March a total of 3,728 residents of Surabaya, consisting of government officials, members of organizations and businessmen, had attended the courses. In April alone a total of 1,465 persons attended the courses, giving a grand total of 5,193 persons as of the end of April.

Attendance increased in April because the courses were presented not only by the BP-7 but also by community groups at the precinct, citizens' association and neighborhood association levels, where nonnative citizens can easily

participate. Simulation groups and study groups are also being used to popularize the courses, and there are already 1,392 study groups that are using the simulation game. Teguh Suyono said that the use of these procedures makes the public more enthusiastic about becoming involved. It should be noted that there are 873 citizens' associations and 5,601 neighborhood associations in Surabaya municipality and that all of them have simulation groups.

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CSO: 4213/224

ISLAMIC LEADER WOULD WELCOME SANCTIONS AGAINST SECT

Jakarta PELITA in Indonesian 5 May 84 pp 1, 7

[Text] K.H. Abdullah Syafei, the chairman of the Jakarta branch of the Indonesian Council of Ulama (MUI) and head of the Assyafiiyah Islamic Institution and its board of regents, welcomes the government's plan to take firm sanctions against followers of the Ahmadiyah Qadiyah sect, an action already taken in Pakistan and other Islamic states.

K.H. Abdullah Syafei is ill and he issued this statement through his son, K.H. Rasjid Abdullah, when he was contacted on Thursday [3 May].

Minister of Religion H. Munawir Syadzali announced in Jakarta on Wednesday that the government is thinking about issuing a regulation that will impose firm sanctions on followers of the Ahmadiyah Qadiyah sect.

"K.H. Abdullah Syafei has long been of the opinion that the Ahmadiyah has left Islam," his son said. Abdullah Syafei has hundreds of thousands of followers in Jakarta and surrounding areas and also has influence in other places in Indonesia and in Singapore and Malaysia.

The ulama, speaking through his son, said that the Ahmadiyah was prohibited from describing itself as an Islamic organization in both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.

He said that in 1983 the World Islamic Organization, which has its main offices in Mecca, held a conference which issued a message warning all Muslims in the world to be wary of the activities of the Ahmadiyah. The organization also urged Muslims not to go to Ahmadiyah activity centers, that is, to Ahmadiyah mosques.

The World Islamic Organization in Mecca also is of the opinion that the Ahmadiyah has left Islam and that it deviates from the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad. K.H. Abdullah Syafei said that the Ahmadiyah Qadian recognizes Qulam Ahmad as a prophet who came after the Prophet Muhammad, but to Muslims the Prophet Muhammad was the last prophet.

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CSO: 4213/224

ORIGINS, GOALS, PROGRAM OF PEMUDA DEMOKRAT INDONESIA OUTLINED

Surabaya SURABAYA POST in Indonesian 19 May 84 p 2

[Text] Surabaya--"If there is still activity being carried on in the name of the Gerakan Pemuda Marhaen [Proletarian Youth Movement], that is not our responsibility." This was stated by Abdusamad, a leader of the Surabaya branch of Pemuda Demokrat Indonesia [Indonesian Democratic Youth], on 18 May in the presence of the committee to celebrate the 37th anniversary of Pemuda Demokrat Indonesia.

He said that the Gerakan Pemuda Marhaen automatically went out of existence after it made its declaration of 27 August 1982. However, a number of people who are still used to thinking in the old-style way continue to support the former organization. At present they only amount to a few people, but they don't mean very much. He added that Pemuda Demokrat Indonesia continues to follow a "smiling policy," inviting them to come back and join us, because both of us have the same ideological outlook.

On this occasion Amanoe, the chairman of the Surabaya Branch Executive Council, expressed the hope that the government would quickly enact the law on mass organizations, so that not only Pemuda Demokrat Indonesia but also other mass organizations would have a guide for their activities. According to another leader of the Surabaya branch, if the law on mass organizations is enacted, the Gerakan Pemuda Marhaen will be defeated in its efforts. In that connection he hoped that the members of Gerakan Pemuda Marhaen would join Pemuda Demokrat Indonesia immediately, before the law on mass organizations is enacted.

Change of Name

Amanoe declared that in an historical sense Pemuda Demokrat Indonesia is not a new youth organization. On the contrary, there has only been a change of name.

On 31 May 1947 Pemuda Demokrat Indonesia was established in Jakarta, led by Moe-hamad Isnaeni and Ahmad Soebagio. It was established as an independent youth organization. It was not until 1963 in Surakarta [Central Java] that it became a part of the "sub-structure" of the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), and automatically adopted the founding principle of "Marhaenisme" [Proletarianism].

In accordance with political developments in Indonesia and in adjusting itself to the speech by the president on 16 August 1982, which set out the Pancasila [Five

Principles of the Nation] as the single founding principle for mass organizations and youth bodies, Gerakan Pemuda Marhaen changed its name on 27 August 1982 to Pemuda Demokrat Indonesia, with the Pancasila as its founding principle. This declaration by the Central Executive Council was approved at the National Conference of Pemuda Demokrat Indonesia, which was held from 16 to 19 December 1983 at Cibubur in Jakarta. In this way the organization resumed its former status as an independent body.

Regarding the independence of Pemuda Demokrat Indonesia, Amanoe admitted that difficulties had been encountered in obtaining funds. He said: "The problem of funds is receiving our full attention. We continue to hope for further participation by the members." In fact, there are about 90,000 members in the 19 districts of Surabaya, but most of them are only passive members.

Although this is so, he added that Pemuda Demokrat Indonesia, since the 1982 declaration, has extended its activities to the lowest levels of the organization. In the political area the long term program calls on legislative bodies to function properly, so that the aspirations of the people can be achieved, in accordance with the constitution.

Consolidation

The short term program provides for the consolidation of the organization, which has already been achieved with the establishment of leadership bodies down to the basic level. He added that there remains the task of improving the leadership. Later on, cadre training programs will be undertaken. One such program has already been undertaken from 10 to 19 December 1983, at which 150 cadres were trained. Another activity being planned is a communications program to help members keep in touch with various developments, including national political problems. The final program under preparation involves participation in supporting the national development program.

Imam Chusen, the chairman of the Committee for Celebrating the 37th Anniversary of Pemuda Demokrat Indonesia, stated that the principal objective of Pemuda Demokrat was to try to consolidate and reunite the youth organization through community service [kerja bakti] activities on 20 May 1984, which at the same time will be a commemoration of the birth of the nationalist movement. This effort will also answer those who say that the organization is not doing anything.

Also on the program will be social activities, a soccer game, chess, a 37 kilometer hike open to the public, and table tennis.

The high point of the activities will take place on 17 June when there will be a reception at the Balai Pemuda [Youth Hall], bringing together young people who will hear for the first time the organization's song, "Pemuda Demokrat March."

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CSO: 4213/230

DECREASE IN AIR TRANSPORTATION OF TRANSMIGRANTS

Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 5 May 84 p 2

[Text] Over the last 6 months the number of flying hours accumulated in transporting transmigrants in Hercules and Transall aircraft has declined about 50 percent from the norm and this situation is affecting the operations of PT Pelita Air Service (PT PAS). PT PAS supervises the operation of these aircraft.

Moelyono, the director of PT PAS, briefed reporters on the situation in his office on Friday [4 May].

PT PAS supervises the operation of six Hercules and three Transall aircraft that are used to carry transmigrants from their departure points to locations outside Java. PT PAS also operates a number of smaller aircraft in support of Pertamina's oil exploration activities, and these operations are not declining but are tending to increase.

The nine Hercules and Transall aircraft are supposed to be operated a minimum of 1,260 hours a month, and if this much flight time is accumulated PT PAS can meet its operating costs for transporting transmigrants without suffering a loss.

But, according to Moelyono, the fact is that during the last 6 months the Department of Transmigration has only used an average of 50 percent of the allotted flight time for the 9 aircraft and consequently the aircraft are spending more time standing idle in the hangars at Kemayoran.

Official records show that the nine aircraft accumulated only 2,056 hours and 40 minutes of flight time from April 1983 to March 1984, but during the same period in 1982/83 they accumulated 4,905 hours and 8 minutes of flight time.

Damaged

The reasons for the recent decline in the air transport of transmigrants are not known but it is assumed that the Department of Transmigration is still occupied with the preparation of settlements for the transmigrants who will be placed during Pelita IV [Fourth 5-Year Plan]. Or, as Transmigration

Minister Martono once noted, the placement of all Pelita III transmigrants has been completed and the placement targets were even overachieved.

The maintenance of the aircraft must continue even if they are not being operated, and all maintenance costs are borne by PT PAS. At the same time, under the amended contract the Department of Transmigration is required to make payments only after the aircraft are used to transport transmigrants.

Moelyono said that he hoped that the Department of Transmigration would soon increase its use of the aircraft. "PT PAS or the government will be 'damaged' because large amounts must be spent on aircraft that are not being used, and the aircraft cannot be used for other purposes without the permission of the minister," he said.

Sufficient Capacity

Moelyono said that the government has established a transmigration target of 750,000 families for Pelita IV. The PT PAS fleet, with its nine Hercules and Transall aircraft plus two more Transall aircraft that will be added in 1985, will have sufficient capacity to support the transportation of the transmigrants, he said.

He said that when the Department of Transmigration leases the planes to carry transmigrants it pays for the round-trip flight. He noted that the aircraft are empty on the return flight to Jakarta (Java), although sometimes transmigration officials or their families take passage to Java without paying fares.

Potential Wasted

He said that the aircraft that return empty to Java could be used to transport cargo, including the agricultural products of the transmigrants. The fact is that the potential represented by these empty aircraft has never been utilized, he said.

Files kept by KOMPAS show that during Pelita III the government (Directorate General of Road Construction, Department of Public Works) built a number of special airfields outside Java to handle transmigration traffic using funds allocated to the Directorate General and Department of Transmigration. The airfields were built at Batu Licin in South Kalimantan, Sanggau in West Kalimantan, Rimbo Bujang in Jambi, Pasir Pangarayan in Riau, and other places.

Moelyono said that the special airfields have never been used in transporting transmigrants by air. "Transmigrants that are carried in aircraft use or get off at airports operated by the Department of Communications," he said.

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CSO: 4213/224

EXTERNAL DEBT OF \$21.6 BILLION AT END OF 1983

Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 10 May 84 p 1

[Text] At the end of December 1983 Indonesia's external debt stood at \$21.684 billion and consisted of government debts of \$19.952 billion and government corporation (Pertamina and Garuda) debts of \$1.732 billion.

Drs Radius Prawiro, the minister of finance, announced the figures in Jakarta on Wednesday [9 May] during a working meeting with the parliamentary commission on the national budget. The meeting, which was chaired by Wiratno Puspoatmodjo, SH, the head of the commission, discussed draft laws dealing with additions and changes in the 1983/84 national budget and with the computation of the 1980/81 national budget.

The commission questioned the minister about the position of Indonesia's debt at the end of fiscal 1983/84 for the purpose of identifying trends that have occurred in the debt during the last fiscal year. The minister told the commission that accurate figures were not yet available and that the government could only provide data on the position of the debt through the end of December 1983.

"It can be seen from the data that our debt is greater than it was at the end of March 1983," he said. At the end of March 1983 foreign loans stood at \$19.665 billion and consisted of government debts of \$17.788 billion and government corporation debts of \$1.877 billion.

At the end of 1983 government corporation debts stood at \$1.732 billion, with Pertamina's debts totalling about \$1.003 billion and Garuda's debts \$729 million.

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CSO: 4213/224

BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION ON INDONESIAN PERSONALITIES

[Unless otherwise noted, the following information on Indonesian personalities has been extracted from Indonesian language sources published in Jakarta.]

COL SAIFUL SULUN—Major General Soelarso, the commander of Military Region VIII/Brawijaya, presided over a change of command ceremony involving the posts of chief of staff of the military region and chief of staff for daily operations of the East Java Special Branch. The two positions were transferred from Brigadier General Poniman, the former incumbent, to his replacement, Col (Artillery) Saiful Sulun. The ceremony was held at the headquarters of Military Region VIII on Jalan R Wijaya in Surabaya on 30 April. Brigadier General Poniman has been assigned to new duties as chief of staff for civil affairs functions in Region III in Yogyakarta. Col Saiful Sulun had previously served as chief of staff of Military Region IV/Sriwijaya in Palembang. [Excerpts] [Jakarta HARIAN UMUM AB in Indonesian 1 May 84 p 6] 5170

MASTER OF LAWS SINGGIH—Attorney General Ismail Saleh, master of laws, presided over a transfer of office ceremony involving the post of chief of the Jakarta State Prosecutor's Office, from R B Soekardi, master of laws, to Singgih, master of laws. The attorney general said that Singgih is not a new man in Jakarta, as he had previously served as the chief of the Central Jakarta State Prosecutor's Office and as assistant for operations in the Jakarta State Prosecutor's Office. R B Soekardi has been assigned to new duties as chief of the Planning Bureau in the Office of the Attorney General. [Excerpts] [Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 11 May 84 p 3] 5170

STATE SECRETARIAT OFFICIALS PROMOTED—Sudharmono, master of laws and minister and state secretary, on 9 May was informed of the promotions of three senior officers in the Office of the State Secretary. They are: Engr Ginandjar Kartasasmita, deputy minister for increasing the use of domestic products; Sukarton Marmosudjono, master of laws and assistant minister and state secretary for liaison with higher state institutions; and Subagyo, master of laws and secretary and minister of state for improving the efficiency of state institutions. Engineer Ginandjar was promoted to air commodore in the Air Force, while Sukarton Marmosudjono and Subagyo were promoted to the rank of commodores in the Navy. The promotions were based on a presidential decision of 27 April. [Excerpt] [Jakarta TEMPO in Indonesian 12 May 84 p 16] 5170

PROF DODDY TISNA AMIDJAJA—Prof Dr Doddy Achdiat Tisna Amidjaja, who will shortly leave his duties as director general of higher education, was installed in office on 12 May as chairman of LIPI [Indonesian Science Council], replacing Prof Dr Engr H T Bachtiar Rifai, who had been chairman of LIPI for the past 11 years. Doctor Doddy obtained his master's degree in biology in 1952 from ITB [Bandung Technological Institute, when the ITB was still a part of the University of Indonesia. He obtained his doctor's degree in biology from the University of Bonn, in the Federal Republic of Germany. In addition to serving as director general of higher education, a position which he had held since 1976, Doctor Doddy had served as assistant rector of the ITB from 1968 to 1976. After he had become director general of higher education, he returned for a time to the ITB to occupy a position in the office of the rector, when the students at ITB were going through a period of "restlessness." [Excerpt] [Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 15 May 84 p 1] 5170

MAJOR GENERAL SOEKENDRO DIES—Maj Gen (Retired) Haji Achmad Soekendro, who had once served as minister of state and chief of staff of KOTOE [High Command for Economic Operations] during the period of the Old Order [prior to 1967], died in the Federal Republic of Germany on 11 May at age 61. His remains were buried on 15 May at Kalibata Heroes' Cemetery in Jakarta. The deceased suffered from a painful brain tumor. He had been operated on four times and had been in a coma for 22 months when he died. He leaves a wife, a child, and a grandchild. Soekendro was born in Banyumas [Central Java]. He served as Indonesian military attache in the United States while obtaining his M A degree from the University of Pittsburgh. At the time of the G30S/PKI [abortive communist coup d'etat in 1965] he was in Peking but was able to escape to Hong Kong, returning to Jakarta from there. He later was assigned to the intelligence area and was assistant I to the Army chief of staff until he retired in 1975. [Excerpts] [Jakarta TEMPO in Indonesian 19 May 84 p 15] 5170

ALI MURTOPO DIES—Lt Gen (Retired) Ali Murtopo, deputy chairman of the Supreme Advisory Council, died of a heart attack at the Press Council Building on Jalan Kebun Sirih in Jakarta on 15 May. He was 60. The deceased leaves a wife (Mrs Wastuti) and two sons, Engr Harris Ali Moerfi and Lucky Ali Moerfiqin. Ali Murtopo began to be publicly known during the struggle to regain Irian Barat during the 1960's. He became better known during the period of the New Order [since 1967], with his appointment on 14 August 1969 as private assistant to the president. At the same time Ali Murtopo also held several important positions in BAKIN [State Intelligence Coordinating Body], serving as deputy chief of BAKIN from 1976 to 1978. In 1978 Ali Murtopo was appointed minister of information. After his resignation as minister of information when the cabinet was reshuffled, Ali Murtopo was appointed a member of the Supreme Advisory Council and was later elected deputy chairman of this high state institution.

Ali Murtopo was a true soldier in the Army who began his career as a soldier of the lowest rank. When he and other senior officers were retired from the Army by General Poniman (then the chief of staff) a few years ago, he told the press: "I entered the Army with the lowest rank, a Class III soldier. I never believed that I would retire as a lieutenant general." He said that the rank he best remembered was that of captain. At that time being a captain meant really serving as an officer in a command position.

Ali Murtopo entered the Army as a soldier in the Students' Army when the war for independence broke out in Pekalongan [Central Java]. Later, he joined Regiment 17-BE 8 in Division VIII and took part in several clashes in the northern part of Central Java, particularly near Pekalongan, Pemalang, and Brebes. When the war for independence ended, Ali Murtopo was appointed city military commander in Pemalang, in which position he served from 1949 to 1950. He was also commander of Company B-XI in Division III and commander of Company BE-IV-XI. From 1950 to 1957 he served as a troop commander, serving as a company commander in Tegal [Central Java] and deputy commander of Battalion 431 in Infantry Regiment XII (Banteng Raiders), a highly-regarded unit in Central Java at the time. [Excerpts] [Surabaya SURABAYA POST in Indonesian 16 May 84 pp 1, 12] 5170

PROF DR SUKADJI RANUWIHARDJO—Minister of Education and Culture Prof Dr Nugroho Notosusanto presided over the installation in office of Prof Dr Sukadji Ranuwihardjo as director general of higher education in the Department of Education and Culture, at a ceremony held in Jakarta on 17 May. Wearing a dark blue coat, Prof Dr Sukadji Ranuwihardjo, the new director general of higher education, appeared very happy, as usual. He was born in Kesamben Village on 9 November 1931, the son of a small farmer. He is no stranger to university rectors. Although his father only completed elementary school at the Ongko Loro School and his mother was illiterate, Sukadji was rector of the University of Gadjah Mada in Yogyakarta from 1973 to 1981. Although he is no longer rector of that university, Sukadji is still kept busy by university students there who need letters of recommendation. This professor of economics went to the University of California in 1959 and obtained a master's degree in 1961. He then returned to Yogyakarta as a teacher in the Faculty of Economics of the University of Gadjah Mada. He is married to Soetarlinah, who has a doctor's degree herself. They have three sons and a daughter. They hope that this year two of their children will complete their studies in the technology of electricity and in psychology at the University of Gadjah Mada in Yogyakarta. Sukadji has a strong will and likes to work hard. [Excerpts] [Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 18 May 84 pp 1, 9] 5170

CSO: 4213/231

BRIEF

COMMUNICATIONS SECTOR GROWTH ESSENTIAL--Minister of Communications Rusmin Nuryadin states that during the Fourth 5-Year Plan the communications sector must grow at a rate of 9 percent per year in order to support the non-petroleum and natural gas sector. For that purpose the investment of 11,355,000,000 rupiahs will be needed during the Fourth 5-Year Plan, so that the objectives sought during this period of time may be met. It is expected that domestic investments will provide a total of 3,577,000,000 rupiahs of this total, while foreign investments will provide about 7,778,000,000 rupiahs. It is also expected that the BUMN [State-Owned Enterprises Board] will handle 56.7 percent of this investment, or 6,440,000,000 rupiahs in new equipment and facilities. Speaking at the opening of a working conference of the Communications, Telecommunications, and Tourism Sector of KADIN [Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry] on 17 May, Minister Rusmin declared that the 9 percent rate of growth in the communications sector was absolutely necessary to achieve, to meet the increased flow of passengers and freight during the Fourth 5-Year Plan. It is expected that with the anticipated increase in the flow of passengers and freight in 1983-84, the total achieved will be 102.6 million passenger kilometers and 56.2 million ton kilometers of freight. By 1988-89 the total will be 213.4 million passenger kilometers and 106.4 million ton kilometers of freight. In that connection the Department of Communications must adopt policies to facilitate the flow of goods and services and increase human mobility throughout the country and particularly in the villages, in new residential areas, and in heavily-populated urban areas. [Text] [Jakarta HARIAN UMUM AB in Indonesian 18 May 84 p 1] 5170

CSO: 4213/230

LAOS

ID CARDS ISSUED TO FIGHT ENEMY SUBVERSION

Vientiane VIENTIANE MAI in Lao 5 May 84 pp 1, 4

[Announcement No 835/VtC of Vientian Administrative Committee chairman Khambou Sounisai on 19 April 1984 on issuing ID cards to fight enemy subversion]

[Text] To all work sections, districts, companies, and factories around Vientiane Capital

Subject: ID cards issued for cadres, government employees, and government and state enterprise workers around Vientiane Capital

Based on past experience with the enemy, their schemes to resist and dismantle the policies of the party and government, and to infiltrate the ranks of the party and government in many ways;

Based on the plenum of the Council of Ministers No 320 on 20 November 1982 on the issue of ID cards to Lao people throughout the LPDR,

Based on the plans of the Vientiane Capital Administrative Committee for protecting the safety of the capital and offices, organizations, and factories around Vientiane Capital in every way.

In order to implement this plenum correctly, the Vientiane Capital Administrative Committee hereby makes the following announcement to district administrative committees, work sections, companies, and factories around Vientiane Capital.

I. Preparation prior to issuing ID cards for cadres, government employees, and workers

A. The Vientiane Capital Administrative Committee has agreed to assign the Vientiane Capital Police Headquarters to prepare a place for specialized task cadres who will issue the cards with equipment to be used for issuing the cards and who will act as a driving force in issuing ID cards for cadres, government employees, and workers under work sections, districts, companies, and factories under Vientiane Capital.

B. The Vientiane Capital Administrative Committee has agreed to let the work sections organize and train cadres in each section to collect lists of names for all personnel, cadres, government employees, and workers in each district, work section, company, and factory under Vientiane Capital (according to the table attached) to be handed over to the section that organizes and trains cadres in Vientiane Capital for checking in order to give them to the card-issuing section so they will know in advance.

C. All cadres, government employees, workers, companies and factories who have old Vientiane ID cards and new cards issued by the Ministry of Interior before should report and hand in their cards and have new ID cards issued.

D. All cadres and government employees and workers in companies and factories who come for their ID cards should bring money to pay for the fee.

E. Cadres, government employees, and male and female workers who come for their ID cards must have their pictures taken right where the cards are issued. Proper attire is required for the picture taking. Men must have their hair cut western-style. Women must wear their hair up in Lao style and must carry some money for the cost of the photo.

II. Organizing the actual operation

A. Once this announcement has been received, each work section, district, company, and factory must quickly collect lists of names for the cadres, government employees, and workers in their own sections and hand them over to the Vientiane Capital organizing section immediately.

B. The organizing committees in each section must work in cooperation with the Vientiane Capital organizing section to collect lists of names for cadres, government employees, and workers who are eligible for ID cards and hand them over to the organizing section in order to pass them along to the sections that will issue the cards.

C. Those cadres, government employees, and workers who wish to carry official ID cards should contact the Vientiane Capital Police Headquarters (Population Control Section) during the official hours.

D. The places where ID cards will be issued and the order in which the work sections will receive them will be announced later.

E. Cadres, government employees, and workers who work far away or who have just started their work must have a paper filled in to confirm this from the cadres in the organizing and training section they are under along with their transfer papers certified and approved by the government to show to the section that issues ID cards so it can issue their cards.

III. Rules for issuing ID cards

A. ID cards for individual work sections and units must be eliminated. However, if it is considered necessary to have one, an official paper must certify directly only those units and work sections.

B. Cadres, government employees, and workers who have already gotten ID cards, or if they have not yet been issued ID cards and they have finished their duty in a work unit or work section or have moved somewhere else, must bring their card or papers to the card-issuing section before leaving.

C. Issuing of ID cards to cadres, government employees, and workers will start the day the lists of names in each work section, district, company, and factory are reported.

D. The documents for issuing ID cards can be obtained from the Vientiane Capital Police Headquarters (the section that issues cards directly).

On receiving this announcement all should quickly study and collect lists of names of personnel eligible for ID cards for the levels mentioned above and hand them over immediately to the section that issues ID cards. Vientiane, 19 April 1984, Vientiane Capital Administrative Committee, Chairman Khambou Sounisai.

9884

CSO: 4206/126

BRIEFS

VIENTIANE CAPITAL MILITARY ACTIVITY--In the first 3 months of 1984 the LPA cadres, combatants, and regional forces in Saithani District under the military command of Vientiane Capital emulated each other to score the following effective achievements: 1) they held military training for a group of 30 secondary and senior high school students for 5 days in order to qualify them as school teachers; 2) they trained 2 groups of guerrillas districtwide; 3) they inspected and organized 2 groups of guerrillas; 4) they successfully organized praise for guerrillas throughout the district; 5) they guided and taught 3 groups of guerrillas dealing with inspection work; 6) they carried out 6 inspections in villages and cantons with 900 [laborers]; 7) they organized and protected 100 meetings with 1,000 [laborers]; 8) they organized and led guerrilla units 25 times to maintain security with 360 [laborers]; and 9) they held a course on the fifth plenum of the Party Central Committee and the Vientiane Capital Party Military Committee which lasted 5 days and had 20 attendees. The cadres and combatants of this district were able to maintain political and civil security in their own localities and to make the people feel comfortable about taking part in agricultural production and other work according to the policy of the party and government. [Text] [Vientiane VIENTIANE MAI in Lao 28 Apr 84 pp 1, 4] 9884

SECOND QUARTER RICE PURCHASES--On the afternoon of 5 May 1984, Mr Thongpet Soulivong of the party and administrative committees and chief of the Vientiane Provincial Trade Section told VIENTIANE MAI reporters about the outcome of rice purchases and exchanges in the 2nd quarter throughout Vientiane Province. After the meeting from 30 April to 2 May 1984 for observing and assessing prices as well as the strong and weak points of rice purchases and exchanges in the 2nd quarter within Vientiane Province, we can conclude that throughout Vientiane a total of over 10,300 tons was purchased and exchanged with the people. Mr Thongpet Soulivong added that in carrying out the actual plan during this period many districts admirably exceeded the figures for the plan, e.g., Keo-Oudom, Feung, Vang Vieng, Kasi, Saisomboun, and Thoulakhom, where all were able to struggle to exceed the expected figures for rice purchases and exchange and for agricultural taxes set by the province. [Excerpt] [Vientiane VIENTIANE MAI in Lao 7 May 84 pp 1, 4] 9884

VIENTIANE POPULATION, CHURCH STATISTICS--[Question] 1. How large is the population of Vientiane Capital now? 2. What is its total area? 3. How many temples and hospitals and schools are there? [Answer] 1. Vientiane Capital

now has seven districts, three districts outside the provincial municipality and four inside it. There are over 315,000 people in the 7 districts. In the 4 districts inside the provincial municipality there are over 130,000 people. There are 403 villages and 51,798 people. Of the 315,000 people over 12,000 are aliens (these are all the latest statistics). 2. Vientiane Capital has 3,267 square km or 96.5 persons per square km on the average. For the 4 districts inside the provincial municipality there are 93.4 square km (with 1392 persons per square kilometer). 3. There are 874 temples throughout Vientiane Capital and 16 [Catholic churches]. There are 2,300 monks. Vientiane Capital now has 7 senior high schools, 52 high schools, 325 elementary schools, and 5 movie theaters. These are the latest figures based on documents for Vientiane Capital. [Excerpts] [Vientiane VIENTIANE MAI in Lao 8 May 84 p 2] 9884

VIENTIANE MILITARY RECRUITMENT--In the first 3 months of 1984 over 100 youth in Sanakham, Vang Vieng, Kasi, Saisomboun, and Hom Districts, Vientiane Province, were awakened to happily serve the country. These youth have now been placed in the ranks of air defense units and the Public Security Service and are determinedly training themselves to become revolutionary combatants. [Text] [Vientiane VIENTIANE MAI in Lao 9 May 84 p 1] 9884

VIENTIANE RICE PURCHASE, PLAN--By clearly seeing their duty to take part materially and mentally in national and local development and to make it prosperous, in the 1st quarter of 1984 the agricultural co-op members and farmers of ethnic groups in Vang Vieng, Kasi and Thoulakhom Districts, Vientiane Province, actively sold their rice and exchanged their goods with the government extensively. They exceeded the expected figures. There were 3,304 tons of paddy rice which was 404 tons over the annual rice purchase and exchange plan. Of these, in Kasi District alone there was 1,104 tons, 4 tons over the plan. There was 1,600 tons in Vang Vieng District and Feung Subdistrict, 400 tons over the plan. Thoulakhom District had 600 tons. Therefore, the rice purchase and exchange total in 9 districts in Vientiane Province is already 6,756 tons. Now, the people and farmers of ethnic groups all over Vientiane Province are continuing selling rice to the government and are also getting ready for this coming wet-rice cultivation. [Text] [Vientiane PASASON in Lao 9 May 84 p 1] 9884

ADP-FINANCED SAWMILL--On the occasion of the annual International Labor Day celebration on 1 May 1984 the Ministry of Industry, Handicrafts and Forestry held an opening ceremony for a modern sawmill which was honored to be named the "1 May Sawmill." Mr Maisouk Saisompheng, Party Central Committee member and head of this ministry, also participated in the ceremony. According to the factory board of directors, the construction of this modern sawmill started in early May 1983 and was finished in early 1984 using a loan from the Asian Development Bank and capital from within the country. The machinery that was installed was modern with an automated control system. There are [two table milling machines with verticle belts, two table cutting machines with vertical belts, one table cutting machine with a movable circular blade, and one table cutting machine with a small belt]. Production capacity is 14,000 cubic meters per year. In this factory there are now 54 workers including 17 technicians. The board of directors also told us that from now on the sawmill will operate on a normal basis and in two shifts both night and day. They will also increase the number of workers and the products will be doubled. This is to implement the fifth plenum and the third session of the party to become reality. [Text] [Vientiane PASASON in Lao 4 May 84 pp 1, 3] 9884

LOUANG NAMTHA CONSTRUCTION, SECURITY--The bridge and road construction section of the Louang Namtha Provincial Transportation and Post section guided by technical cadres from the Ministry of Transportation and Post has been carrying out the high bridge construction project on the Louang Namtha-Bo Keo route. The project started on 29 March 1984 with 30 people from the bridge and road construction section as the primary forces. Meanwhile, the provincial administrative committee has expressed its views and helped in many ways, and has mobilized youth around the province to repair 44 km of the road from Nam Tha to the construction site with glorious success. Furthermore, this high bridge construction project has also been supported by different sections within the province. The people near the construction site have supplied a number of necessary construction materials for the bridge and also maintain security in the construction area very well. Thus, the bridge construction project has been carried out on a normal basis. The workers have transported 30 tons of steel for the bridge from Luang Prabang, dug 200 cubic meters of bridge supports, built 350 cubic meters of bridge posts, filled the bridge head with 2,000 cubic meters of dirt, and bulldozed 9,000 cubic meters for a road 44 m long leading to the bridge. By the end of April 1984 60 percent of this project had been completed, and it is expected to be opened to the public soon. [Excerpt] [Vientiane PASASON in Lao 4 May 84 p 3] 9884

ROUTE 9 CONSTRUCTION PROGRESS--In the 1st quarter of 1984 the Route 9 construction cadres and workers under Irrigation Construction Company 1 in Savannakhet Province actively put all their creativity into their specialized task. During this period they were able to clear 300,000 square meters of new road, pave the road surface with over 10,167 cubic meters of red dirt, transport over 33,460 cubic meters of dirt for road paving, and shovel 2,290 cubic meters of dirt to fill the road surface. They have completed over 2 km of standard road. [Excerpt] [Vientiane PASASON in Lao 5 May 84 p 1] 9884

COFFEE PURCHASE--In the 1st quarter of 1984 the trade cadres of Champassak and Saravane Provinces attentively purchased products from the people, especially coffee beans totalling over 700 tons in which approximately 500 tons was from Champassak Province. The purchase of coffee beans in Saravane Province was done in two districts, La Mam and Lao Ngam. Last year they were able to purchase over 800 tons of coffee beans from the people. In Champassak Province alone they were able to purchase coffee beans on the plateau in Paksong District and in some localities in the Baching Chaleunsouk District area. Last year the provincial trade section was able to purchase over 2,000 tons of coffee beans from the people in this locality. As the 2nd quarter of the year came along the trade cadres of these two provinces still continued purchasing coffee beans from the people and producers in different localities. In Saravane especially, there are 11 collective stores and 12 state stores that purchased coffee beans from the people with cash and that exchanged necessary goods for produce. [Text] [Vientiane PASASON in Lao 30 Apr 84 pp 1, 2] 9884

DEVELOPMENT LOTTERY INCOME--On 24 April the Lottery Development Committee of the Ministry of Finance started to distribute the first set of the State development lottery in Oudomsai Province. The distribution of this lottery has now expanded its branches to 11 provinces: Vientiane Capital, Vientiane Province, Khammouan, Savannakhet, Champassak, Attapeu, Saravane, Sayaboury,

Luang Prabang, Xieng Khouang, and Oudomsai. The committee has organized the drawing of the development lottery twice a month except for the special case where it will be three times a month. For the 1 May drawing the lottery drawing committee will organize the development lottery in Champassak Province. The government started to distribute the development lottery in 1983. After the distribution in the past year, the cadres, combatants, government employees, workers and the people of all classes have attentively taken part and extensively supported the purchase of the state development lottery. This is shown by the over 35 million kip for the actual revenues. In the 1st quarter of 1984 alone they were able to earn over 10 million kip from the development lottery distribution, or 50 percent of the cost of printing the lottery distribution in 1984. [Text] [Vientiane PASASON in Lao 28 Apr 84 pp 1, 3] 9884

SAVANNAKHET DISTRICT POPULATION, CONDITIONS--Samouai is a district in a mountainous area approximately 320 km east of Savannakhet Province. Samouai District has a total of 1,848 square km and there are seven cantons in all: Meo, A-Touk, A-vao, A-Sing, A-Sak, A-Cha, and Samouai. There are 52 villages, 1,188 families, and 6,368 people consisting of 3 ethnic groups: Pako, Kado, and Kamai. The Samouai District people with the red blood of the Lao people have also been a strong base for the revolution. Prior to 1981, throughout Samouai District there were only three hectares of ricefields that used 90 kg of seedlings. Other than this, they engaged only in highland cultivation and in growing a number of starchy crops. However, even though Samouai District is a mountainous area, the people are now awakened and many of them have decided to stop engaging in slash-and-burn cultivation and to come down to engage in rice, paddy growing. Throughout the district there are now 51 hectares and they use a total of 1,534 kg of seedlings. As for education, there is an ordinary school for 2 cantons that has nearly 100 students. There is one school for district youth of ethnic groups which has 48 students. There is also one supplementary school for district cadres, and there are 3 classes with 47 cadres. Last year they were able to wipe out illiteracy in a total of 375 district, canton and village cadres. [Excerpts] [Vientiane PASASON in Lao 28 April 84 p 2] 9884

KHAMMOUAN WOOD PRODUCTION (KPL)--Last year the workers in the tree felling and wood processing section under the Agriculture, Irrigation and Agricultural Co-op in Khammouan Province struggled to carry out the plan fairly effectively. They felled a total of 2,904 cubic meters of trees and produced 2,041 cubic meters of lumber. They also disseminated documents on forestry to the people of ethnic groups in each locality throughout the province in order to stimulate their awareness to protect the forest. In 1983, the area that was slashed and cultivated by the people of ethnic groups was reduced from that of the years past by almost half. Very valuable tree growing to replace the trees cut down has been expanded in many localities. The forestry section alone planted 3,200 trees on 2 hectares. [Text] [Vientiane KHAOSAN PATHET LAO in Lao 28 April 84 p A4] 9884

POW, LPA COMBAT ACHIEVEMENT--Captions. 1. A pilot of a marauding U.S. F-105 aircraft shot down in Viengsai, Sam Neua Province. 2. Many Thai mercenaries

have been captured as prisoners of war. From 1955 to 1975 (the war resistance to the U.S. invaders) [we] wiped out 231,258 on the battlefield. Of these 138,082 were killed, 39,943 were wounded, and 48,874 surrendered and were captured; 4,359 [attacked] the people. Of those who were wiped out from the battle, there were 368 Americans and their henchmen, 15,861 Saigon puppets, and 11,119 Thai soldiers. We destroyed and seized 77,359 of all kinds of guns, and shot down and destroyed 2,519 aircraft. [Excerpts] [Vientiane VANNASIN in Lao Feb 84 pp 10, 11] 9884

CSO: 4206/27

INCORPORATION OF ISLAMIC VALUES IN COOPERATIVES ADVOCATED

Kuala Lumpur UTUSAN MALAYSIA in Malay 4 May 84 p 8

[Editorial: "Islamic Values To Be Incorporated in Cooperatives"]

[Text] If anyone has been paying close attention, attempts are being made to incorporate Islamic values in the government and in the lives of the Malaysian people, step by step, even though the public may not be so sure that it is being carried out.

Like faith, the strength of which may be measured by good deeds performed, attempts to incorporate Islamic values into people's lives might also be demonstrated by the projects underway to introduce Islamic values into society and the country.

In the economic field, the Islamic Bank has proved to be astoundingly successful in developing Muslim economic activities by extending loans based on the Islamic system of 100 percent [repayment at no interest].

Even earlier, the Tabung Haji [pilgrimage savings association] did the same thing for Muslims who are obligated to make a pilgrimage to Mecca once during their lifetimes.

Not long ago mention was made of attempts to form an Islamic insurance institution to replace the present system which carries interest.

However, economic activities which can most easily be adapted to the Islamic economic system but which are mentioned rarely are cooperatives or cooperative associations which are operating in all nations at present.

The cooperatives movement being promoted by the government is aimed at providing financial gain or profit to more people although this may not amount to a great deal of money.

However, because the system in effect now involves interest payments, a small change in the cooperatives ordinance must be made to adapt it to Islamic values.

So, the statement made by Haji Tajul Rusli, parliamentary secretary for the National and Rural Development Ministry, regarding changing the cooperatives ordinance "to permit Islamic-type cooperative organizations to operate in this country" is heartily welcomed.

If the present Islamic Bank system is able to eliminate interest payments from its dealings, there is no reason why the same thing cannot be done in cooperative activities.

Cooperatives are a form of mutual aid business activities aimed at providing the same return to more people compared with the free trade practice which usually offers a big return to one person only.

This concept is in accord with Allah's decree to: "Give and receive aid for the favor of and service to Allah and do not give and receive aid for sinful and hostile purposes...."

Receiving and giving aid without charging interest in business affairs is greatly encouraged by Islam.

6804

CSO: 4213/221

DISSENSION IN MCA DECRIED

Editorial Urges New Election

Kuala Lumpur UTUSAN MALAYSIA in Malay 30 Apr 84 p 8

[Text] The actions of the two opposing groups in MCA [Malaysian Chinese Association] that caused the police to cancel the rallies planned to be held last night in two separate places near Kuala Lumpur will definitely hurt their respective memberships. However, we feel the step taken by the police was a wise one because, with the tension existing between these groups, gigantic rallies of this sort will not resolve the ongoing dispute in the MCA.

It is better to cancel the rallies rather than have something untoward happen. This is what the national police chief has done, and all parties involved, even though some people are annoyed or angry, apparently agreed to the police request. They proved to be loyal citizens who obeyed the country's laws.

They clearly placed the general peace above their personal interests. It may be that some feel the measure taken by the police conflicts with democracy. We do not agree with this view. Rather what the state police chief did was aimed at safeguarding this country's democracy so that conflictin parties do not use it to destroy each other.

We believe that MCA members should not be greatly disturbed by the cancellation of their rallies. If they had been held, nothing would have been resolved. It would only have complicated matters. True, Datuk Neo Yee Pan, MCA president, and Encik Tan Koon Swan, the former vice president who was dismissed from his post, could give their great supporters a pat on the back. But for what? To break up the MCA? For our part, it is unpleasant to see the MCA, an organization that helped to create history by struggling with the United Malay National Organization to achieve independence, faced with ruin in a situation like this or one created by "false members."

What is apparent is that an organization like the MCA cannot have two chairmen. Now, with the cancellation of the extraordinary congress planned by Koon Swan, there is a good lull in which the leaders could settle their differences. As we explained earlier, an election should be held to turn the decision over to the members in accord with democratic action in the party.

It would be best if the present leadership resigned. A temporary committee for administrative matters, independent of either the Datuk Neo or Koon Swan group, should be entrusted with guiding the party until the membership decides on its leaders. Those involved should accept their decision.

Editorial Urges Self-Examination

Kuala Lumpur BERITA HARIAN in Malay 30 Apr 84 p 10

[Text] The police measure taken, directing the opposing groups in MCA to cancel their rallies planned to be held last night near Kuala Lumpur, reflects the increasingly widespread fear that the dragged-out conflict in that party will erupt into a situation that could threaten the country's security. The police would not have taken this action if they did not have sufficient information and reasons for thinking that something untoward might happen because of the rallies. Encik Tan Koon Swan and his supporters proposed the holding of an extraordinary congress at the Hilton Hotel while Datuk Dr Neo Yee Pan and his group were to hold a rally at MCA House.

Although some people inappropriately charged that the police action smelled of politics, the police should not be disheartened. We should like to remind those who made these accusations about the unfortunate affairs that were sparked by highly emotional altercations. No one, including the MCA leadership which has continually been implicated in seizures of power, can now deny that this affair has turned into an intensely emotional crisis for the Chinese people. The statements made daily in the newspapers by the two sides are charged with emotion. What has been said beyond the pages of the newspapers is even more heavily charged with emotion.

In such a situation, the police who are responsible for approving the holding of meetings and safeguarding public security were concerned that these meetings, held simultaneously, would erupt into a situation that would be difficult to control. The decision of the parties involved to hold meetings on the same day was sufficient reason to feel that the emotions of the party members were to be used by their leaders to strengthen their respective positions.

It would be better if the opposing sides, particularly those who complain about their leaders, took a look at themselves and studied the measures they were taking before accusing others. If those in conflict in MCA had not allowed the problem to drag on and become increasingly complex, the police definitely would not have thwarted their desires to hold the rallies. But they permitted the problem to degenerate so that confidence in their capability to control the situation waned.

The MCA is not an immature political party that needs to be given guidance on political organization and activities. MCA is one of the three original political parties that became the core of the country's government for 26 years. The MCA also is familiar enough with the special characteristics of Malaysian politics and limitations which must be respected. The MCA like the United Malay National Organization and the Malaysian Indian Congress has witnessed many terrible affairs that erupted because of the failure to be aware

of and to respect the limits to freedom which exist in a country with countless religious beliefs and nationalities. So, we would like to ask: If the MCA fails to set a good example, who can?

As a primary political party that supports the National Front, the MCA has a heavy task. The behavior of the divided leadership that created a problem resulting in the cancellation of their rallies by the police is regrettable. The laws are created for a purpose and must be respected by everyone. Moreover, the MCA itself was involved in drafting those laws because it was represented in Parliament. It is unwise and dangerous for the MCA leadership to make a problem out of a step that was taken and which was based on the laws because this may wear away the confidence and the belief on the part of the masses in the country's laws.

It is very unwise for the MCA leadership to drag anyone else, particularly those on the side of the laws and security, into their crisis. The MCA leadership does not need to be reminded about its responsibility to the country. Other political parties experienced crises from time to time, but these crises did not erupt into threats to security, except for the Pas crisis in Kelantan in 1978. The MCA leadership must look at itself first before placing a burden on others with its various accusations. The crisis broadens every day that the MCA leadership continues its wrangles.

Editorial Cautions Leaders

Kuala Lumpur UTUSAN MALAYSIA in Malay 2 May 84 p 8

[Text] The police did not approve of the holding of two MCA rallies--one, an extraordinary congress proposed by former vice president Encik Tan Koon Swan, and another, a rally demonstrating power, by President Datuk Dr Neo Yee Pan on Sunday [29 April].

Even though the two meetings were not held, more than 1,500 persons representing the MCA met in a hotel in the capital for breakfast and agreed on a decision to dismiss the president from all offices he held.

These representatives consisted of individuals who would have attended the extraordinary congress. Therefore, since the police did not give their approval to hold an extraordinary congress, they held another meeting instead.

This meeting apparently was held without obtaining approval of the police, and it was held instead of the extraordinary congress which had not been approved.

Herein rises a problem, what is the nature of a leadership that holds another meeting? They apparently had invited more than 1,500 representatives to denigrate the law and indirectly set aside the police directive.

A good leadership is a leadership that guides its members toward obeying the regulations and facing any tribulations put before them bravely and calmly. The way the breakfast meeting was held apparently will only heighten tensions existing in the MCA.

In the present atmosphere, the leaders must display their authority by guarding against fermenting strife. The expanding crisis in this party appears to be a test of the topmost leadership.

If the leaders cannot control themselves and must invite their followers to join them in a demonstration of wrath, not much can be done to help settle the party's problem. Rather, it will exacerbate the problem.

It now is becoming increasingly clear to the public that the political crisis in MCA is nothing more than an attempt to seize power. The issues of the false members and so on which were promoted are only a coverup for the real motives.

The most depressed and increasingly bewildered members of society are those of Chinese descent; moreover, they are the ones who so loyally offered their support to the MCA.

What is important now is that the leaders, both those within and those outside the MCA, be aware of their mistakes and stop any activities that would cause the disorderly situation in that party to spread outside the party.

6804

CSO: 4213/221

NEO YEE PAN ANNOUNCES FOUNDING OF MCA EDUCATION FUND

Purpose of Fund

Selangor SIN CHEW JIT POH MALAYSIA in Chinese 14 Apr 84 p 1

[Article]

[Text] Datuk Dr Neo Yee Pan, acting president of the Malaysian Chinese Association [MCA], announced that the MCA education fund, one of the party's 10 Major Plans, has been formally approved and founded.

The main purpose of this fund, he said, is to renovate and build Chinese schools and to provide educational scholarships.

He pointed out that the principal beneficiaries of the fund will be Chinese schools, particularly those located in the rural areas.

Datuk Neo disclosed that the MCA headquarters have acquired preliminary pledges for the education fund totaling M\$3.25 million.

He gave out this information at the MCA mansion in the presence of Datuk Mak Hon Kam, the party's acting deputy president; Tan Sri Chong Hon Nyan, secretary general; Wong Kuan Lee, Tong Kok Mau, Yeoh Poh San, Lim Kean Siew, See Tun Ho and Wong Chan Shin, all Central Committee members.

SIN CHEW Comment

Selangor SIN CHEW JIT POH MALAYSIA in Chinese 16 Apr 84 p 2

[Editorial]

[Text] MCA Acting President Datuk Dr Neo Yee Pan announced on 13 April that one of the MCA's 10 Major Plans, the education fund, has been officially inaugurated.

Datuk Neo indicated that this fund will be used to refurbish and rebuild Chinese schools throughout the country, particularly Chinese primary schools, and also to provide scholarships to deserving and needy Malaysian students.

The announcement of the founding of the MCA education fund, at a time when Chinese primary schools are generally facing the problem of renovation, is heartening and exciting happy tidings indeed.

A considerable number of Chinese primary school buildings is of prewar construction, while others built after the war are many years old.

In recent years, these Chinese schools, especially those located in the countryside, are in a dilapidated condition. Some of them are hazardous and nearly crumbling down, and they need renovation urgently.

Of course, the huge expenses required for this renovation and expansion work cannot be entirely defrayed by the MCA education fund.

In reality, our public-model Chinese primary and middle schools receive government subsidies. Fundamentally speaking, the expansion and renovation of these schools should also be the responsibility of the government. If Chinese organizations and the Chinese community as a whole can render the necessary aid to the best of their ability, this would be a good deed worth encouraging.

Inasmuch as Chinese schools receive but a proportionately small educational subsidy from the government, it stands to reason that the MCA, as a senior member of the National Front coalition, should make greater efforts to obtain a reasonable government appropriation to aid the construction and development of Chinese primary schools.

The decision of the MCA to utilize a portion of its education fund to supplement the government's aid to Chinese primary-school development is a move that gives no cause for much criticism. What is more important is that the MCA's top leadership should consider the plight of independent Chinese middle schools which urgently need a development fund but which receive no government subsidy.

According to our understanding, many Chinese middle schools have conducted courses which fairly coincide with the practical needs of our society, including Malaysian language and literature, computer science and business management and technology. These courses will have a positive impact on the future development of independent Chinese middle schools. This revised curriculum deserves the support of Chinese organizations.

Originally, education and culture have been pristine problems in human society, but unfortunately they have often been twisted into a political issue.

Although professing to represent Chinese nationals, the MCA has, since its founding 35 years ago, often differed with or even run counter to the interests of the Chinese community, because the party has been bound by political restrictions.

The problem of Chinese education is a typical case in point. Many issues are still in a "fire and water" condition and have not been brought into line or resolved, such as the twin memos concerning the education problem submitted to the government by the three major institutions, the problem of independent

Chinese middle schools, the controversy over Rahman College and the founding of Merdeka University.

In all fairness, in striving for the support of the Chinese community, the MCA has experienced many twists and turns. It is hoped that the founding of the MCA education fund represents the party's real effort to tear down the barrier that has been separating it from the Chinese community for a long, long time, not merely an expedient measure. The MCA should fight for the survival and development of Chinese schools, the happiness of the Chinese nationals and the prosperity of our country.

KIN KWOK Comment

Selangor KIN KWOK DAILY NEWS in Chinese 16 Apr 84 p 2

[Commentary]

[Text] One of the MCA's 10 Major Plans, the MCA education fund, was officially approved by the government.

The main purpose of the fund is to refurbish and rebuild Chinese schools. At the same time, a part of the money will be earmarked for scholarships. Naturally, the beneficiaries of this education fund will be middle and primary students of Chinese schools, especially those who live in the villages. Of course, other nationals will also benefit from this fund to a certain degree.

Perhaps the public thinks that Chinese primary schools are already fully subsidized by the government and therefore do not need public donations for their development. As taxpayers, they reason that they should not be asked to help the development of Chinese schools because this should be the responsibility of the government.

However, as ethnic Chinese citizens, we are fully aware that, based on official statistics, the full subsidy received by Chinese primary schools is negligible and minuscule in comparison with subsidies received by other schools with different origins and courses. It appears that Chinese primary schools are still in the stage of bare survival. Their classroom facilities and the renovation of their buildings are neglected by the authorities, and therefore conditions for study leave much to be desired. If we do not rely on ourselves to make up for government inadequacy, the study environment will worsen as time passes. This is not what we want to see.

We admit that the authorities concerned have gone to all lengths to try to improve all kinds of facilities of Chinese primary schools. However, alas! the difficulties have not been resolved, an indication that ethnic Chinese interests have been neglected and ignored.

Indeed, the authorities have the obligation to develop Chinese primary schools. But, under the prevailing circumstances, Chinese primary schools definitely cannot receive the nutrients necessary for their sound and reasonable

development. Therefore, only by the strength of our own society can the schools be capable of outstanding achievements.

It is for the sake of Chinese primary schools' survival and of a good learning environment for the students that the MCA has advocated an education fund.

At present, this education fund has won the nod from Prime Minister Dr Mahathir, and the authorities concerned will surely carry out vigorously the fund-canvassing work to realize this plan which will bring benefits to Chinese school students.

According to this disclosure, this education fund has accumulated donation pledges amounting to M\$3.25 million. However, the target is reportedly set at M\$20 million--the more the better, of course. Therefore, we are still a long way off, and we want to appeal to the public to help accomplish this act.

We believe that this is an educational problem deserving of our serious thought for the sake of the future of all ethnic Chinese students. Therefore, the promotion of an education fund, no matter by which organization, is worthy of support. Consequently, we feel that the public, representing all walks of life, especially the monied gentry, should give donations generously, so that the target can be reached at an early date for the benefit of all students.

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CSO: 4205/62

COMMENTARY CRITICIZES DEPUTY MINISTER OF EDUCATION TAN TIONG HONG

Selangor SIN CHEW JIT POH MALAYSIA in Chinese 22 Apr 84 p 2

[Commentary: "Cassocks and Monks"]

[Text] The other day, speaking at an evening party held to celebrate the 32d founding anniversary and the completion of the auditorium of a national-model Chinese primary school in northern Kuala Lumpur, Deputy Education Minister Tan Tiong Hong made an appeal as follows: "For the sake of our coming generations, our Chinese compatriots must cement their cooperation with one another and keep the education torch burning, so that its radiance keeps shining upon our children forever." He also pointed out: "Most of the Chinese primary school buildings in our country were constructed out of donations by generous supporters of Chinese-language education. Every brick and every tile on these buildings were the crystallization of Chinese blood and sweat. Our supporters donated money and effort and sacrificed their egos to realize the aspirations of Chinese children. Their spirit is worthy of admiration."

No doubt the above appeal is rich in encouragement, especially because it is uttered by the deputy minister of education, who represents the government. Not only did it evoke excitement, but it also struck a sympathetic note. After feeling gratified, however, we cannot help asking: Was he speaking for the government? If his appeal represented the official view, we can say that the government now understands the pains and the zeal of the Chinese community toward Chinese-language education and recognizes the Chinese contributions to our national education. If this were the case, we would dare say that the Chinese public will go through fire and water to continue to donate money and effort for our education and our national reconstruction, just as President Kennedy once remarked: "Ask not what your country can do for you; ask what you can do for your country."

Assuming that Dr Tan Tiong Hong's appeal represented his personal sincerity, and not the government's standpoint or his own party's view, we still should congratulate him, for at least he can appreciate the aspirations of Chinese nationals and cherish basic human rights. If the deputy education minister can move one step forward and cautiously, appropriately, righteously or effectively make the government listen to the inner voices of the Chinese people, then the achievement of Deputy Minister Tan may be likened to "adding flowers to the brocade."

Looking back at the facts, however, we fail to see any sign that can make us rejoice. Leaving aside for the time being the much-dreaded Article 21 (2) of the 1961 Education Act, and judging by recent government measures, we cannot gain any confidence in the words of the deputy education minister. For instance, what steps has the deputy minister taken to solve the current shortage of Chinese primary school teachers? Is the training course for temporary teachers during the vacation period going to be resumed? Why has it been delayed and delayed again? Why is it that the salaries of provisional teachers have not been paid for months on end? Why is it that the number of Chinese primary schools cannot be expanded in direct proportion to the increase in Chinese population? Even in areas where many Chinese inhabitants congregate, why is it difficult to open new schools? We await with bated breath Deputy Education Minister Tan's answers to these questions. Indeed, Chinese community members are willing to cooperate in keeping the education torch burning, but we hope that this aspiration, if not encouraged, should at least not be obstructed by the authorities.

In addition, a cabinet minister representing the Malaysian Chinese Association [MCA] recently announced the establishment of an education fund. At first glance, this is a heartening concrete expression, but after carefully studying it, it is not difficult for us to see that this is a move that "concentrates on details but forgets the main objective." As a member of the ruling National Front coalition, the MCA should concentrate its efforts on obtaining reasonable and legitimate appropriations for Chinese schools from the government treasury, not on canvassing donations from the public, especially because similar foundations already exist among the people, and with good results, too. For example, the Federation of Associations of School Teachers and Trustees has established working committees in Chinese middle and primary schools. It also gives loans to deserving and needy students. It has set up a development fund for independent Chinese middle schools. Now why should a political party separately canvass donations from the public at a time when the Independent Chinese Middle School Development Fund is also soliciting public donations? If those ministers are interested, we would hope that they learn from Dr Goh Cheng Teik. Most recently Dr Goh has been on the road across the country, relentlessly aiding the Federation of Associations of School Teachers and Trustees in soliciting donations from members of the National Livestock Union. He is winning positive support from the people, and this is what we may call a concrete expression. If a deputy minister can collect donations totaling M\$600,000, we think that a full-fledged minister should be able to obtain M\$1 million. Consequently, it is not difficult to get more than M\$10 million in donations.

Up until now, many people tend to say one thing but do another thing. Sometimes it really makes people confused. In times of drought, an occasional breeze tends to fool people into believing that a heavy downpour of rain is forthcoming. But we want to tell one and all: Those who wear cassocks are not necessarily monks.

PROSPECTS FOR 'YOUNG TURKS' RETURNING TO RTA DISCUSSED

Col Manun On Reinstatement, Kampuchea

Bangkok ATHIT KHLET LAP in Thai 28 Apr-4 May 1984 pp 10-13

[Interview with Colonel Manun Rupkhachon: "We Are Ready to Die at the Border"; date and place not specified]

[Text] During the past 3 years, there have constantly been rumors of the Young Turks returning to government service. Now, the once faded hopes seem more bright since General Athit Kamlangek has given the green light. As for whether or not the Thai military will again have unity, colonel Manun Rupkhachon, the leader of the Young Turks, has provided an answer in this interview by KHLET LAP, the first and only interview that he has given.

[Question] What do you think about returning to government service?

[Answer] As for the possibility of this and what might happen, it all depends on the decisions of senior people, particularly General Prem Tinsulanon in his position as minister of defense. He is the person who will or will not sign [the order]. It depends on him. This depends on him.

[Question] Are the Young Turks ready to return to government service?

[Answer] We have talked about this for a long time. Some people have stopped thinking about this. But now, senior people want to do this. We don't have any problems.

[Question] If you return, what will you do?

[Answer] The details are not clear at this time. But we are professional soldiers. We are ready to carry out whatever tasks are assigned us. In particular, we are experts concerning the conflict that Thailand is experiencing along the border, and we are ready to tackle the problems. We Young Turks are ready to die at the border. In particular, Colonel

Prachak Sawangchit and Colonel Phanlop Pinmani are well suited for carrying on activities along the border. This would be the way to ensure that the people living along the border are affected as little as possible by these events.

[Question] Which police officers have not returned to government service?

[Answer] Police Colonel Pricha Prasoet, Police Lieutenant Colonel Phaisan Pinmani and Police Lieutenant Colonel Thawit Kanchanaphon have all been approached and scolded out.

[Question] What is behind your return to government service?

[Answer] There is nothing behind this. I know only what the newspapers know. That is, General Athit Kamlangek wants all factions to unite.

[Question] What is your view on the border problems?

[Answer] At present, there are problems all along Thailand's borders, including our borders in the east and northeast, along the Mekong River and in the west. Take the border with Burma, for example. Thailand and Burma have not had trouble with each other for a long time. Rather, the problem concerns the Karens who live along the Thai border. They are fighting the Burmese government and have fled into Thailand. When Burma pursues them, we have to defend our land. There has been a reaction against the Burmese, with people feeling that we cannot let Burma enter our territory. And so problems have arisen.

[Question] This is similar to the tense situation now existing between Thailand and Vietnam.

[Answer] Concerning the fact that we have had to get involved in the fighting, this has had a great effect on Thailand's image. The reports that have been publicized throughout the world are very worrisome. This can greatly affect Thailand's economic and social situation. At present, all businesses--large, medium-sized and small--are going through a recession. Even though the border problems are not fundamental problems, they do have an effect on things.

[Question] What about the effect on foreign investments?

[Answer] At present, General Prem and his entourage are touring Europe and Canada in an attempt to persuade them to invest in Thailand. But when they hear the news about what is happening along the borders--reports that have been well publicized by the government--investors will certainly hesitate. This is a great obstacle.

[Question] What is the best way out, or the best way to handle this situation?

[Answer] As for solving this problem, we cannot use just military methods. As for a way out, we must clearly state what our international political position is. Trying to solve the problems using weapons will just complicate things even more and lead to more and heavier fighting. Each side will suffer greater casualties, and the pressures will be greater. When things reach that stage, a national war may break out, which would not be at all good for the Thai people.

[Question] What should Thailand's international political attitude be?

[Answer] Concerning this, we have to determine who is behind the war and who is supporting Vietnam and the Khmer coalition. We have to analyze things carefully and hold firmly to what is in the country's best interests. Once we have analyzed things, we have to use international political means to solve the problems. That is, we have to make Thailand really free from all sides. We must be free from the influence of the great powers, regardless of which camp it is. We are not really neutral. Do you know why? The truth is that we supported the formation of the Khmer coalition. We support their unending fight against the Vietnamese.

[Question] If that is the case, this could lead to a confrontation between Thailand and Vietnam, and a national war could break out.

[Answer] Concerning a national war, Thailand would not be the one to start this war. But Vietnam might. We don't know what they have decided. We can only keep evaluating the situation. No one can predict what will happen in the future. But we have to be prepared. In particular, the people should be kept fully informed; nothing should be kept secret from them. Senior people should not deceive the people concerning what is really happening along the border. The people should be told the truth. Concealing the reality of the situation led to the loss of South Vietnam. We must rely on the support and cooperation of the people. If things get bad, the people will be a force that will help save the country. Senior people should admit the truth. The actual situation may alarm some people, and they may flee in order to save themselves. But the great majority of the people will stay. They are patriotic. If anything happens, they are ready to fight.

In order to keep things from getting out of control, we must stipulate a new international political attitude. That is, we must be independent and free. We must be prepared to talk to all sides, including those in the socialist camp. We have to realize that the countries around us are all socialist countries and that "having friends nearby is better than having relatives who are far away." We do not have any dealings with our neighbors, instead we have made enemies. This is very dangerous to our security.

[Question] Since you used to be the commander of an armored unit, what is your view on the M-48 tanks that the United States wants us to buy?

[Answer] Yes, I was in a tank unit and was involved with armored units for a long time. The good feature of the M-48 is that it has a 500mm gun. But as for other aspects, particularly its weight, it is too heavy for the terrain in Thailand. In the rainy season, it won't be able to move. And it is difficult to find parts for the M-48 tank since this is a tank of Second World War vintage. It is difficult to repair, parts are hard to find and it is expensive. The Thai army needs a powerful but light tank that is maneuverable, that has fighting power and that has armor like the PT-76 or the M-113 armored personnel carrier, which can operate in water and which weighs only 11 tons. [We need a tank] that can be modified, that is inexpensive and that can be operated in all seasons. Great attention should be given to selecting weapons and materials that are suited to the terrain here. The United States no longer uses the M-48 tank.

[Question] What is the greatest need of the Thai military?

[Answer] People must be built up. The deciding factor in a battle is people. People must have a fighting spirit and be ready to sacrifice their lives. The U.S. forces [in Vietnam] had modern weapons but were defeated by the psychological strength of the Vietnamese forces. In my opinion, the Thai military is placing too much emphasis on weapons. What the Thai military needs is: 1. Resolve in combat and psychological preparedness on the part of the troops; 2. group solidarity; 3. discipline; 4. capable fighters; 5. honest leaders and commanders who will not exploit others or try to make profits from their subordinates; and 6. unit organization and training.

I have stressed personnel. Above all, we should improve our personnel. We must train continually. We must ensure that each generation is prepared.

[Question] The military budget has increased every year. The same is true this year even though it is generally agreed that the threat from the Communist Party of Thailand has declined. What reason will the military give for requesting a larger budget?

[Answer] Normally, the budget will increase 10 percent over the previous year's budget because of inflation. As for any increase over that, the need for such an increase must be discussed. It must be determined whether increasing the budget will increase the efficiency of the military.

[Question] What is the domestic political situation like?

[Answer] Things are tense and uncertain. It isn't clear what will happen. How can domestic politics be stable since it isn't clear who has real power or who holds state power. The present government cannot govern the country in accord with the policies. There are centers to the front and back. Concerning efficiency in administering the country, there

has been no effect on the people in general. It's as if there were no policies. If we look at things, sometimes the targets have been hit and some good changes have been made. General Prem Tinsulanon has announced the government's policies. I would like to ask him whether these policies have achieved what they were supposed to achieve. Concerning rural area development in particular, has the Prem government taken any resolute action to improve the lives of the people living in the rural area? Are cabinet reshuffles and the border situation related? Many people have said that the reason why things are so quiet on the domestic political front is that the border situation must be resolved first.

As for politics and the military, such talk shows who leads who. In my view, the two should not be related since the military has firmly stated that it can control the situation. The military is responsible for defending the border and should not have anything to do with domestic politics. If the government has any problems concerning the efficiency of the cabinet and is ready to make changes in order to increase efficiency in governing the country, it should go ahead and make the changes. But concerning Thai politics, can politics and the military really be separated?

Vice Chief of Staff Gives Views

Bangkok MATUPHUM in Thai 30 Apr 84 pp 1, 16

[Article: "Mana Replies to Athit, Says That There Are No Positions For Young Turks"]

[Text] Mana says that whether the Young Turnks have the right to return to government service depends on the "receiving units" and not on General Athit alone. Athit will forgive them.

Lieutenant General Mana Rattanakoset, the deputy chief of staff of the army for civil affairs talked with MATUPHUM about the return to government service of the "Young Turk" soldiers. He said that this is still possible if they request to return in accord with the regulations. General Athit Kamlangek, the supreme commander, is not one to bear a grudge against anyone. The only thing is that their return to government service is not up to General Athit alone. It also depends on whether the "receiving unit" has any objections.

Lieutenant General Mana said that to date, none of the receiving units, or units to which these men were subordinate, have informed the supreme commander about vacant positions. Because when these officers left government service, other people were moved in and their subordinates were promoted to replace them. Thus, it depends on what these units propose to superior officers. "We don't harbor any ill feelings or want to punish anyone. If someone is a good person with capabilities, who wouldn't want him?" said Lieutenant General Mana.

An army news source told MATUPHUM that there is little chance that the Young Turks will return to government service since the units to which they were subordinate have shown little interest in them. This is because they do not think that the Young Turks would be interested in serving in positions in which their superiors are people who were once their subordinates. And many high-ranking officers do not feel that they Young Turks should try to return since all of them are leading comfortable lives. And there is no reason for them to worry about their former duties, which have been taken over by others. Because the truth is that, even without the Young Turks, there are others who are quite capable of handling things.

Furthermore, in an interview concerning this matter, General Athit Kamlangek, the RTA CINC, said that "I don't know whether the Young Turks have filed petitions to return to government service or not."

Background Information

Bangkok LAK THAI in Thai 19 May 84 pp 13-16

[Article: "The Young Turk Phenomenon; Is It Up to Prem or Athit?"]

[Text] On 27 April, former General Prem Tinsulanon returned to Thailand from his trip to Canada, the United States and Europe. That was also the day that a group of men known as the "young officers of 1981" waited for Prem with great hopes. Because during the period that Prem was out of the country, besides the events concerning the Vietnamese, another interesting news story concerning the military was the request submitted by the "young officers of 1981" asking to return to government service. And these are the people who were responsible for the disorder of 1 April 1981. Concerning this matter, it is clear that action has been taken on this and that it is now up to General Prem Tinsulanon to make a decision in his capacity as the minister of defense. It is now up to him to decide whether to let them return or to "let them wait" as has been the case in past years. Concerning this matter, this is something that LAK THAI has published reports on from the very beginning to the point where the decision rests on just one person--with that person being the "uncle" [Prem] of the Young Turks of Class 7, Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy.

The Young turks waited patiently for the return of the person whom they refer to as "uncle" since they believed that in his interview with the press, he would definitely be asked about the matter that "is in the news." Thus, for them, waiting for the return of Prem was like "waiting for the day" to return to government service as regular soldiers.

Two days before his expected return, the "activists" in the Young Turk group held a meeting at a rather open location since this meeting was attended by people other than just "alumni" of 1 April. Four to five other officers also participated in the discussion on general problems. And they also discussed what the result of their request

to return to government service would be. Among those attending this meeting, it was felt that when Prem returned, his attitude on this matter would indicate how the matter would turn out. If, for example, the press asked him his views on the Young Turks returning to government service and he answered that he did not know the details, this would be tantamount to saying that the "time has not yet come." Because showing indifference or not giving a response is a very clear answer. Because all the Young Turks are well aware that this is Prem's way of saying "no." That is, he just remains silent since he does not like to issue a verbal denial. Instead, he says "no" by his facial expression or actions. It is said that "people like Prem" have never said "no" to anyone or uttered a denial. Rather, they just refuse to acknowledge the problems by remaining quiet.

But the return of General Prem was somewhat of a disappointment to the Young Turks since General Prem remained quiet and acted as if he had not heard the reporter's question on this matter. And the meaning of that was even deeper than a verbal response.

On the evening that General Prem returned from his trip and went to his Sisao home to rest, the Young Turks held another meeting in order to "determine what to do next" or "find another way [since] we have not yet reached a deadend."

But why did the Young Turks think that the way was still open when it was fairly clear that "uncle's" silence was a definite answer and since the minister of defense kept quiet as if the matter had been settled? Or has it?

On the morning of 1 May, a news source in high military circles told LAK THAI that the Young Turks were mistaken about General Prem's attitude when they viewed his attitude on the moment of his arrival home as a definite denial of their request. It is true that the matter of the Young Turks returning to government service was "in the news" during the time that General Prem was abroad. But he has known about this for a long time. And during the time that he was away, the situation concerning this matter changed very little since the person who can change the situation is General Prem. Thus, he did not respond to reporters' questions about this matter. And another thing is that General Prem may not have wanted to discuss minor matters. He may have wanted to concentrate on the more important matters of the border situation and the results of his visit to friendly countries. "He probably wanted to focus attention on his trip abroad. Because if he had discussed the Young Turks that day, other matters might not have been given any attention," said the news source.

This may have been a new story for the daily newspapers and other journals, but as far as LAK THAI is concerned, the matter of the Young Turks requesting permission to return to government service is a story that we have followed for a long time. It isn't necessary to refer to an old story that has already been reported. A more up-to-date report

on this matter is that several "green lights" have gone on, and it is thought that the "path is open." That is, General Athit Kamlangek, the supreme commander and RTA CINC, has given his approval and said that the time is ripe for their return. The first step, which has already been taken, is that the Young Turks wrote a request asking to return to government service and sent it to the RTA CINC through the assistant chief of staff for personnel (Lieutenant General Akkhaphon Somrup), the deputy chief of staff of the army (Lieutenant General Chawalit Yongchaiyut) and the chief of staff of the army (General Banchop Bunnak). This is because the matter must first pass through the staff, or administrative, section before being considered by the command section. The matter has already passed Lieutenant General Akkhaphon Somrup and is now in the hands of Lieutenant General Chawalit Yongchaiyut. As for the chief of staff of the army, that is the final "desk" before the matter goes to the RTA CINC, that is, General Athit Kamlangek.

In discussing this matter, the administrative sector has not lumped everyone together but discussed each person on a case-by-case basis, including their role in the events of 1 April. Thus, it is quite likely that if people are allowed to return to government service, only some will return since each person played a different role in those events. There are at least five people who will probably not be allowed to return at this time. This has led to the objection that if some are allowed to return, then all should be allowed to return since all were equally involved in those events, with the only difference being that some were of higher rank or had more command power than others. Some held staff positions and did not have any command power. But they still took part in the events. As for the matter of some people, such as Colonel Prachak Sawangchit and Colonel Somkhit Kitwiriya, not requesting to return to government service since they were activists and do not feel that they have any chance of being considered for reinstatement, which would be a loss of face, this is not the case. "We have all submitted requests; there are no exceptions. Even Colonel Prachak and Colonel "Po" have submitted requests," said one of the Young Turks.

From looking at the data and following the activities of the army administrative sector for personnel, LAK THAI has been told unofficially that the reason for considering the various roles of the people involved in those events is that this is felt to be the fairest way of handling the matter. And "senior people" hold to the policy of considering the "seriousness" of the individual's role since at present, there are not enough vacant positions to allow all 35 people to return to government service at the same time. Thus, things must be considered in stages so that no difficulties arise in assigning personnel.

"In their position as regimental commanders, Colonel Prachak and Colonel Manun mobilized their entire regiment. But Colonel Bunsak Phocharoen, who was attached to the AAA Regiment, came with just one other officer and his driver. Looked at in this way, things must go easier for Colonel Bunsak. Another example is Lieutenant Colonel Somphong Wisetsang, the

former commander of the Air Battalion, Army Air Corps Center. He had three helicopters from the Army Air Corps Center participate in the rebellion. Since there were two pilots and two mechanics per helicopter, a total of 12 men joined him. Thus, Lieutenant Colonel Somphong did not mobilize his forces either. But Lieutenant Colonel Bunyang Bucha, the former commander of the 2nd Battalion, 11th Infantry Regiment, mobilized his entire battalion. This was different from Lieutenant Colonel Somphong, who was a battalion commander, too."

These are the views of the Young Turks, who hold a different view than that held by those who are considering who should be allowed to return to military service first. The view of the Young Turks is that they were "all in it together" and that there is no difference between them.

As for what was behind General Athit Kamlangek, the RTA CINC and supreme commander, giving the "green light," some have said that he has given the green light because he wants to maintain unity within his command. He does not want any division along lines of this or that person or this or that [military] class. This is because past lessons have taught that helping or encouraging one class to gain greater prominence than other classes amounts to doing the same thing that was done in the past. And what is beyond belief is that Class 7 from Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy, which was referred to as the "beloved children" class, rebelled against General Prem Tinsulanon.

At present, General Athit Kamlangek is viewed as being very close to members of Class 5, Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy, of which Major General Suchinda Khrapthrun, the director of operations, is the activist. Important members of this class include Major General Issraphong Nunphakdi, Major General Suthep Siwara, Major General Wimon Wongwanit, Major General Khachon Ramanwong and Major General Somphon Toemthongchai. Members of Class 5, CRMA, are now at the "divisional commander" level. That is, most are in command of divisions. In another 2 years or even this coming October, some of these men will rise even higher, that is, they will be put in command of even larger forces in more senior positions. But such positions are not "just right" or "fitting" for certain tasks since they are too high and too far removed from the "real forces." The important power bases are at a lower level such as the "regimental level," where the commander is in closer control of the forces. But at present, most of the regimental commanders are from classes 8 and 9, CRMA. Both of these classes are very close to Lieutenant General Chawalit Yongchaiyut, the deputy chief of staff of the army. Thus, it is thought that Lieutenant General Chawalit Yongchaiyut is in control of the "heart" at one level.

If the Young Turks return to government service,, they will hold positions at the "regimental commander" level, which is the level that they were at before. If they are allowed to return at this level, they will be in competition with members of lower classes, that is, classes 8 and 9. Concerning the matter of Class 5, CRMA, being unhappy about the return

of Class 7, CRMA, that is probably not true since the members of Class 5 have already risen above this level. And so, if the Young Turks return, they will not have any problems with this class. But they will have problems with lower classes that want to rise in position. But if this becomes a problem, it will not be a problem for General Athit Kamlangek. Because it is Lieutenant General Chawalit Yongchaiyut who is close to classes 8 and 9. And this may be the reason why a Thai student in the United States was so eager to inform people about military activities in the United States. He said that recently, during Lieutenant General Chawalit Yongchaiyut's trip to the United States, he spoke with Thais there and told them that the "time was not yet ripe" for the return of the Young Turks. The Young Turks discussed this at their meeting, too. But it was felt that Lieutenant General Chawalit had said this just because of the situation and that actually, Lieutenant General Chawalit and the Young Turks are very close to each other in spirit. At present, if any member of the 1 April group has problems, he can go and ask Lieutenant General Chawalit for help. All they have to do is ask. Thus, some feel that Lieutenant General Chawalit Yongchaiyut is the superior of all three classes, that is, classes 7, 8 and 9, CRMA. And if he does become another leader of classes 7, 8 and 9, there may be changes that no one can foresee.

Another reason why Lieutenant General Chawalit Yongchaiyut would probably welcome the return of the Young Turks is that, in military circles, it is well known that a close friend of General Athit Kamlangek is Air Chief Marshal Chakon Thattanon, the first assistant RTAF CINC, who is a fellow member of Class 5, CRMA. He has discussed this matter with General Athit Kamlangek. But regardless of how this could benefit the forces of Air Chief Marshal Chakon Thattanon, something that should be made known is that an aide to Air Chief Marshal Chakon whom Air Chief Marshal Chakon trusts very much is Squadron Leader Manat Rupkhachon, the youngest of the Rupkhachon brothers (the oldest is Special Colonel Yutthane Rupkhachon, the deputy commander of the 4th Military Circle and the commander of CPM [Civil-Police-Military Unit] No 34, which is responsible for the western border. The other brother is Special Colonel Manun Rupkhachon, a Young Turk leader and the former commander of the 4th Cavalry Regiment).

One Young Turk told LAK THAI that the Young Turks feel that their chances of returning to government service are very good since senior people, who have been very fair about this matter, are very sympathetic to them. It has been 3 years since they were pardoned. That is, they were pardoned on Coronation Day, 6 May 1981. And so a sufficient period of time has passed. In all past cases, rebels who have been pardoned have stayed out of military service for a time and then been recalled to duty. No one has ever been kept out this long, and this includes the staff rebels, the palace rebels and the 26 March rebels of General Chalor Hiranviri's class. All of them were allowed to return to government service after a year or so or at most 2 years. The only one who did

not return is Colonel Sanan Khachonprasat, an MP from Phichit Province who did not request to return. "Take General Net Khamoyothin, for example. He returned to government service and is now a senior person in the Government House. And there is Police General Suraphon Chunlaphram. When he was a soldier, he took part in the Staff Rebellion. He returned to government service and became the director-general of the Police Department. I don't think there should be any problems. Since the supreme commander has said that the time has come [to reinstate the Young Turks], the time probably has come. And I think that he will have to do what he said very soon. In the past, there were several matters that he had to monitor personally and in several cases he was the one who carried out things. He is a person who gets things done quickly. Some people wonder why this matter is taking so long or they think that he may have problems. But we don't think that he has encountered any problems. He may be waiting to see what Prem's attitude is and Prem may want to see what Athit's attitude is. And while they are doing this, we have to wait."

One Young Turk said that "at heart, we are still soldiers 100 percent. That is our life. We cannot be anything else. Since we left government service, we have been able to survive by engaging in business activities. But how can we compete with real businessmen? Our trading stratagems cannot compare with theirs. Another thing is that to engage in trade, you need capital. We don't have that much capital. Most of us have had to go to work for companies that took pity on us. We have been able to earn enough to feed our families. But in our hearts, we still consider ourselves to be soldiers."

The matter of the Young Turks' returning to government service can be summarized by saying that General Athit Kamlangek has given the "green light." But other factions or echelons may not agree with this. "I think it would be better if he just ordered the personnel section to reinstate us rather than just sitting around discussing our request to return. As for what General Prem wants and whether he opposes this, we don't want to cause any trouble for General Prem or General Athit, and there shouldn't be any problems. Once the supreme commander says O.K., Prem will probably go along without any objection since this is something that he has already considered carefully. But something that we are still very concerned about is that the political situation is very unsettled. Things are swaying back and forth and so the matter involving us is unsettled, too. It's impossible to find a stable point so that the senior people can consider the matter carefully. As far as soldiers are concerned, there are no problems. There are no problems concerning this matter. It's just that politics is interfering even though we are not involved in politics," said a Young Turk.

"Some people have said that if General Athit allows us to return, Prem will feel isolated. But that is not true. If we return, we will have superiors over us, including the minister of defense, the supreme commander and the RTA CINC. We haven't made any requests concerning being in the command line or concerning which forces we would like to command. We just want to be soldiers again. If people are promoted or demoted, that is of no consequence. 11943

THAILAND

CPT CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER PHIRUN INTERVIEWED

Bangkok ATHIT KHLET LAP in Thai 12-18 May 84 pp 10-21

[Interview with Phirun Chatrawanitikun, a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Thailand, by a German reporter and a Hong Kong reporter (Tan Kok Liu); date and place not specified]

[Text] Phirun Chatrawanitikun once attended Chulalongkorn University. When he lived in the capital, he was a student leader who had long engaged in left-wing activities. He was active in the Student Christian Movement, an important group whose student members later played a rather large political role. Besides this, he founded the Writers' Front at Saphan Hua Chang, which played an ideological role among intellectuals, students and instructors at several universities. A news report stated that after large numbers of students and intellectuals fled into the jungle and joined the Communist Party following the events of 6 October 1976, he served as the "organizer" or leader of the student leaders. According to government reports, he was known as Comrade Khwan. Some people said that he rose in the party hierarchy because of his close relationship with Wirat Angkhathawon, or "Chang Yuan," who played a rather large role in the CPT. At present, there are reports that Phirun Chatrawanitikun is a member of the Central Committee of the CPT. And it is thought that he is one of the "new generation" in the party. Recently, a German reporter and a Hong Kong reporter (Tan Kok Liu) went to interview Phirun Chatrawanitikun. It is not clear where the interview took place. Atsatang Kengsamat, a special reporter for ATHIT in Germany, followed this matter and asked for a transcript of the interview. He also asked these reporters to ask several questions for him during the interview. We feel that this interview is of value to the government. And those who have studied the communist problem will understand this interview. Thus, we are publishing the interview in its entirety.

[Question] Recently, Lieutenant General Chawalit Yongchaiyut, the deputy chief of staff of the army, officially announced that three communist leaders, that is, Thong Chaemsi, Prasitthi Taphienthong and Winai Phoemphunsap, may surrender or that they are negotiating with the government. How likely is this? Also, some former students in Bangkok have told us that these people may just be carrying on activities in the city. What is the truth concerning this matter?

[Answer] Both Thong Chaemsi and Prasitthi Taphienthong are still in the provinces. When I met them not too long ago, they were both still in the provinces. As for urban activities, as far as I know, the duties of these two men are not directly concerned with the cities. Concerning the statement by Police Major General Kasem Saengmit, the commander of the Special Branch Division, who said that the CPT has so few people left that older people like Thong have had to work like coolies, I don't think things have reached that point. Both Thong and Prasitthi are well known to Special Branch officials. It would not be correct to send them to carry on activities in the city. As for their surrendering, based on the conversations that I had with them recently, I don't think that there are any problems that would lead them to do that. Even though they are both getting old and life in the jungle is hard for them, the morale of both of these men seemed very good.

[Question] And what about Winai Phoemphunsap?

[Answer] As for Winai Phoemphunsap, actually, his area of responsibility is the lower northeast. I have not met with him directly for a long time now and so I really can't say whether he has entered the city or not. I'm not sure. As for the reports that Mr Winai has conflicts with the center and that this has been analyzed, I don't think that this is anything new in the party. It's impossible not to have conflicts. But the conflicts would not have caused Mr Winai to surrender. Actually, Mr Winai has long played an activist role. He was the president of the Thammasat University Studentbody Association for 2 years in a row. He has a long history of struggle. He is quite skilled as a coordinator.

[Question] Concerning divergent views, in the past, if someone held views that differed from the communists in the internal organization, he was looked at askance. But now, it seems that people who hold different views have a greater chance [to express their views]. What is the reason for this? Is this a result of summarizing the lessons?

[Answer] It is partly the result of summarizing the lesson. But in the past, it was a matter of difference in actions. That is, when someone held a different view, people would consider the matter to see if there was a problem concerning standpoint or whether the [person's] views might lead to deviations. But things are better now. In particular, concerning international lessons and the writings of scholars and their research on party systems abroad, at present, the view concerning Stalinist-type party systems is that differences are not respected.

[Question] Does that mean that Stalin's system was too rigid?

[Answer] The creation of a Stalinist-type party is now coming under severe criticism for being too rigid and for taking too severe measures against those who hold different views. In general, we refer to this as creating a Stalinist-type party. But I would like time to study this. If there are real weaknesses, communists will certainly be willing to make changes so that the party system enables each person to realize his full potential.

[Question] Is it possible that the CPT's recent decline in strength has resulted from errors in mode of operation?

[Answer] Concerning this, lessons have been summarized concerning the improper handling of some matters. For example, in dealing with those who hold divergent views, the matter may be handled by making things more democratic or allowing them to express their views. But as for using force or eliminating those who hold differing views, we have never done that. But I do admit that errors have been made.

[Question] You have been viewed as being closely attached to Chang Yuan, that is, you have been viewed as being very rigid. Do you agree with that?

[Answer] Is that how I am viewed? I have thought a lot about myself. I admit that during the 10 years or so that I have been active in the movement, both before and after going into the jungle, I have made mistakes in looking at the situation and in evaluating people. For example, in evaluating friends and enemies we sometimes overestimate the shortcomings. Concerning work, during the course of daily life or in administering the daily tasks, mistakes have certainly been made. I admit that I have been criticized as being too naive and too leftist. But I think that I am O.K. I admit these things. And if things can be improved by making changes, I am ready to make the changes right now.

[Question] Concerning the situation from an overall standpoint, regardless of whether it was the military forces or the democratic forces, the old estimates were wrong. Can you tell us what the CPT's new estimates are?

[Answer] I admit that this has been a problem. For example, in one period, evaluations were made from an international standpoint. We thought that the world capitalist system was on the line and was about to collapse, but it didn't. Every time that the situation was evaluated, we thought that the crisis of the capitalist world was growing worse. People kept saying that the [capitalist system] was growing weaker and weaker, but it never collapsed. Concerning the capitalist world, even though it has experienced crises in certain periods, it has always had a way out. We reviewed things and realized that this way of evaluating things was too dogmatic and inflexible.

The evaluation made of the domestic situation was just like that for politics. In the period following 6 October, we overestimated the revolutionary forces somewhat. It seemed that we were not far from victory, that victory was within our reach. We also evaluated the policies related to the suppression activities of the government or military. But we did not make continuous evaluations; we thought that they would keep using the same methods. But then they made changes. For example, they implemented Policy 66/1980. I don't feel that we have studied Policy 66/1980 enough.

And we assessed the military to try and determine whether it would make changes and open up democracy by holding to democracy in the urban zones. They have allowed people, at least scholars and the press, to express their ideas. This has changed a lot. If we had not evaluated things sufficiently, we would have predicted that the government would announce some policy and then, after a certain time, revert to its old ways, using strong suppression measures to threaten the people. And so in the end, the people would not be able to bear this system. But instead, in the rural areas at present, it must be admitted that the national army has stepped up development and is aware of the conditions of the masses. At one military installation, when Thai People's Liberation Armed Forces (TPLAF) made an attack, instead of using the old methods, that is instead of rounding up the people and forcing them to tell who the secret agents were so that they could handle matters using violent means, the government military forces kept quiet and suppressed such reports and did not trouble the people. This is what they have been doing recently. They have improved. The government has made changes.

At present, we are giving much attention to this and are trying to determine whether these are just tactical changes. We are not sure whether the government has really had a change of heart about democracy and whether it will give [people] a chance to fight using democratic means. An example is allowing the CPT to fight for democracy openly in accord with the laws, that is, by repealing the Anti-Communist Act. We don't think that the government is sincere about repealing this act even though some people have proposed this. Lieutenant General Chawalit Yongchaiyut has said that people's freedoms will be increased somewhat (said with emphasis). Concerning this, we feel that he intends to use this "easing" of things to reach the suppression goals. We have not evaluated this sufficiently. We have not dealt with this sufficiently. That is, in my view, we have not dealt with Policy 66/1980 sufficiently. Since this is the case, it is difficult to take the political offensive.

[Question] Concerning this re-evaluation of things, what are things like economically and what are things like concerning the political parties and the power groups?

[Answer] My knowledge about certain things is limited. But what is clear is that in the past, the CPT underestimated the development or expansion of capitalism. During the past 20 years, we have observed the changes in capitalist production methods. Actually, conditions

in the rural areas have changed greatly. In the small, medium-sized and large villages, there have been changes on the commerce, trade and transportation fronts. Things have not remained static. Because we have not done a good job of evaluating the changes in production methods, the struggle tactics that we have stipulated have not been in accord with reality. For example, we have not made sufficient use of the growth of capitalist production methods as a factor in our activities. We have made little use of this.

The CPT is still committed to using the rural areas to encircle the cities. And this view is still valid. We are still committed to using war forms from the rural areas. But these rural areas are rather remote and backward. Most are mountainous areas. Such war forms have resulted in our being confined to the mountains. We have not been able to contact the masses in the plains. Even though the CPT has developed a reputation for being the party of the peasants, the CPT has not been able to reach the peasants in the plains areas. We have not been able to go very far. But recently, in some areas we have been able to carry on activities faster. Instead of taking 10 days to go from one place to another, we can now get there in 30 minutes using motorcycles. And now communications are better, and we can do much more in contacting fronts. But since we did not evaluate things sufficiently, we have not been able to make complete use of these factors to benefit our activities. And so we continue to carry on activities by foot, too.

[Question] In short, political and economic conditions were underestimated in comparison to actual development.

[Answer] It can be said that our understanding of world society is not broad enough.

[Question] What about political, economic and social growth based on your, or the CPT's, new assessment?

[Answer] On the economic front, as far as the near future is concerned, capitalism will still be able to expand, particularly in the rural areas. But how great the development is depends on the government's efficiency. In the private sector, or the sector of capital, they are ready to expand. The economic development plan has been expanded. But the problems are the efficiency of the bureaucracy, the sincerity of the government and the stability of the government. How great a chance will the private capitalists have to expand investments? I know that the private sector is prepared. But there will be problems with the tax system. This slow and inefficient system will be a hindrance. But I think the trend is for continual expansion.

[Question] Before talking about politics, [we] would like to ask about the expansion of capitalism. That is, some military groups feel that monopoly capitalists will control the country and that they will join the political parties and create a parliamentary dictatorship. Thus,

these soldiers are opposed to monopolies. Do you agree with these soldiers about the growth of the capitalists?

[Answer] Monopoly capitalism is a subject of much debate now. Monopoly capitalism already controls Thailand. I agree with the view that monopoly capitalism must be differentiated. Monopoly capitalism from abroad came here a long time ago and is related to world capitalism. The old capitalists are capitalists who came from the land owners, that is, the people who used to own the land, which can be called feudalism. These capitalists have accumulated wealth, and they have shifted from controlling the land to controlling the capital. Thus, they have been able to oppose others and rely on [their] influence in government circles since they were the ones who used to control state power. Also, some groups are cooperating with foreign monopoly capitalists. These monopoly capitalists have had power in the country. As for other monopoly capitalists, I think that this is a new group that arose from accumulating capital in the new period. They do not have a feudal background. These capitalists are relying on or cooperating with foreign capitalists to monopolize things. There is one more type of capitalist that can be referred to as a medium-sized capitalist, or national capitalist. These are capitalists who should have been given a chance to grow. But they were eliminated, that is, they were hindered by the foreign capitalists and original monopoly capitalists. Thus, these capitalists could not develop. As for what has been said, the view of the military is tantamount to denying the fact that Thailand is controlled by the foreign monopoly capitalists and the old monopoly capitalists. Structurally, the military is cooperating with these groups to maintain this state of affairs.

As for the political parties, these should be differentiated, too. Concerning the large political parties such as the Social Action Party, the Thai Nation Party and the Democrat Party, it is not true that the politicians and elements of these political parties are all monopoly capitalists. There are some who are large monopoly capitalists. That's true. And they are playing leading roles in these political parties. But concerning the important elements in these political parties, people of various occupations who are medium-sized and small, or minor, capitalists are beginning to play a greater role in the various political parties.

Concerning the characteristics of the political parties, some people say that they are good-for-nothing and rather undisciplined. I think that what this shows is that in the parties, the monopoly capitalists who are party leaders cannot control the various elements in the party or get them to follow their line. The large parties all have "wings." For example, there are the young people in the Social Action Party, the Young Turks in the Thai Nation Party and the leftists in the Democrat Party. What this shows is that the monopoly capitalists cannot control their parties in a unified way. And so the attacks on the political parties are directed at the wrong target. Actually, support should be given to the political parties so that they grow stronger. Each political party should have a broader mass base. This would enable more people to play a role in the parties instead of restricting things

to the monopoly capitalists. But this does not mean that an entire party is the representative of the monopoly capitalists. That is my view.

[Question] Does this mean that the political parties should be allowed to grow bigger naturally?

[Answer] In my view, not only should they be allowed to grow, but if the government is sincere about developing democracy, it should implement measures that will promote or stimulate greater growth than is the case at present. I have compared this to when trusts or private companies are about to fail. The government makes funds available to keep these businesses from collapsing. But [it doesn't do this] in the case of the political parties. Actually, political parties came into being only recently and so there are technical problems, administrative problems and problems in training people and educating them concerning democracy. The large parties may have the forces, but some parties don't. The government should provide help. If it holds a good view of the political parties, it should set up a fund so that these parties can spread democracy. If the government is sincere, it should promote this and not view the political parties as enemies of the government. It feels that the political parties may grow and become opposition parties, or parties that do not agree with the government. But an important duty of the opposition is to help discover the shortcomings so that the government can correct these shortcomings.

Democratically, if this is how we feel, we should promote the growth of the political parties. But to date, even the documents of Lieutenant General Chawalit Yongchaiyut make the assessment that the political parties that have formed the government in past periods have been factors in the growth of the communists. That is, the assessment is that the political parties have been war factors, local influential groups and dark influences. This is the assessment! I feel that in a democratic system, the government should have a more favorable view of the political parties than this.

And recently, there was the matter of the opposition parties holding a no-confidence debate on General Sitthi Chirarot, the minister of interior. But those who think he is good "give flowers." I think that this is normal. That is, they can express disapproval. But they should not oppress the opposition. Because the more you scrub, the cleaner you will be. General Sitthi may have been accepted, that is, he may have passed the test. But the action taken by General Athit Kamlangek, the supreme commander, was aimed at putting a brake on things. Even though he later said that he was just joking, this was a bad joke. If he wanted to joke, he should have done so in private, he shouldn't have done things like that. This was a direct threat. His views on trade and other matters, which he has made quite clear, should have been expressed in parliament. We do not agree with what was done.

[Question] You said that the military has constantly been changing. In your view or in the view of the party, in what form has the military or military structure developed from the standpoint of the military being a force in society?

[Answer] We must distinguish between the institution and the organization. We don't claim that the entire [military] is like that. From the standpoint of the institution, based on past history, theoretically, I think that the military is an upper structure that is an obstacle to the development of democracy. I am referring to the military from an institutional standpoint. The recent actions of high-ranking leaders such as the RTA CINC show that they are not sincere about a democratic form of administration. A simple example is that when the Thai Nation Party attempted to hold [no-confidence] debates in various hotels, threats were made to get them to stop. Even Lieutenant General Mana Rattanakoset, the deputy chief of staff of the army who is known as a progressive person, opposed the activities of the opposition.

But I have said that from the structural standpoint, the military has played politics and meddled in politics too much. But as a force, if the soldiers act like professional soldiers, which is what people are demanding, and work to defend the country, the people will not oppose them in this role. The military should play this role to the full. But there are a few senior officers who occupy principal positions in the military who have led the military in that direction. In this situation, [the military] is still an obstacle.

But concerning soldiers in general, I agree that today's soldiers have greater knowledge of the world. They don't study just military science. In recent times, officers have studied outside the [military] institutions. They have studied for their master's degrees at various universities. The fact that they have a relationship with society will help them understand the views that people on the outside have toward the military. If they stay in their camps, they won't learn anything. The field-grade level is the most interesting level since the trend is for officers at this level to have knowledge about democracy or have democratic ideas. They tend to accept social change. They are acting like soldiers should act and not getting involved in or meddling in things. Instead, they are allowing democracy, even though it is still imperfect, to have time [to develop]. And things will gradually improve. The political parties, which are not strong, will grow stronger.

Concerning the problem of MPs giving out money in dirty elections, I think that things have improved. Soldiers at this level understand this problem very well. They don't approve of this. I have listened to mid-echelon or field-grade, officers and seen the differences between the military during the time of Sarit and Thanom and the military of today. The military of today is much better than it used to be. I don't agree with having the military revert to the old system. Some soldiers want to develop education and the rural areas. They want to develop the villages. Certainly, one of their goals in doing this is to suppress

the communists. But some of them are doing this with pure intentions since they feel that the rural areas are an important problem. This is particularly the case among those soldiers who grew up in rural areas and who have peasant backgrounds.

And there was the development of the Young Turk officers. Before the [attempted] coup d'etat of 1-3 April, these officers had spent much time in the rural areas and had lived in the terrorist zones. When they went to suppress the terrorists, they learned about the problems in the rural areas and saw the injustices there. They felt that changes should be made. If things were allowed to continue on like this, there would be problems. Thus, concerning the development of the views of the Young Turks, I don't think that this was limited just to this small group. At present, there are probably many soldiers who hold such views. But the problem is that they are part of a large structure, and because of disciplinary regulations and other things, they have few opportunities to express their views.

[Question] As for the CPT, has it ever carried on democratic activities and has any soldier ever had a chance to get close to or understand real democracy?

[Answer] One thing that is strange is that senior officers who have retired are more democratic than when they were on active duty. After they are free from command duties, their views change. Examples are Air Chief Marshal Krasae Intharat, General Lak Salikhup and General Thawit Seni Wong Na Ayuthaya. The ideas of these officers changed greatly. The views of General Lak changed greatly from when he was the commanding general of the Second Army Area. [But] officers who are still on active duty have expressed rather democratic ideas, too. Take General Chamnan Nilawiset, for example. He understands things and knows what the problems are. But unfortunately, the senior officers who understand the problems are usually blocked. Ever since he was the director of operations, General Han Linanon expressed rather democratic ideas and developed [these ideas] well until his recent retirement. And he has announced that he will join a political party. I think that if General Han continues on in this manner, that is, if he continues making progress gradually and does not rush things, he will go very far.

[Question] There have been reports that General Han did much damage to the CPT.

[Answer] That is a matter of war. We can't criticize him concerning that. When there is a clash in war, both sides will suffer losses. From the standpoint of politics, I respect his ideas and the decisions that he has made recently. I am not saying this in order to form a united front. I am just analyzing things and saying that what he has done is correct. These ideas are much more beneficial and progressive than those of officers in general. If high-ranking commanders in the military hold views similar to those of General Han--that is, they

don't have to hold the same views exactly but should be willing to listen to the views of others--how can they be accused of holding conservative views? They should be broadminded. Just as the 1st Division's radio said, expressing ideas is natural. People should be broadminded enough to listen to the views of others. Those who are not willing to listen to others are dictators. If the military holds such views and acts on them, I think that democracy in Thailand will be able to proceed smoothly and that it will not be necessary to make drastic changes. That is my view.

[Question] Returning to international problems, that is, the CPT's views on international matters, there has been much criticism that the CPT's views are very narrow and not really independent. Do you agree with this criticism? If you agree that international views are wrong, what should they be?

[Answer] What people like to say about the CPT is that our foreign policy adheres too closely to China's foreign policy. But that is an overstatement. This starts from the three-worlds theory. If I remember correctly, on 1 December 1979 the Political Bureau issued an explanation. In this, it upheld the three-worlds theory. But at the Fourth Party Congress held in February 1982, there was an official denial of the three-worlds theory. And we criticized ourselves by saying that in accepting the three-worlds theory at that time, we had deviated and had not studied things well. In admitting this, we admitted only that this was the foreign policy of China. But the CPT does not agree with the three-worlds theory. What is most important is that we feel that our only international enemy is the United States. Unlike China, we do not consider the First World to be composed of the United States and the Soviet Union, the great powers. Thus, at the Fourth Party Congress, we were quite clear about this. That is, we did not designate the Soviet Union as an international enemy. This is a matter that was cleared up at our Fourth Party Congress.

As for past assessments, whether official or not, we have considered certain parties and countries to be revisionists. For example, the Soviet Union was considered to be a revisionist [country], and East European [countries] were thought to be reserves of revisionism. At the Fourth Party Congress, an official document was issued stating that we no longer hold this view. That is, we no longer say whether a party is revisionist. We do not consider the Soviet Union to be revisionist but feel that we have to study things well. If we have not studied things well, we should not state a view. But this does not mean that we will agree with the socialist countries or socialist parties on everything. If we do not agree with something, it must be about a specific matter. That is, we will discuss concrete matters. For example, concerning the matter nearest us, we do not agree with Vietnam sending troops to occupy Kampuchea. We do not agree with them about this. But even though we do not agree with them about this, we have not charged Vietnam with serving the Soviet Union by helping the Soviet Union expand its power in Southeast Asia. We [don't] have to oppose them all the time or be enemies on all matters. We have just expressed our opinion independently.

If things reach the stage of invasion or occupation, we don't agree. Thus, we don't agree with their crossing into Thai territory. We feel that, if possible, the best thing would be for Vietnam to withdraw [from Kampuchea] and allow the Kampuchians to decide matters for themselves.

As for other important views, we must build broader relations with all parties. We are now in the process of doing this. But I think that we will make distinctions. For parties with which we have had close relations and that are thought of as fraternal parties, when we make changes, we will definitely not abandon our friends. We will maintain relations. But concerning these relations, we will maintain relations independently. That is, we will not lean toward one particular party. In the past, we have tended to get our information and ideas from a rather narrow circle because we have studied other parties very little depending on our trust in them. However, we will maintain our good relations with these parties.

As for parties with which we have never had relations or with which relations are not yet good, we are all socialist parties and communist parties. But in some cases it can be said that we have never had any contact with each other. There are two reasons for this. One is the lack of travel factors. Another is that our views toward them have not been correct. For example, if we have the view that they are pro-Soviet, this makes it difficult for us to have relations with them. We have stopped this. Now, we try not to make any assumptions about anything and do not assume that one is a real Marxist while another is not. We have to meet others and build relations. And these are the parties with which we are trying to [build relations].

[Question] Concerning action on the international front, do you think that you have had sufficient independence?

[Answer] As for the past, I would not go so far as to say that the CPT has been under the control of some party. That is, some have said that the Chinese Communist Party has controlled the CPT to the extent that it has infiltrated all elements of the organization and that the leaders of our party are of Chinese ancestry. But in my view, some aspects of this are incorrect. That is, in the past, it was said that we were their underlings. I don't think that things went that far. But we did rely on them. It must be admitted that in that period, the Chinese Communist Party was highly respected, particularly during the period when Mao Tse-tung was in power. Concerning theory, we tended to lean toward the Chinese Communist Party and gave much attention to Chinese theory since there were translations. Some of the activists spoke Chinese but did not speak English. That is, they were not able to learn much about other theories except for what was written in Chinese. As for gathering and exchanging intelligence, we were too close to the Chinese and obtained most of our information from this one source. We did not read enough newspapers of other parties. Thus, we leaned toward [China]. This led to the feeling that we were not independent. And in certain periods, we expressed views on behalf of them. That is,

our views were related to things that happened in China. For example, we agreed with the Cultural Revolution. But later on, they reversed themselves and said that the Cultural Revolution had been a mistake. And so we changed our position, too. In such circumstances, it can be seen that our party was not independent. But concerning this lack of independence, I think that we lacked independence concerning theoretical thinking and intelligence. But it did not reach the point of their giving orders to us. The Chinese party did not intend to make underlings of us or turn us into a subservient party. It did not reach that point.

Thus, after we corrected things, we gained a broader understanding of other parties. Now, we have stipulated that we will not limit ourselves to having relations with communist parties only. If international parties that are democratic socialist or progressive democratic parties are not opposed to us, we welcome having relations with them. Now, we have not even stipulated that these parties must be Fourth International parties. Concerning the Fourth International, we feel that there are elements that are in agreement with our struggle path. For example, the Fourth International has opposed the American imperialists, too. We don't require that it be the Fourth International or a true Marxist party. I think that by opening up things like this, our party will gain a broader understanding of the world and have a better understanding of reality. We will be better able to distinguish right from wrong. In the long term, this will help us to be independent.

[Question] Concerning the future of the CPT, what are the chances of the CPT recovering? And concerning the appeal to wage a peaceful struggle, will this occur?

[Answer] As for confidence in the future, from the little contact that I have had with the older or high-level activists, they feel very confident. Personally, I think that they are somewhat overconfident. That is, they still feel that there is a future. They are still working hard. However, it cannot be denied that within the party, there are also those who feel that we face great difficulties and that we will not be able to recover quickly or easily. At the Fourth Party Congress, adjustments were made at one level. But there are those who feel that the adjustments did not go far enough and that major changes should be made. That is, there are those who feel that the changes that were made were like a reform and not like a revolution. Here, I am just telling you about the various views. However, I think that these two factions will be able to work together to solve the present crisis within the party. The major problem concerns the theoretical line. In the past, we admitted only that our party was very weak concerning this. And because our theoretical line has been very weak, this has resulted in various activities not being in accord with reality. Thus, we must improve this. But this is not an easy task. As I said, we are studying things more broadly. The internal documents or documents produced by the party discuss quantity and quality. It must be admitted that the materials disseminated in society, such as scholarly writings and journals, are very useful for study within the party. These things

provide a basis for comparison and we even obtain some rather good ideas that depart from our original (ideological) framework. Concerning this framework, over time, we have seen that certain things are wrong. And so, scholars and theorists outside the party have done much to stimulate our internal studies.

However, we feel that things are different. Concerning dealing with the outside and confronting the pressures applied by the government, we feel that each sector, regardless of whether it is the provincial or central sector.... We feel that we can handle things. We have struggled for more than 10 years, and we know each other's capabilities. In some zones and regions, we have expanded rather well. But in general, we are still constricted. In expanding, we still face certain obstacles. But some sectors are all right.

In summary, there is confidence that our party will recover. But it is generally accepted that this will not be easy and that it will take time. But we will try. However, we are not too worried. We feel that our party is just one part of the democratic force. Recently, we have been greatly heartened by the (activities of) the democratic forces outside the party, such as the activities of other mass organizations that love democracy, the activities of certain politicians, the activities of scholars and the articles of reporters. These things have developed greatly. Unlike our party, these democratic power groups have not been stopped. That is, they have developed continually.

[Question] There seem to be many groups, including the present state power groups, that are very interested in the matter of a peaceful struggle. Would you discuss this in greater detail? Has the CPT discussed this seriously?

[Answer] Concerning this matter, there have been reports that the Anti-Communist Act will be repealed. At present, we are very interested in whether this act will actually be repealed. If this act is repealed, it does not mean that this will benefit our party only. There are many other acts that trample on (people's) rights and freedoms. If the government agrees to repeal the Anti-Communist Act, this would seem to be the ultimate step. And so we feel that these other, less offensive, acts would be repealed at the same time. That is, the people would enjoy more rights and freedoms than they do now. Increasing these rights and freedoms to the point where the various views and beliefs of the people in the country are all accepted is the ultimate issue.

We have studied this matter carefully. A subcommittee has done research on this problem and stated that if the Anti-Communist Act is repealed and if the government is sincere about allowing us to wage a peaceful struggle, the CPT is ready to move forward and establish a legal political party in accord with the law. As for whether we will be allowed to wage a peaceful struggle, a subcommittee of ours has studied this directly. We feel that if the government is sincere, we are ready. At present, I feel that the CPT has altered itself to the point where whenever there

are conditions for waging a peaceful struggle and for forming a legal political party, we will do so immediately. However, the problem is that while this government may agree to this, the next government may not agree and may again turn to suppression activities. And we are ready to struggle using force. We will not struggle peacefully forever and miss an opportunity like some parties, which have not been able to deal with the suppression activities. That is, they were misled into thinking that peace was permanent and that there would not be any change. No matter how short the period of peace, we will use that short period to wage a legal struggle. But whenever things change, we will be ready to struggle using other forms.

But it can be said that peace is up to the government and not the communists. We began fighting because the government tried to suppress our party. We are not bloodthirsty. We aren't committed to an unreasonable use of weapons or to seizing state power using force. Thai political development is now being discussed. Buddhism, as the national religion, eschews the use of force. We have pondered these traits of the Thai people and feel that if Thai politics can be developed peacefully, our party will show flexibility. We don't desire violence. But we were not the ones who proposed this. This is up to the government.

[Question] Does this mean that in the CPT's struggle, even though the CPT's line has always been a struggle using weapons, the CPT acknowledges the struggle of the peace groups?

[Answer] That is correct. We support struggles for justice and democracy. We will support the people's struggle regardless of the form it takes.

[Question] Concerning the entire democracy movement, where has the CPT placed itself within the movement.

[Answer] We are a part of this and are an equal to the other groups that are struggling for social justice and democracy. At present, we are not striving to establish a perfect society. We just want a democracy that is better than the semi-democracy of today. Our minimum goal is a better democracy than the present one.

[Question] You will fight peacefully only when you have enough confidence in democracy, isn't that right?

[Answer] Yes.

[Question] Are you confident that there won't be any violations or oppression?

[Answer] Yes.

[Question] Concerning democracy, this may result in the CPT waging a peaceful struggle imitating democratic methods.

[Answer] In short, we just want the parliamentary system to continue for a long time to come. We don't want any coup d'etat by power groups or the military. We want the parliamentary system, the political party system, to develop to the point where people will listen to all points of view with a broader mind and where those elements of communism and socialism that differ from today's democracy are accepted as a matter of course.

[Question] Can you co-exist?

[Answer] Yes.

[Question] Can socialist, communist and democratic ideas all co-exist?

[Answer] Yes, they can.

[Question] This, then, is a democracy that the CPT feels will have guarantees.

[Answer] We will struggle for a democracy that is better than the present democracy. We oppose all forms of dictatorship no matter which group is involved. If the interests of the people are [adversely] affected, we oppose that.

[Answer] Even the so-called "dictatorship of the proletariat?"

[Answer] Yes. At present, there is much criticism of the dictatorship of the proletariat. We are discussing this. If the dictatorship of the proletariat interferes with the interests of the people and actually oppresses the people, we oppose that form of dictatorship, too.

Society will change and the CPT may be able to cooperate with the group that holds state power. We will support democracy. The election system and rights and freedoms of the people must be ensured. This will happen at some point in time. We are talking about the future. Actually, concerning our having a part in holding state power, that will not happen for a long time. But if the CPT did have such a part to play, I believe that the system used to select our nation's leaders would be that of a general election. It might be a direct or indirect election, but the leaders would be elected. They would not be appointed from the parties. We now fully accept these ideas.

[Question] Concerning the research subcommittee that is preparing for peace, was this the idea of the Political Bureau?

[Answer] This is a subcommittee of the Central Committee. We are studying things to determine what the party's line should be if the Anti-Communist Act is repealed. But we don't oppose a peaceful struggle. This is a subcommittee of the Central Committee.

[Question] The government has assessed the successes against the communists during the first 6 months of fiscal year 1984. Have you studied this?

[Answer] Actually, I am preparing to write a report, the third one, in response to Lieutenant General Chawalit. This will probably be disseminated very soon. But I don't think that this assessment is very different from the one made in 1983. One interesting thing is that the person who wrote the summary admitted certain things. Instead of saying that the CPT has been "completely defeated" or "basically defeated," this was changed to "stumbled." However, after making these statements within the country, when Lieutenant General Chawalit went to Los Angeles, he again used the words "completely defeated." From this, we can see the sincerity of the assessment. There were erroneous tendencies [on our part], such as the tendency to rely on the writings of Mao Tse-tung. These sayings have been omitted. But concerning the details of the criticism of this 6-months summary, I will write a detailed response to Chawalit.

[Question] Lieutenant General Chawalit said that the government was having problems destroying the united front and that it would, therefore, have to try to destroy the party's ideals.

[Answer] As for destroying communist ideals, as I said before, I think the ideas of Lieutenant General Chawalit are drivel. Communist ideals are found elsewhere besides Thailand. This is an historical development that is difficult to deny. As for destroying the CPT, I don't deny that this is possible. It depends on the conditions. It doesn't mean that when a communist party is established in some country, that party is invulnerable. That party may in fact disintegrate. This may happen at certain times and in certain places. The CPT is in a period of change. If the CPT cannot change quickly enough or, in the long term, is incapable of changing, the CPT may very well disintegrate. This depends on the efforts that we make. This means that when we form a party, we must struggle to the end and not make mistakes. To keep from being destroyed, we must struggle. But as for ideals, that is far beyond the capabilities of Lieutenant General Chawalit. That is my view.

[Question] It is estimated that you now have about 1,000-1,200 armed men. How close is this estimate to the actual number?

[Answer] I don't know the actual number. This involves the armed forces, which does not release such information. But at present, concerning estimating the size of the CPT's armed forces, I think that there are special factors. At present, the TPLAF is no longer bearing arms like before or forming squads or companies with a definite number of men. At present, the TPLAF has made changes and is entering urban and rural areas in the plains in small groups. In the plains areas, they carry pistols, or they hide their weapons and travel unarmed in an inconspicuous manner. But they can obtain weapons whenever they need to use them. I think that it is difficult to estimate the number of such forces. I am not boasting. I think that there is much truth to this. If only

those actually bearing arms are counted, I think the estimate will be in error. The figure will be worthless. But [the actual number] is a military secret. I can't tell you the actual number since I don't know what it is either.

[Question] In short, the southern [branch of the CPT] is now the strongest.

[Answer] That is the assessment that has been made.

[Question] Both General Athit and Lieutenant General Chawalit have said similar things, but they have not been very clear. Does this mean, as you indicated a moment ago, that the armed forces are trying to carry on a terrorist movement in the cities? Is this a policy?

[Answer] At present, it is not our policy to carry on sabotage or to wage a violent struggle in the urban areas. We will not use weapons to cause trouble or carry out sabotage in order to destroy the fears of the people. We have to consider whether our actions will cause problems for the people. If we think that some action might bother the people, we will not carry out that action. As for the fear that we will commit acts of sabotage, at present I can say that that is not our policy.

[Question] Returning to the very first question concerning the surrender of three CPT leaders, what is happening? They have not yet surrendered, have they?

[Answer] No. In this period, actually I can say for a long time now, no one has surrendered. I cannot guarantee absolutely that they won't surrender. But I can say that these three don't have any problems that would cause them to surrender.

[Question] Why do you think that Lieutenant General Chawalit said this? He seemed to be saying that contact had been made or that they were trying to make contact.

[Answer] Concerning this matter, I think he is engaging in psychological operations. Last year, Lieutenant General Chawalit said that Prachuap Ruongrat and Sin Toemlim would surrender. But it is now clear that those two men did not surrender. And just recently it was announced that Prachuap Ruongrat had been captured. But Prachuap was able to escape in just 1 hour. I think that this is just meant to get people excited. Lieutenant General Chawalit is very skilled in psychological operations. He is hoping to achieve certain results. Because these three men are quite well respected within the party, Mr Winai is respected in the lower northeast, and at present, there are zones in the lower northeast that are waging an armed struggle. For example, Zone 207 has been encircled rather tightly. But even though it has been encircled, it is still active. In putting out such reports, one of their objectives is to raise doubts in the minds of those who are still fighting there about whether their leaders have surrendered. The leadership organization still affects those in the rural areas. When such reports are issued,

it raises doubts. I think they are aiming for short-term results. I think that in a few months, it will be clear that they did not surrender.

[Question] As for you, the Special Branch Division has said that even though you have not given any indication of surrendering, you are hiding in the city. Would you discuss the matter of surrendering to officials.

[Answer] Concerning this, I am fighting for democracy. I don't feel that I have done anything wrong. Thus, I refuse to admit that I have done anything wrong that would require me to surrender or report [to government officials]. Thus, I have no intention of surrendering. But the fact that I will not surrender does not mean that I will stand firmer than others. I don't want to say anything that would affect someone else. I just want to say that I am not clever enough to fight in a limited area. My thinking may be too free for carrying on limited activities. Thus, concerning having me surrender in order to limit me like a prisoner with a red card who is not treated with respect by either the government or society, I am content to carry on activities aimed at fulfilling my ideals using underground methods. If I am caught, that is another matter. It has been said that I am not one to surrender. I am not a mouse who will become exhausted from running away from the cat. I am not in that situation. I still derive will power from the democratic movement. I will not choose that course [surrender].

[Question] Is the same true for Achan [teacher] Don?

[Answer] As far as I know, yes. She will never surrender.

[Question] What is the position of Mr Damri with respect to the CPT?

[Answer] I don't know the details. Before a person is captured, he is subordinate to some organization. After his capture, according to official documents, that is "S.S.P.T." documents, published last year, Mr Damri was praised quite highly. He was praised as being the man of the year. That is my understanding. He was praised for his struggles to boost his morale.

[Question] But because of the circumstances, he doesn't have any position in the party.

[Answer] Not at the present time since he is no longer carrying on activities and is not in contact with any organization. But as a combatant who was captured by the government, he was not treated fairly. The government should not have arrested Mr Damri. A decision should be reached as quickly as possible. He should be released. He is a good person. Besides being a politician and an activist who has worked with the CPT, he is a scholar who is rather skilled in languages, including the Thai and Shan languages. He has a deep knowledge of history. Thus, if he is released, he can do research and do things that will greatly benefit the country.

[Question] Mr Wirat Angkhathawon is said to be in southern Thailand. Is that true?

[Answer] He is in Thailand, that's true. But I cannot say whether he is in the south.

[Question] Government officials have said that the CPT's leadership center is now located in the south. Is that true?

[Answer] That, too, is something that I can't reveal.

[Question] Since you were once a student leader, would you give your views on today's student movement, that is, just the students?

[Answer] Actually, as I said before, I am far removed from that. I have just read various comments and criticisms. I can only say that the Thai student movement is the hope of the country. In the history of the struggle, an important political event has been the role played by the students. Even though the student movement has now declined and even though [the students] are engaging in few political activities, I think that the word "mature" can be applied to the student movement. And I am confident that it will mature even more. The student movement has passed through various struggles and learned many lessons. There were the events prior to and during 14 October and then they went into the jungle to fight following the events of 6 October. I think that these things strengthened the students and made them think about what the final decision would have to be. As for now, I think that they should be given more time. I am confident that the Thai student movement will mature even more. If something happens in the future, I think that the students will engage in activities that will be accepted by even greater numbers of people than before.

[Question] Is this a time of waiting for them?

[Answer] We are waiting for them to mature. I think that there are two conflicts within the student movement. Philosophically, I will say that within the student movement, there are features that have given rise to conflicts. These have been summarized in more detail than before. Concerning this quiet period, I don't think that this is a meaningless quietness. This quietness has its own meaning. I am sure about this. But actually, concerning what will happen with the student movement, I admit that I am far removed from the situation and don't really understand what is happening.

[Question] I would like to ask about a more minor matter. It is said that you are a follower of Chang Yuan. How did this story arise?

[Answer] In April 1977 or 1978, a seminar was held in a northern zone. Those attending included student leaders and mass leaders who had taken part in the events of 14 October. The lessons of those events were

summarized. Mr Wirat Ankhathawon took part too as the representative of the center. By chance, I happened to be responsible for the zone where the seminar was held. That is, they felt that this was an appropriate zone since it was the location of the student center in the joint revolutionary situation. Thus, student leaders who had taken part in the events of 14 October and 6 October were already there. Also, the situation was quite favorable. That is, we were located in a remote area where government troops could not easily detect us. As for my relations with Mr Wirat, who had come to participate, people on the outside may have felt that we were close prior to this. But actually, I had met him only twice before and only for short periods, that is, during the time that I studied the resolution of the Third Central Committee [Congress], Fourth Session. Those studying this at that time included Prawut Simantra, Prasong Phetchamrat and Anut Aphaphirom. This was just a normal visit. We did not know each other personally. Our meeting at the seminar was the third time that we had met. But concerning work and military activities, we contact each other, but not often. I think that this is understandable. Concerning what has been said, I don't think that I have been maligned.

[Question] But why does this seem to be so serious? And do you talk with Mr Wirat very often?

[Answer] We talk together very infrequently. We are in different areas.

[Question] What is your view of Mr Wirat?

[Answer] From what I know, he is a very unique person. He monitors the situation in a more systematic way than other people. I am not the only one who feels this way. Some student leaders who were here at that time agreed that Mr Wirat stated his views on the situation and on theory in a very logical and reasonable manner. He is a person who is not afraid to give his opinion. This is different from other people. He has good views. Some people are afraid to give their personal opinions if they differ from those held by others, but Wirat is not afraid to state his opinions.

[Question] Lieutenant General Chawalit has said that the CPT is dominated by the ideology of Chang Yuan and attaches great importance to this. Is this true?

[Answer] It is recognized that in one period, the ideas and recommendations of Mr Wirat were quite influential. This, concerning certain operations, if we look at them today they may seem to be incorrect. But that is in the past. In general, among the leaders, there is a feeling of collective responsibility. Even though the proposals made then were made by Mr Wirat, they agreed with him. Things were acknowledged like that at that time.

As for within the inner [circle], there is an acceptance of collective responsibility. But because I don't know whether other things of a

dominating nature took place, I cannot deny this. I have not worked with him much. But concerning Wirat's idea of using the rural areas to encircle the cities, which was the view of Mao, I don't think that Wirat was the only one to hold this view. This was the view of most people at that time. They felt that this was a viable line. Thus, if it is said that following the "rural areas encircle the cities" line, or holding to Mao's line only, not studying other Marxist ideologies and failing to make adequate adjustments is the thinking of Chang Yuan, I will say that I, too, once had views and ideas that were not in accord with reality. Thus, I can be criticized for being leftist or Maoist. I admit that my knowledge was limited. But when we become aware of other problems, it does not mean that I or the CPT will not change our ideas. I think that even Mr Wirat has changed his ideas.

[Question] How old are you?

[Answer] Thirty-six.

[Question] Would you tell us about Achan Chon?

[Answer] We were just married on 1 December 1983. We have been married 5 months now. We had not yet gotten married at the time that all the reports were coming out. We were just engaged. We were engaged for almost a year. We were married in the secure zone.

[Question] Is your wife pregnant yet?

[Answer] No.

11/43

CSO: 4207/157

COLUMNIST DISCUSSES NEUTRALITY ON KAMPUCHEAN ISSUE

Bangkok CHAT ATHIPATAI in Thai 27 May 84 pp 24, 25

[Article by Narasing: "The Kampuchean Border Problem, What Can We Do to Solve This Problem?"]

[Text] I once proposed that to solve the problems in Kampuchea or Indonesia, mainly political methods must be used, with military methods being secondary. Otherwise, we will not be able to solve the problems and things will just get worse and more complex. This could turn into an international war between the Free World and the communist world and lead to a world war. Using politics means taking a neutral position. Having a neutral policy is secondary because that is the government's policy, and it can be repealed at any time. Or if there is a change of government, the policy may be changed, too.

Neutrality originates from war. When a war breaks out, there are always some countries that don't want to get involved and so they announce their neutrality. Thus, in principle, in the absence of war, "neutrality" is meaningless. But in the present situation or in the world at present, neutrality has been adapted to peacetime, too. Even though there is peace, it does not mean that the countries of the world are not arguing. Because in times of peace, there are always conflicts. It's just that it hasn't reached the stage of fighting.

Originally, neutrality concerned relations between the countries in the Free World only, or neutrality in countries within the same social system. Because at that time, there was still no communist world. But now, neutrality has been adapted to include neutrality between different social systems. That is, there is neutrality between liberalism and socialism, or communism.

Thus, neutrality today is different from in the past. In the past, to remain neutral it was necessary to consider both the geography and resources of the country. For example, Switzerland could remain neutral because its geography, administration and natural resources supported this.

But now, things have changed greatly. The advances in technology and science have made geography a secondary factor in considering the neutrality of a country. Because people can now go to any spot on the earth easily. In considering the possibility of a country remaining neutral, the important factor now is the surrounding political situation, or the international situation, and the conflicts that affect that country.

As for Thailand, whether or not we can be neutral does not depend on geography. The important factor is that Thailand is one of the strategic points in the world. It is a center in the conflict between the Free World and the Communist World and between members of the socialist world, that is, China and the Soviet Union. Thailand can be compared to a beautiful woman who is desired by several men of both the same religion and a different religion. That is, the interests of both the Free World and the communist World are centered on Thailand. China is not willing to allow the Soviet Union to gain prominence in Thailand. Similarly, the Soviet Union is not willing to allow China to have influence in Thailand. The United States doesn't want either the Soviet Union or China to have influence over Thailand. And the same is true for Japan, which has major interests in Thailand. It does not want any country to gain influence over Thailand. Thus, Thailand is like a beautiful woman who is desired by several men. And none of the men is willing to give in to one of the others. Put this way, if Thailand does not lean toward any country, it will be difficult for any of these countries to pile up profits from us. But if we make a mistake, besides the fact that this will lead to a struggle among the various countries, we will be torn to pieces, too. Thus, Thailand must be very careful. And what is most important is that Thailand must not become too deeply involved with anyone. Instead, we must remain neutral and try to benefit from all sides in the safest way possible. Thus, Thailand should maintain a position of real neutrality and not live in a dream. Because the political situation and the conflicts are factors that are favorable to us, as I have said previously. Before going into the details, I want to discuss types of neutrality in order to refresh your memories.

Neutrality can be divided into three aspects: Neutral policy, neutral situation and neutralism, or not becoming attached to any side.

Neutral policy: This is the foreign policy of a country that does not lean toward any particular side in a conflict or war. It is an internal matter and does not require that other countries or the great powers give guarantees. Thus, this is a temporary neutrality since the government of that country can change the policy.

Countries with neutral policies are usually small or weak countries. The large and strong countries, or great powers, don't use a neutral policy; they are not neutral. As for the small countries, it's not because they are strong. No matter how strong a small country is, it would definitely lose to a great power. Rather, the reason why small countries can succeed in using neutral policies is that the international situation supports this. Regardless of the fact that they are weak, they can remain neutral if the international situation supports this. For example, Thailand can certainly use a neutral policy in the war between Iran and Iraq since the fighting is taking place far from us and they don't need any help from us. But the United States and the Soviet Union have never given any thought to remaining neutral. They can support whichever side they want to or that will benefit them.

It can be seen that whether or not a small country remains neutral does not depend on the strength or weakness of that country. It depends mainly on the international situation. And success in implementing a neutral policy depends on the ability to use the international situation and the conflicts in the most advantageous way possible.

As for Thailand, there are three different lines of thought concerning the problem in Kampuchea, that is, on whether Thailand should remain neutral. Communist fighters and those who understand the struggle line in Policy 66/1980 favor announcing a policy of neutrality between the contestants in the war in Kampuchea. But other groups do not agree with this since they think that if we remain neutral, the Khmer coalition will certainly be defeated by Vietnam. Thus, we must support the Khmer coalition so that it can serve as a buffer and make it difficult for Vietnam to invade our country. Another group is somewhat hotheaded. It is not willing to be stepped on by Vietnam and is urging that the [Thai] military invade Vietnam.

The ideas of all are valuable and useful. We should not belittle the ideas of others. We should analyze the various ideas carefully to determine who is right and who is wrong. This should be done based on theory, what is possible, national security and the nation's interests.

11943

CSO: 4207/162

EDITORIAL ASSESSES MILITARY VIEWS OF POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT

Bangkok THAI RAT in Thai 8 May 84 p 3

[Editorial: "The Military and Politics"]

[Text] Lieutenant General Chawalit Yongchaiyut, the deputy chief of staff of the army, recently talked with Thais in Los Angeles and the newspaper PRACHAMIT printed some of his remarks. One interesting thing that he said is that "at present, we are very worried about whether or not the political parties or MPs will really be able to fulfill [the needs] of the masses. For this reason, the military has gotten involved in this. And this has led people to think, mistakenly, that the military is interfering in politics, in particular, that it is meddling in order to revise the constitution."

Two aspects of this statement can be discussed. 1. The military has no intention of meddling in politics if the political parties and politicians do things properly. 2. At present, the military does not have much confidence in the politicians, who say that they can turn the country into a democracy.

Concerning his talking with Thais living in the United States, who are considered to be a resource since most are well educated and play a large role in both domestic and international politics, it is our understanding that he was told to do this by one of his high-level superiors. These statements express the views of senior military people who have made their views public and who are watching politics and the politicians. In particular, they have said that the political parties are not yet perfect according to the principles of democracy, regardless of how this is measured. This is worth paying attention to.

As for the matter of the military not wanting to get involved in politics, this is nothing new. In the democracy of the past 50 years, based on their past political actions, it cannot be denied that the military has interfered in politics. And each time that it has interfered in politics, it has always said that it has done so "for national security" reasons, although past and present claims may differ because of the changed situation.

At the same time, Thailand has been experimenting with democracy for half a century now. If we feel that, in this, Thailand has not succeeded in keeping pace with the needs of anyone or any group and that it is, therefore, essential that we devise a new structure, this is tantamount to insulting ourselves and the masses. As said, we have failed to heed the voice of those with the highest sovereignty, that is, the people who exercise their right to vote.

Looked at from the perspective of the military, that is, from the standpoint of national security, we feel that this is a method far removed from the democratic system that we are trying to develop step by step. That is, we want to develop the parliament, the parties and the politicians, and this will require time and patience and knowledge on the part of the people. Several countries have developed these aspects continually. At the same time, the political parties and the politicians must ask themselves how they should develop themselves in order to keep the military from interfering in politics.

11841

CSE: 4257/161

THAILAND

DRAFT BILL NOTES MILITARY PAY SCALES

Bangkok MATUPHUM In Thai 29 May 84 p 1

[Article: "Details on the Military Draft Act on Military Pay Scales"]

[Text] Principles and Reasons

Government Service Draft Act (Issue No...)

Year....

Principles:

The 1978 Military Act is revised as follows:

1. Military pay scales for regular soldiers, draftees on active duty and students subordinate to the Ministry of Defense will be revised (Draft Article 3; revision of Article 12).
2. Regular soldiers, draftees on active duty and students subordinate to the Ministry of Defense will receive the salaries stipulated (Draft Article 4, addition to Article 12-two).
3. The military pay scales stipulated at the end of the 1978 Military Act will be revoked, and new pay scales will be used instead (Draft Act 5).

Reasons:

The military pay scales now in use are no longer suitable since some ranks have too few pay grades. Thus, in some cases, senior people cannot be placed in the minimum rank in accord with the system of military ranks. And in raising pay grades, in some cases a person must be appointed to a higher rank than he should be. Because of this, the number of pay grades should be increased for certain ranks. Thus, it has been necessary to draft this act.

Draft of the Military Act (Issue No...)

Year

Because it is fitting to revise the law on military personnel:

Article 1: This act is called the "Military Act (Issue No...) of ...(year).

Article 2: This act will go into effect the day after it is announced in the government gazette.

Article 3: Article 12 of the Military Act of 1978 is hereby rescinded. The following is to be used instead:

"Article 12: The pay scales for regular soldiers, draftees on active duty and students subordinate to the Ministry of Defense are shown at the end of this act. There are 13 levels, with each level having the following number of grades:

(1) Private 1 level, 19 grades; (2) Private 2 level, 20 grades; (3) NCO 1, 25 grades; (4) NCO 2, 14 grades; (5) Officer 1, 21 grades; (6) Officer 2, 13 grades; (7) Officer 3, 13 grades; (8) Officer 4, 10 grades; (9) Officer 5, 10 grades; (10) Officer 6, 9 grades; (11) Officer 7, 9 grades; (12) Officer 8, 6 grades; and (13) Officer 9; 1 grade.

Article 4: The following is to be added to form Article 12-Two of the Military Act of 1978:

"Article 12-two: Regular soldiers, draftees on active duty and students subordinate to the Ministry of Defense are to receive the following salaries:

(1) Draftees on active duty (privates) and students subordinate to the Ministry of Defense are at the Private 1 pay level.

(2) Regular privates (volunteers) are at the Private 2 level.

(3) Non-Commissioned officers from the rank of lance corporal, petty officer 3rd Class and warrant officer 3rd Class to master sergeant, warrant officer 1st Class (navy) and warrant officer 1st Class (air force) are at the NCO 1 level.

(4) Non-commissioned officers of the rank of master sergeant and warrant officer 1st class whose pay scale is that of special master sergeant and special warrant officer 1st class are at the NCO 2 level.

(5) Commissioned officers from the rank of sublieutenant and pilot officer to captain, lieutenant-junior and flight leader are at the Officer 1 level.

(6) Commissioned officers with the rank of major, lieutenant commander and squadron leader are at the Officer 2 level.

(7) Commissioned officers with the rank of lieutenant colonel, commander and wing commander are at the Officer 3 level.

(8) Commissioned officers with the rank of colonel, captain and group captain are at the Officer 4 Level.

(9) Commissioned officers with the rank of brigadier general, commodore and air commodore or officers with the rank of colonel, captain or group captain whose pay scale is that of a special colonel, special captain or special group captain are at the Officer 5 level.

(10) Commissioned officers with the rank of major general, rear admiral and air marshal are at the Officer 6 level.

(11) Commissioned officers with the rank of lieutenant general, vice admiral and air vice marshal are at the officer 7 level.

(12) Commissioned officers with the rank of general, admiral and air chief marshal are at the Officer 8 level.

(13) Commissioned officers with the rank of field marshal, admiral of the fleet and marshal of the Royal Air Force are at the Officer 9 level.

Article 5: The military pay scales shown at the end of the 1978 Military Act are hereby rescinded, and the pay scales shown at the end of this act are to be used instead.

Article 6: The pay scales for regular soldiers, draftees on active duty and students subordinate to the Ministry of Defense who went on duty or who were attached to a regular unit or who were given student status before this act went into effect and who were still on duty, who were still attached to a regular unit or who still had student status when this act went into effect are to be adjusted in accord with the military pay scales shown at the end of this act as stipulated by the Ministry of Defense with the permission of the cabinet.

Article 7: The minister of defense is responsible for ensuring that the provisions of this act are carried out.

11941

Doc: 4207/161

CPT CODE-BREAKING, INTERCEPT CAPABILITIES NOTED

Bangkok ATHIT KHLET LAP in Thai 26 May-1 Jun 84 pp 38, 39

[Article: "Code Breaking, a Lesson From the CPT"]

[Text] In February 1984, the Second Army Area captured some documents and a quantity of weapons and ammunition from an old communist terrorist operations base in Nakhon Phanom Province. What startled the officials was that among the documents captured were two or three notebooks containing notes on breaking the codes of military units operating in the area. Some parts of the notebooks were transcriptions of secret intelligence communications and operations orders of government units that the communist terrorists had clearly been able to read. When the officials checked the document numbers referred to by the communist terrorists, it turned out that they all matched. This shows that the communist terrorists were able to intercept the communications of officials and break the codes.

In the notebooks of the communist terrorists, who are thought to have been an intercept and code-breaking section, there were detailed instructions on how to break the codes of government officials. It can be said that these were manuals that new communist terrorists could study. And this shows that the communist terrorists made such a great effort to break the codes of the officials that they finally succeeded. As a consequence of this, officials have suffered large losses. The loss of life and property may not have been very great, but there were great losses in terms of operations failing to achieve the objectives since the communist terrorists were aware of things ahead of time.

From the documents captured, [it was learned that] the communist terrorists knew the "code names" of all the government units in the northeast from the Second Army Area to CPM [Civil-Police-Military Unit] No 21, 22 and 23 since each unit has its own code name. For example, "Nang Ron" refers to the 13th Infantry Regiment at Udorn Thani and "Pan Thip" refers to the 8th Infantry Regiment at Khon Kaen. Important people also have their own code names in order to prevent people who are intercepting the broadcasts from knowing who these people are. But the communist

terrorists were able to break the codes. For example, "wan chat" referred to the commanding general of the Second Army Area at the camp of CPM No 22 (which was recorded by the communist terrorists).

The communist terrorists were able to break the signal codes that we have frequently heard the Police Department use, for example, "W.1" and "W.13." They were also able to break the signal codes of the military units in the area from "W.1" to "W.43." For example, as recorded by the communist terrorists, "W.8" meant "request orders," "W.6" meant "request permission to make direct contact" and "W.16-2" meant "not receiving you clearly."

The communist terrorists were able to break many of the military, civilian and police codes used in the area, particularly the "sonakan" code, which is a single-level code that uses letters, numbers or a combination of letters and numbers in five-word groups. This is a very easy code to break. The communist terrorists who were responsible for intercepting broadcasts or breaking codes kept detailed notes on types of codes, transmission methods, code-breaking principles and language used. At the end of the notebook, the communist terrorists had written the text of government orders, intelligence reports and so on that they had intercepted and translated into plaintext.

Breaking the codes enabled the communist terrorists to learn about the communications networks, particularly the network of the Second Army Area and the subordinate units. As recorded by the communist terrorists, they [were intercepting the broadcasts] of the divisions, regiments, battalions, platoons CPM units, the border operations center, the provincial ISK communications net that maintains contact with the areas and Regional Security Volunteers and the communications net of the Ministry of Interior that maintains contact with the provincial governors and border patrol police.

These captured documents consisted of government codes that had been broken in 1982. But since they were able to break the codes in 1982, it shows that the communist terrorists probably have the ability to break today's codes, too.

A news source in the Second Army Area said that the communist terrorists in the northeast have attached importance to intercepting the communications of officials ever since 1980. There was a conference about this matter in April 1980, and the importance of "intercept intelligence" concerning the activities of officials was stressed. Unit 46, which was the regional intelligence unit of the Northeastern CPT Headquarters in Nakhon Phanom, was responsible for this. The communist terrorists made tactical use of the intercepts mainly in order to defend themselves. However, they also made use of this intelligence in order to attack officials.

In the northeast, many of the communist terrorists who have surrendered have stated that the communist terrorists use radio transmitter-receivers captured from government officials to intercept the communications of officials and that they are able to break the codes. Thus, they know about the movements of the officials. In the past, the communist terrorists sent broadcasts while officials were talking in order to annoy the officials. But later on, higher officials resolutely forbid this since they did not want government officials to know that the communist terrorists were able to intercept their broadcasts. One communist terrorist who was a student and who surrendered to officials stated that he had once intercepted and broken the codes of officials in Nak Phanom Province. Communist terrorist radio cadres had given him his initial training. Later on, he studied the communications systems of officials and gradually learned how to intercept the broadcasts and break the codes of the officials, tasks at which he became very proficient. Even though the officials changed codes every month, it did not take him long to break the "sarakun"-type code used by officials.

A news source in the Third Army Area said that in 1981, during the "suriyaphong" operation in Nan Province, the Third Army Area captured communist terrorist documents that stated that the communist terrorists in the north were able to intercept the broadcasts and break the codes of the Third Army Area and the subordinate units. They used radio transmitter-receivers captured from officials as intercept equipment. The news source in the Third Army Area also said that the major operations in which the military was successful in seizing communist terrorist camps were successful because the military made a great effort to limit radio communications as much as possible. Since the communist terrorists could not intercept the broadcasts of officials, they did not know about their movements. Thus, they learned of the operations only when they were attacked by officials. The news source admitted that whenever radios were used to transmit messages, the communist terrorists were usually able to find ahead of time, so the soldiers suffered heavier casualties than normal.

Similarly, a news source in the Fourth Army Area said that the communist terrorists in the south were capable of intercepting and breaking the codes of officials. Whenever an operation is launched, no radio messages are transmitted unless it is absolutely necessary. This is because it is feared that the communist terrorists will be able to intercept and read the secret messages. An important loss was once suffered in the Fourth Army Area when the communist terrorists intercepted a message concerning a visit by Mom Chan Wiphawatt Rangsriy. At that time, the communist terrorists did not know who this was. The only thing they knew was that this was an "important person." And they knew that a helicopter would pass over this area. Thus, the communist terrorists hid on top of a high hill that the helicopter would pass over and then fired at the helicopter carrying Mom Chan Wiphawatt Rangsriy. This story

made the headlines. In the "Tal Bun Yen" operation, the soldiers captured a code-breaking book of the communist terrorists in Surat Thani Province. This confirmed that the communist terrorists had in fact been the ones to fire at the helicopter carrying Mom Chao Wiphawadi Rangsit in 1976.

A military officer who is responsible for maintaining communications security said that government radio officials frequently disregard the regulations concerning maintaining communications security. Using radio communications to inform others of the situation and to transmit orders is very quick. But the weakness is that the radio signals are broadcast into the air and cannot be controlled. Anyone can intercept the transmissions if they have access to the same frequency. The way to maintain secrecy is to use codes. But sometimes the radio officials or coding officials take the easy way and broadcast in the clear, thinking that no one will intercept the transmission. They don't realize that their carelessness may result in the nation losing an important person. In particular, when a high-ranking commander goes on an inspection tour, reports of his visit must be sent in advance. Communist terrorists who intercept such broadcasts can set an ambush on the highest mountain over which they think the helicopter will pass. Pilots normally fly over an area at a certain altitude and do not increase their altitude when they pass over a mountain. This enables the communist terrorists to shoot down or damage the helicopter. This has happened to several generals. But it isn't known if news of their visit leaked out because of communist terrorist intercepts. Also, radio and coding officials feel that news of such trips is common knowledge and not a secret. And so they don't encode such messages, which is a misunderstanding on their part.

After he surrendered, the communist terrorist whose duty had been to intercept and break the coded messages of officials wrote a memorandum warning officials that:

1. The use of radio communications, particularly concerning negotiations, intelligence and personnel matters should be avoided.
2. For top secret messages, the messages should be sent by courier.
3. If it is necessary to send secret messages by radio, the code used should be difficult to break.
4. The codes should be changed frequently.
5. Special substitute words taken from another code should be used in place of sentences or syllables that must be used frequently.
6. The "anagram" type codes should not be used since they are easy to break.
7. Sending messages partly in code and partly in plaintext should be avoided since this makes it easier to break the code.

Concerning what this former communist terrorist had to say, government officials should not ignore his warning. Because in general, the things that he said are already included in the regulations for maintaining communications security.

In Bangkok, it is common to see police or military officials carrying radio transmitter-receivers like an ornament or status symbol. When they are eating (in a restaurant), people can hear the broadcasts. In most cases, the messages concern traffic matters, crimes or other ordinary matters. But there are also messages that outsiders should not hear. Concerning such radios, if a person has just a P.S.B.-type radio receiver, which can be purchased in Hong Kong or at Khlong Thom or Khlong Toei and which does not cost very much, he can intercept these messages. The newspapers usually use these radios as do almost all the embassies. Even though the Communications Authority of Thailand claims that it is illegal to own such equipment, the law gives little attention to this.

The best way to safeguard (communications) is to stop sending secret information by radio. If it is necessary to do so, the information should be encoded in a high-level code that is difficult to break.

11043

TSR: 4207/142

THAILAND

COLUMNIST CALLS FOR HALT IN KAMPUCHEAN MILITARY STRUGGLE

Bangkok CHAT ATHIPATAI in Thai 20 May 84 pp 19, 20

[Article by Narasing: "The Kampuchean Border Problem, What Can We Do to Solve This Problem"]

[Text] "Vietnamese attack Thais, 56 killed or wounded...fire artillery shells at the community center."

"Fierce clashes in Surin; Prem orders retaliation."

"Vietnamese embassy refuses to admit guilt, protests second time; relations almost severed."

These were the headlines in some of the daily Thai newspapers on 1 and 2 May concerning the artillery shells that landed in Ban Charat in Bua Chet Branch District, Surin Province, which killed one person and wounded 50 others as was reported in the newspapers. Concerning these headlines, it can be said that they have damaged the country since this will probably alarm people who do not know what is happening and frighten foreigners. They will think that Thailand and Vietnam are about to go to war against each other. And this will affect the country's economy since both domestic and foreign investments will drop. The only ones to benefit from such stories are our enemies.

I am frequently asked: If we fight Vietnam, can we win? Why do we allow them to get away with this; why don't we take resolute action?

As for this problem, I can only say that if a war between Thailand and Vietnam breaks out, this could lead to a world war and Thailand might even find itself a communist country. We could experience a fate such as we have never before experienced in the history of the country, regardless of whether we win or lose. And it is difficult to see how we could win since, most likely, we would not be fighting just Vietnam. We would also have to confront the Soviet Union and troops from Laos.

Are Thais afraid of the Vietnamese. Not at all! Thais have never bowed down to any country. We have always managed to maintain our national sovereignty. Throughout the world it is well known that Thailand was never colonized. We were never defeated by any foreigner, no matter

the great power they were. As for being cowardly or defeatist, no Thai would ever exhibit such qualities. Looking back at the history of our country, in solving the problems facing the country, our ancestors always chose the path of peace if they could avoid a war. Our ancestors knew that winning without having to fight represented an even greater victory for the country. And our national religion, Buddhism, which teaches people to cling to the correct path, eschews violence. Thus, Thais are unique in the world. They can get along well with all nationalities and do not have racial prejudices as do people in other countries. All people who come to Thailand are given a warm welcome. When they see our customs and traditions, they are quite impressed.

As for the problem along the Kampuchean border, which is compared to a thorn in our side these days, this will pose a great threat to the survival of the nation if we make the wrong decision or if we lack commonsense and are not fully aware of the stratagems of the communist world, the situation, the strategy and tactics of the CPT and the policies of the communist world. Readers are probably well aware of the fact that the important struggle in the world today is the struggle between the Free World and the Communist World. And the fact that we have problems with Vietnam means that we have problems with the communists, or that we are struggling to defeat the communists. If we get into a fight with Vietnam, we will have to fight the Soviet Union indirectly. The Soviet Union will definitely not abandon Vietnam since they believe that:

"Communist countries must protect and help each other. Communist countries cannot remain neutral; they must depend on the senior countries, that is, the Soviet Union and China."

Stated simply, the Soviet Union would definitely not allow Thailand to defeat Vietnam or occupy Kampuchea. Because having problems with Vietnam is tantamount to having problems with the communist countries, we must be very careful. Thus, to solve the problem in Kampuchea or the Thai border problem, we must use mainly political methods and use the military only when necessary. If we try to solve the problems using military methods, we will fail to solve the problems. This could pose a grave danger to Thailand and lead to a world war.

In using political methods, what is involved? Primarily, this means implementing a policy of strict neutrality (in the conflict) between the Khmer coalition and Vietnam, or remaining neutral between China and the Soviet Union, who are now engaged in a serious conflict.

Stated simply, we must not get involved in the fighting between the communists and just let them kill each other. As for the refugees, we must use humanitarian principles. If [forces] cross the border, we must expel them. Because the border cannot be sealed off with barbed wire. Both the Vietnamese and the various Khmer resistance groups frequently

violate our border. And there have been several clashes between Thai and Vietnamese forces along our border just as happened in the past. When there are clashes, both sides suffer casualties, which is something that our side cannot tolerate. If real fighting breaks out and we destroy each other using real forces, that is, if there is a war between Thailand and Vietnam, which would be a war between different ideologies, this would be a disaster for both countries.

Yes, the important questions facing our country are how to avoid war without losing our honor and how to improve our position in such a situation. These are questions that should be given attention.

11943

CSQ: 4207/162

CARTOON LAPOONS IMPORTED WESTERN CULTURE

Bangkok DAILY NEWS in Thai 21 May 84 p 5

[Cartoon]



GEN HAN: COUNTERCORRUPTION EFFORT LACKS TEETH

Bangkok SIAM RAT in Thai 19 May 84 pp 1, 12

[Article: Office of the Commission to Counter Corruption Said to Lack Real Power; Five Ways to Correct This Recommended"]

[Text] The former secretary-general of the Office of the Commission to Counter Corruption (O.C.C.C.) has called the state's counter corruption organization a paper tiger. He said that the main thing is that the O.C.C.C. lacks sufficient power to carry out its duties. Even after the results of an investigation have come out, superior units shelve the matter and sometimes they even alter the evidence of the O.C.C.C.

In his capacity as the chairman of the Subcommittee to Discuss Influences and Dark Powers, General Han Linanon, a senator, told reporters at noon yesterday that the subcommittee had asked Mr Suthi Akatrak, the former secretary-general of the O.C.C.C. to come and provide data concerning the activities of the O.C.C.C. since this commission is responsible for eliminating corruption in state units. Mr Suthi spoke about the problems and obstacles in carrying out the work of the O.C.C.C. He said that there are two [basic] problems, that is, the legal structure and the resulting problems.

As for the legal structure, in carrying out the tasks, the O.C.C.C. cannot hit the targets because it does not have the power to subpoena documents from the various units. And when a case of corruption has been investigated and presented to the Office of the Prime Minister, the people superior to those in the unit being investigated form their own investigative committee, and the evidence and investigation reports of the O.C.C.C. are not used. Thus, the work of the O.C.C.C. is all wasted effort.

As for the problems that arise when the evidence obtained during the investigation is sent to the unit, some matters are shelved for 7-8 years. Thus, the evidence is out of date, and evidence is altered. There are constant delays. Besides this, there is also the problem of people holding to old values and not realizing what it means to be a government official. This will take a long time to correct.

General Han Lianan said that the former secretary-general of the O.C.C.C. had recommended five ways to correct this:

1. An increase in the number of corrupt and illegal activities in government circles must be prevented, and the government must be very strict concerning delays in cases investigated by the O.C.C.C.
2. There must be greater strictness about the policies for using existing tools in accord with the state's administrative system. The results of the work must be checked in accord with the administrative line. Discipline must be maintained, and good morals must be preserved.
3. If strict action has been taken and emphasis has been placed on the policies for using the tools in accord with the state's existing administrative system but this fails to achieve results or increase efficiency, the powers and duties of the units or special affairs committees must be increased so that they can carry out the work in a decisive and resolute matter. There must be measures for meting out harsh penalties in accord with the losses suffered by the state.
4. Government officials must be instilled with a sense of responsibility for the survival of the institutions of state, religion and monarchy so that these serve as values in society in the future.
5. A national strategic plan concerning state administration should be prepared in accord with the laws and data. This will reduce the number of problems or obstacles in government circles and generate [greater] national security. This is an important recommendation.

11943

CSO: 4207/162

COLUMNIST RAISES CONCERN OVER FISHING PROBLEMS

Bangkok THAI RAT in Thai 29 Apr 84 p 7

[Thailand today column by Sunthon Wathi: "Vietnam Sinks a Thai Fishing Boat: The New Law of the Sea, There Is No Way For Thailand to Get to the High Seas"]

[Text] Vietnam sunk a Thai fishing boat. One sailor was killed and 11 were injured. Four were injured only slightly. Three are missing.

This took place just a few days ago. That is, the Thai "Tharassamut 5" fishing boat was sunk by a Vietnamese warship on the high seas. How did you feel when you read about this? My feeling was that "this is another problem" for Thailand today.

On Friday, Rear Admiral Prasan Chuchinda, the secretary of the navy, said that this Thai fishing boat was sunk 47 miles from Kama Island. Many people have said that the boat was in international waters and that Vietnam had no right to attack our boat. But the secretary of the navy admitted that this took place in an area known as a "special economic zone" of Vietnam according to the new Law of the Sea. This is the problem--the major problem for Thailand today.

There would not be any problem if Thailand and Vietnam had good relations with each other. A good neighbor has to warn the other about being in his economic zone and not just start shooting, which is what Vietnam did. Why do I say that this is a problem? The "special economic zone" is the problem.

The Faculty of Political Science at Ramkhamhaeng University will hold a seminar on the Law of the Sea on 3-4 May. I feel that this is appropos and so I have gathered some information on this and will pass it on to you.

What is this "special economic zone" that is causing problems? Dr. Phiphat Tankeubkun, a member of the Faculty of Political Science at Ramkhamhaeng University, is an expert who will present a paper at the seminar. He has written a paper titled "Thailand: Effects from the New Law of the Sea," which explains this matter very clearly.

The United Nations General Assembly held the third international conference on the Law of the Sea during the period June-August 1974 in Caracas, Venezuela. Thailand participated in this conference, too. This conference passed many resolutions on a new Law of the Sea and divided the ocean areas into many zones, including territorial waters, straits, continental shelves, special economic zones and the high seas.

The important matter that I want to discuss today concerns territorial waters and special economic zones. "Territorial waters" refers to the ocean area extending out 12 miles from the coast of a country. This is considered to be the "territorial waters" of that country. That country has full sovereign power over that area just as it does over its land territory.

As for "special economic zone," according to the new Law of the Sea, the ocean area extending out 200 miles from the coast of a country is considered to be the special economic zone of that country. However, that country has only "sovereign rights" in profiting from the resources above and below the floor of the ocean in that area. It does not have sovereign power.

How does this concern Thailand? According to the new Law of the Sea, Thailand has no access to the high seas. In the Gulf of Thailand, our special economic zone extends out less than 100 miles since we have had to share the area with Kampuchea and Vietnam. As for the Andaman Sea on the west coast of Thailand, our special economic zone extends out for about 100 miles since we have to share the waters with the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, which belong to India.

Even though the new Law of the Sea has enabled us to expand our territorial waters to 94,700 square miles and to reap great profits from this area and even though the Thai government has granted oil-drilling concessions, with both oil and natural gas discovered, which has given rise to the dream of a "bright" future, we have also lost advantages. Because as a country that does not, according to the new Law of the Sea, have access to the high seas, both Thai and foreign cargo ships entering and leaving Thai ports have to pass through the special economic zones of our neighbors.

Dr. Paiphat pointed out that the problem is that if our neighbors become "strict" and pass laws controlling ship operations and raise tonnage fees, the foreign goods imported by Thailand will be more expensive, and the goods exported by Thailand will cost more on foreign markets. These are the disadvantages.

Thailand's ocean fishing fleet once ranked seventh in the world, catching 2 million metric tons of fish valued at 8 billion Baht in 1977. If we follow the new Law of the Sea, Thai deep-water fishing boats will not have a chance to fish on the high seas since the special economic zones of our neighbors will block them everywhere in Southeast Asia.

Another thing is that every square inch of ocean in this region is owned by some country, whether Thailand, Kampuchea, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, India or Burma. If Thai fishermen want to fish outside Thai territorial waters, they will have to pay a concession fee. They will not be able to fish free as in the past. Also, they will have to respect and act in accord with the regulations stipulated by the country in whose waters they are fishing.

These are the things that I consider to be problems. We will no longer be able to sing the song "The Sea Is Like Our Home."

11943

CSO: 4207/161

THAILAND

BRIEFS

BANGKOK POPULATION--Mr Prachiet Sakunwong, the director of the Registry and Records Division, Bangkok Metropolitan, released statistics on the population of Bangkok for March. He said that the total population was 5,047,747. There were 2,365,965 men and 2,481,782 women. The most densely populated district was Phra Khanong District with 583,088 people--292,384 men and 290,704 women. The district with the lowest density was Lat Krabang District with 49,137 people--24,023 men and 25,114 women. Based on the monthly population surveys, it has been learned that the population has increased each month. In particular, this past month, the population increased 18,494 from the previous month since there were more births than deaths and since more people moved into the city than moved away. (Text) (Bangkok THAI RAT in Thai 29 May 84 p. 7) 11943

MALAY BORDER DEMARCATION--Concerning the joint Thai-Malaysian border survey and demarcation activities, work on 418 kilometers, which is more than half the work, has been completed. When the work has been completed in accord with the project, the peoples of both countries will benefit. General Athit Kamlanok, the supreme commander and PTA CINC and the chairman of the Thai-Malaysian Border Demarcation Committee, presided at the opening of the 11th meeting of the committee at the conference hall of National Security Command Headquarters. At this meeting, [the participants] discussed the progress made in surveying and demarcating the border, which began in July 1973. To date, a total of 417.2 kilometers have been surveyed and demarcated, which is 65.8 percent of the length of the border. Thus, good progress has been made in the face of the security risks and the difficulties of the terrain. Besides this, at the meeting, it was agreed to increase the number of survey teams in order to step up the work remaining to be done along the border. The Thai-Malaysian Border Demarcation Committee will hold its next meeting in Malaysia in order to complete the work ahead of schedule. Because this work will benefit social and economic development and help improve the living conditions of the people on both sides of the border. (Text) (Bangkok NAFU NA in Thai 10 May 84 pp. 1, 11, 13) 11943

CSD: 4201/161

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

ARMY PARTY ORGANIZATIONS, POLITICAL CADRE FUNCTIONS VIEWED

Hanoi (VNA) DAN NHAN DAN IN VIETNAMESE 26, 27 Apr 81

[Part 4 of 5-part series: "Understanding the New Leadership Mechanism of the Party As Regards Our Army: the Political Organs and the Political Cadre Component." For parts 1-3 of this article, please see JPRS-SEA-84-096 of 20 June 1984 pp 28-39.]

[26 Apr 84, p 3]

[Text] In order for party and political work to be highly effective in our army, it is necessary to have a strong party and political work organization with a cadre component possessing sufficient quality and ability to shoulder the mission.

The political organs at all echelons carry out party and political work within their own unit in accordance with statutes of the party, resolutions of national party congresses, resolutions and directives of the Party Central Committee and Secretariat, and directives of higher level political organs, and based on the military directives and orders of the commander of the unit at their level. The political organ is organized in all echelons higher than the primary level party organizations, that is at the service, division and equivalent levels and higher.

The political director, who has in charge of the political organ, and the commander closely coordinate with each other in the party and political work of their unit. In the command relationship, the political director is below the commander of the same level and at the same time is higher than other military personnel. In the party aspect, the political director is the manager of the party leadership work in the unit. In the command organization, the political director assists the commander in organizing implementation of political activities within the unit.

The political organ system within the army consists of the Political General Department (concerning the entire military), the political directorate at the military region, service, corps and equivalent unit level, and the political bureau at the branch, division and equivalent unit level. The man in charge of the political organ is the political director.

The Political General Department is the political organ of the entire military. The Party Central Committee, regularly and directly through the Secretariat, leads party and political work in the army through the Political General Department. The Political General Department is the organ assisting the Secretariat in supervising party and political work in the army. At the same time, the Political General Department is a general department in the Ministry of National Defense.

The Political General Department closely coordinates with the Department of Propaganda and Training and the Organization Department of the Party Central Committee on party and political work in the army.

To assure the collective nature of Political General Department leadership, the Party Central Committee has decided to establish the Political General Department Council and has assigned the council roster following the suggestions of the Director of the Political General Department with the Director of the Political General Department as the council chairman. The Political General Department Council collectively examines and issues resolutions on major policies and methods of party and political work, on party primary level organization construction, on the work of political cadres in building mass organizations within their purview, on building and strengthening party discipline, etc. The resolutions of the Council will be decided by the majority and will be manifested by directives of the Director of the Political General Department.

Following the stipulated system, the "Political General Department reports in the Party Central Committee and Secretariat on the situation of party and political work in the armed forces and the situation of its own party activities; and reports to the Military Council of the Ministry of National Defense and the Minister of National Defense on the political situation, troop morale and political work in the armed forces and the quality of leadership and the combat strength of party primary level organizations."

The Political Directorate is responsible for party and political work at the military region, branch, corps, general department and equivalent level units.

Based on the directives of the Political General Department, the resolutions of the Military Council and the orders of the command at its own level, the Political Directorate studies and substantiates the policies and plans of party and political work consistent with the actual situation of its own unit, guides lower echelons in achievement and directly organizes the achievement of tasks within the echelons for which it is responsible.

The political bureau is responsible for party and political work in the service, division and equivalent level units, and directly leads the party primary level organizations in the services, divisions and equivalent level units, and in provincial and municipal military organs directly subordinate to the central government.

The political bureau, based on the directives of upper echelon political organs and the orders of the commander at its own level, organizes achievement of party and political work in close coordination with the situation, mission, objectives and operating circumstances of the unit. The political directorates and political bureaus organize political directorate councils and political bureau councils to collectively examine and resolve the primary problems in party and political work, in political cadres working within their purview and in party member discipline.

At the regimental level and lower (and in equivalent level units), there is a deputy commander for politics who directly organizes achievement of party and political work in the primary level units. The deputy regimental commander for politics is the representative of the political bureau.

Raising the political organ from an organ functioning to assist the unit party committee and commander to a party leadership organ responsible for the party and political work and leading the party primary level organizations clearly and totally indicates there has been no reduction in the role of the political work organ in the new mechanism of leadership and command within our army. On the contrary, the political work organ has been upgraded in accordance with the new mechanism primarily to create conditions for party and political activities and work to develop the greatest effectiveness in building party organization, in upholding the responsibilities of the party members and in educate the troops in unswervingly retaining their awareness, revolutionary nature, will and action abilities.

In the primary level units, a political committee has not been organized. The political cadres in the primary level units consist of the deputy commanders for politics in brigades, regiments, battalions and companies, and the primary level party committee secretaries, primary level group executive committee secretaries and the party and political work cadres and personnel in the brigades and regiments. The political work cadres and personnel assist under the direct guidance and assignment of the deputy commander for politics or the party committee secretary.

The official responsibilities of the primary level political cadres are to, under the direction of the upper echelon political organ, to guide and organize the achievement of all elements of party and political work within the unit. In order to self-accomplish these responsibilities, deputy commanders for politics in the primary level units must always maintain a firm understanding that their mission of primary importance is to ensure that the leadership effectiveness of the party organization is continuously maintained and developed, and that the party's leadership of the people's armed forces during the new revolutionary period is continuously strengthened.

Profoundly realizing the importance of regularly strengthening and achieving party and political work to ensure that the party leads the armed forces in every aspect in a direct, concentrated and unified manner, all units must work

stantly perfect their political organs and build strong political cadre components, assuring under any condition or circumstance that a strong party organization is constructed and that party and political work is well-accomplished to enable the units to always be a bloc united in will and actions and prepared to outstandingly complete every mission entrusted by the party and people.

[27 Apr 84 p 3, Part 5]

[Unattributed article: "The Organization and Activity of the Basic-Level Party Organizations in the Army"]

[Text] The basic-level party organizations form the Party's foundation, connect the party with the masses, educate, train, admit, and select party members, and train party cadres. From them are elected the party's leadership organs. They directly introduce the Party's lines and policies to the masses and organize the victorious implementation of the Party's lines and policies.

In the new phase of the revolution at present, a permanent mission of foremost importance of the party building work in the army is to strengthen the Party's leadership, implement the its leadership mechanism in the army, and build pure, strong basic-level party organizations to serve as the hard core in building comprehensively strong basic-level units which have sufficiently strong fighting strength to victoriously fulfill all missions.

The Political Bureau has determined the basic mission of the basic-level party organizations as being to "Strictly implement the resolutions and directives of the Party. The party work and the mass work must be closely combined with the military work, the specialized work, and the production work in order to bring into play the combined strength of the basic-level units, encourage the positive elements, and struggle to overcome the negative aspects. All activities of the basic-level party organizations must be oriented toward ensuring the fulfillment of the missions of the unit: maintaining combat readiness and fighting victoriously, and studying, working, and engaging in production labor with discipline and high quality and effectiveness. It is necessary to pay all-out attention to building pure, strong party organizations and improve the quality of party members, especially the quality of key cadres of the basic units."

In order to perfect the basic-level party organizations and improve the methods of the party work and the political work, so that they can be appropriate to the new developmental phase of our armed forces, the Political Bureau decided to create the positions of specialized party secretaries and specialized Youth Union secretaries in the regiments, brigades, and national defense enterprises. The Political General Department will decide on creating such positions elsewhere, if needed.

The basic-level party organizations operate in accordance with the Party statutes. It is necessary to both improve the effectiveness of the party and political work and develop the effectiveness of the single commander system.

The basic-level party organizations do not decide matters regarding the operational plans, the plan norms, production measures and specialized-technical measures. They do not criticize the orders and directives of the commanders when carrying them out. It is necessary to emphasize the responsibility, creativity, initiative, and decisiveness of the commander, but it is also necessary to exercise continuous leadership of the party members, cadres, and men in fully carrying out all directives and orders of the commander. The party members must not only be exemplary in carrying out orders but must encourage the masses to overcome all difficulties so that the orders of the commander can be effective.

The basic-level party organizations must create all necessary conditions for the commander to fully exercise his responsibility in fulfilling the missions assigned by the Party and state, dealing with situations with initiative, resolve, and urgency in order to win victory, and outstandingly fulfilling all missions. Ability to lead the fulfillment of the missions and responsibilities of the basic-level party organizations depends to a large degree on the combattiveness, initiative, creativity, and steadfastness of the party chapters and the exemplary vanguard role of the party members. The building of basic-level party organizations is tied in with the political missions of the basic units. On the basis of the requirements of the political missions of the units, it is necessary to strengthen the party committees and party chapters, forge and cultivate the party members, and improve leadership. By means of actual combat and maintaining combat readiness it is necessary to train the troops in all regard, improve the quality of party members, consolidate and strengthen the organizations, develop the positive aspects, and struggle to overcome the negative aspects, in order to promote the political-ideological education of the party members and masses. The basic party organizations must be exemplary with regard to a resolute, indomitable will, an absolute revolutionary spirit, and a high level of organization and discipline, and always be worthy of being vanguard units which fight for the working class at the basic level. The results of the fulfillment of political missions must be made the yardstick for measuring the quality of the work of basic party organizations.

Under the direct leadership of the political office, the basic-level party committees are responsible for leading the party organization in carrying out the directives of the political office. The relationship between the basic-level party committee and the commander is based on the stipulation that the party committee of the basic-level party organization is the leadership organ of the party organization. The unit commander must maintain close contact with the party committee, promptly report to it the missions, directives, and orders of the upper echelon and his proposed policies, measures, and implementation, and recommend to the party committee matters needing leadership in order to ensure the fulfillment of the unit's missions. The commander must continually exchange opinions with the deputy commander for political matters and the secretary of the party committee regarding the situation and the essential

problems of the unit, and discuss leadership measures that the party organization must approve.

The deputy commanders for political matters in the regiments, with their status as representatives of the political office, are directly responsible for organizing the implementation of the party work and political work in the unit, and along with the party committee secretary for organizing the carrying out of the directives of the upper echelon and the resolutions of the upper echelon and the resolutions of the deputy commander for political matters.

So that the work of building basic party organizations can be developed continually and strongly, it is necessary to concentrate on increasing the combativeness, initiative, creativity, and uniform level of the basic organization, in which the most important task is improving the quality of the party chapters and the party members, especially the key cadres at the basic level.

As the resolution of the Fifth Party Congress indicated, "The strengthening of the basic-level party committees, and above all the correct appointment of standing committee secretaries and members, are of decisive importance in improving the quality of the basic party organizations."

The party building work is a mission of strategic significance. The results of the party building work are above all manifested in a concrete, lively manner in the basic organizations. Each party committee, cadre, and party member in the army is responsible for building the basic party organization on the basis of obeying the Party Statutes, the party building guidelines, and the resolutions and directives of the Party, for bringing about a new transformation in both thought and organization, and for promoting a broad mass revolutionary action program in order to victoriously implement the resolution of the Fifth Party Congress.

5616

CS0: 4209/322

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TRADE AND AID

THACH RECALLS MEETINGS WITH POL POT, IENG SARY

Bangkok SU ANAKHOT in Thai 27 May-2 Jun 84 pp 41, 42

[Article by Amawasi: "The Meeting With Nguyen Co Thach"]

[Excerpts] Miss Amawasi has gone to Australia to live and will probably live there for quite some time before she returns. But because she wants to keep readers of SU ANAKHOT informed about what is happening there and about things that are related to Thailand, particularly concerning women's matters, Miss Amawasin will continue to write this column with just the form changed.

Recently, I had a chance to interview Mr Nguyen Co Thach, the Vietnamese minister of foreign affairs. I told myself that even though I had no idea what we would talk about, it would still be good to see him since I wanted to meet him and listen to what he had to say. And I wanted to see what kind of reception Australia would give him.

At 0900 hours the minister and three assistants arrived. After we greeted each other, we began the interview. The minister apologized for having a cold. His English had a strong French accent to it and so it was difficult for an English-speaking person to understand him. The man making the movie said that when the interview was used in the movie, he would probably have to use English subtitles, too, so that people could understand what was being said. But foreigners who speak English like this writer can usually understand strange English accents that native speakers have trouble understanding.

One of the minister's assistants who was sitting near me greeted me in what I guessed was Vietnamese. But he was wrong. When I told him that I was Thai, he seemed surprised. And when the minister spoke ill of Thailand, this assistant seemed very ill at ease and glanced at me periodically.

I glanced at him, too, to see his expression. When our eyes met, we smiled at each other and then looked away.

Why is Kampuchea so important to the safety and security of Vietnam?

The minister responded by saying that during the past 2,000 years, China has often invaded Vietnam both from the north and the south. China has frequently put Vietnam in the position of a "sandwich" and used others to fight Vietnam in its place. For example, it is using Pol Pot as a tool. Thailand, too, is a tool of China and poses a threat to Vietnam from the rear. If Vietnam gets careless, China will attack from the front. The minister said that Thailand has invaded Vietnam seven times since the 17th century.

"The ruthlessness of the Thais is well known in neighboring countries. Today, if someone says the words 'Thais, Thais,' in Laos and Kampuchea even the dogs, cattle and chickens flee in terror," said the minister in comparison.

At this point, I had to remind myself that no compassion is shown on the battlefield and that the same is true for diplomatic negotiations. In every case, you have to talk like a winner and try to benefit your side. To be a good diplomat, you have to be very clever.

Have you ever met Pol Pot or Ieng Sary?

The minister said that he had met Pol Pot just once but that he had met and had long talks with Ieng Sary many times. When asked about his personal feelings about Pol Pot when he met him face to face, with the question prefaced by the remark that "some people have said that Pol Pot has much personal charm," the minister laughed and then said that "well, at least he has a wife." I was almost tempted to respond by saying: "But Ho Chi Minh didn't even have a wife." But I "bit my tongue" and didn't say anything since I didn't want to sour the atmosphere.

On this trip to Australia, the minister continued to stress the need to eliminate Pol Pot and said that Thailand must stop serving as a haven for the Khmer Rouge if there is to be peace in Kampuchea. Very cleverly, the minister said that "as for things in Kampuchea, they are better than in East Timor. If you want to ask Vietnam to withdraw from Kampuchea, you also have to ask Indonesia to withdraw from East Timor and the United States to withdraw from Western Europe and Japan."

11943

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PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

HO CHI MINH CITY 9TH ANNIVERSARY OF LIBERATION DISCUSSED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 30 Apr 84 pp 3, 4

[Article by Phan Van Khai, an alternate member of the Party Central Committee and the vice chairman of the Ho Chi Minh City People's Committee: "Ho Chi Minh City, the 9th Anniversary of Socialist Collective Ownership"]

[Text] the date 30 April, the date of our great and total victory over the American imperialists, is of great historical significance. And it is the day that the liberation of the city brought great glory. On this day, the cadres and people of Ho Chi Minh City remember the uplifting words recently spoken by General Secretary Le Duan at the Third Municipal Party Organization Congress:

"Yesterday, the Municipal Party Organization experienced countless difficulties and made sacrifices in order to fight and liberate the fatherland and the city.

"Today, the party organization is overcoming new difficulties and passing new challenges in order to build and protect our beloved city."

With only 1 year left until the 10th anniversary of the glorious 30 April, all people in the city, who have been on the path of socialist collective ownership for 9 years now, are asking themselves the question: What have we done to be worthy of this historical day, which is written in the blood of many generations and of all nationalities?

We know there are many things that must be done. But behind a seemingly unchanging facade, a profound and far-reaching change has taken place, which can be evaluated above all by labor and effective labor. Industry, small industries and handicrafts production have doubled as compared with production prior to liberation even though since 1979 and 1980, materials from state sources have declined by half. Even more important is that the laborers of the city have made an effort to mass produce many types of durable household goods such as bicycles, table fans and sewing machines--which were all imported from abroad before. And the circumstances of common difficulties ordinary consumer goods have been contributed to regional markets and other markets throughout the country and even to friendly countries.

Today, we would like to say more about the outlying areas of the city, which were fierce battlefields that ran red with the blood not only of the people on the spot but also of wave after wave of outstanding people of the Ho Chi Minh youth generation from all over the country who came and to the Sat Forest and Cu Chi and then used them to attack in the year of the Monkey (1968) and in the historical Ho Chi Minh campaign. We want to tell everyone that the former "free-fire" zones of the American bandits have now undergone many important changes. In the first year after liberation, there were only 45,000 hectares of farming area. This has now increased to 90,000 hectares, which is larger than the farming area of Gia Dinh Province under the old system (7,500 hectares). And the above area does not include the more than 20,000 hectares of forest area that have been replanted. Rice yields have increased from 22 quintals per hectare to 30-31 quintals, which is an increase of nearly 50 percent as compared with the first year after liberation. This has provided the outlying areas with sufficient food, with the average quota being 400 kilograms of paddy per person of farmer and worker households.

Another great change in the outlying areas is that specialized vegetable cultivation zones have been established, which has solved the vegetable problem for the city. Previously, vegetables had to be brought in from Dalat. The industrial crop zones are expanding greatly. For example, the peanut area has increased from 2,000 hectares to 5,000 hectares today. And it is estimated that the area will increase to 8,000 to 10,000 hectares next year. In areas long left fallow where few people lived, many state farms that grow pineapples and sugarcane are now in operation. The Sat Forest, which was almost completely destroyed by American bombs, has been virtually restored, with 20,000 hectares replanted and newly planted in conjunction with raising shrimp and fish.

Concerning rural life, housing has been stabilized and the problems concerning schools, health clinics and hospitals for the outlying areas have been basically solved. A number of villages have built a number of other cultural and welfare projects. Concerning the material and technical base, electricity has been extended to Thu Duc, Hoc Mon and Cu Chi. Power lines which passed through part of the Iron Triangle from Ben Cat to Phu Hoa across Highway 15, to An Nhon Tay, across Highway 7 and to Thai My and Trang Bang and nearly through Cu Chi will in the near future reach Ben Duoc, An Phu and Ho Bo. People who go to An Nhon today will clearly see a different life since there is now power and water day and night for the peanut and tobacco fields.

Concerning the cooperativization movement, great strides were made in 1983. Calculated to the end of the year, all the land reform tasks had been successfully completed by the anniversary of the August Revolution and National Day on 2 September. Now, 35 percent of the peasant families and 40 percent of the farming areas are involved in collective life. With the new spirit of the outlying areas, cooperativization will be accelerated at an appropriate rate and will be basically completed this year.

In a large city that was liberated only 9 years ago and that is facing many complex problems, it is impossible to solve all the problems at a single stroke. The party organization and people of the city are grateful for the constant

deep concern of the entire country concerning the municipal movements, for their wishes of success and for their understanding concerning our difficulties and efforts. The party organization has strictly implemented the rectification ideas and instructions from above, and it treasures all constructive ideas and understanding for the problems that may exist or that may originate from revolutionary zeal. On this historical day, we would like to make one thing clear to the collective party organization and that is that in the process of concretizing the various lines and policies of the party and state, we must firmly grasp the real characteristics of the locality, make use of them accordingly and put forth specific positions and policies that are in accord with the characteristics. A special characteristic in economic leadership that must always be kept in mind--and this characteristic is manifested to a high degree in this city and may even be uniquely noteworthy--is the existence of five economic elements.

Experience has shown that whenever the policies have fully considered the special economic characteristics, they manifest an effect quickly and clearly. This is a major problem that must be given careful thought with the aim of exploiting and utilizing the existing or potential production capabilities to fulfill the obligations of an economic center toward the region and entire country. Starting from these special characteristics, first of all in planning, we have advocated making multiple-part plans that include the plans of the state, the municipality and the production installations. This permitted us to share out materials which, through review, resulted in additional production. Concerning this method of handling things, in the beginning, there were unavoidable deviations, but efforts were made to put things on the right track. An important point is that in terms of overall effectiveness better use is being made of the system, the workers have work and are earning an additional income and the state has products and is accumulating [money] for the budget. We think that using the four balanced sources formula of the Third Resolution like this is very effective. The main positive aspect of this policy was doubling the value of industrial and handicrafts production in conditions in which we still lack a smooth, suitable and stable management mechanism.

Starting from the characteristic common to the entire country, that is, moving from small-scale production to large-scale socialist production, in conjunction with the characteristic of the five economic elements, we realize the need for providing leadership for industrial and handicrafts production, by giving attention to the large and medium-sized industrial enterprises and by fully exploiting the capabilities of small industries and handicrafts. We think that exploiting the capabilities the small industries and handicrafts so that they have generated their own growth capital has been a success. This success has an objective aspect. Previously, under the old system, small industries and handicrafts were repressed by foreign countries. On 30 April, the production strength and labor capacity of the city was liberated. But it must be said that this achievement stems above all from making creative use of the Sixth Resolution. It's true that initially, we did not give prompt attention to the problems of organization and reform. But when the Political Bureau's resolution on the city's tasks corrected this, we actively became involved in managing, reforming and rearranging things. For the workers of the city, we

would like to mention that the city's small industry and handicrafts goods account for 60-70 percent of the commodities of many of the provinces in the zone.

Also starting from the special characteristics above and in accord with the initial phase of the transitional period, concerning organization and management, we are promoting a division of labor and decentralization for the wards, districts, subwards, villages, sectors and production installations. It is thus that we actively exploit all of the potential capabilities. The party organization saw the problems early on and built subward and village work mechanisms several years ago. A division of labor and decentralization is the correct direction, which we first saw in the impetus it gave to building production strength. The city had had no other recourse but to divide the labor and decentralize things and let the wards manage the small industries and handicrafts since the municipal echelon could not supervise 200,000 laborers and 20,000 production installations in the small industries and handicrafts [sector]. Similarly, a ward with 2,000 to 3,000 production installations could not manage all of them and so had to entrust responsibility to the subwards. At present there are subwards that are managing 300 to 400 production installations with products valued at 20 to 60 million dong.

Concerning commerce to support life, decentralization by residential area was found to be the more appropriate way. The city decentralized retail sales to the wards and allowed ward commercial agencies to deal with other localities in seeking out source of goods. The consumer cooperatives have clearly shown their capable support role for national commerce. The consumer cooperative network--which consists of service installations such as repair shops, machine shops and barber shops--was planned based on the residential areas. Initially, they were provided in order to prevent consumers from having to travel long distances or go to the markets to make purchases. The primary level is in close touch with [daily] life; concern for the people's daily lives is a dynamic and creative condition and affects the struggle to manage the markets.

Another major problem that the party organization must ponder deeply and gain much experience about in order to be in close touch with the situation is the problem of socialist reform. Reform is certainly a task that must be carried out. But how to carry out the reforms in order to increase production and stabilize life is the problem that the party organization must consider carefully. For a long time now, party resolutions have stated that only if reform is closely related to construction, with construction taking priority, and only if there is much guidance from practical lessons will the party organization gradually be understood. An example is the Ba Thi corporation, on whose experience concerning circulation and distribution NHAN DAN reported.

From the perspective of socialist reform, this corporation presents a number of points that are worth giving attention to. We would like to discuss four points briefly:

1. First of all is what happens to people in businesses affected by reform. Previously, the grain trading sector in the city had 1,000 privately-owned businesses. There was an organizational reform, and the privately-owned grain

businesses were eliminated. But the people and skills were made use of in the grain businesses that we control. According to our laws, our retail sales points have been organized to sell rice based on residential areas. As a result the number of former private business people was insufficient and more had to be employed.

2. After the reforms have been completed, the sources of goods must be controlled. This is most important. In doing this, the old businessmen have a role to play in making purchases at the initial markets.

3. After the reforms have been completed, there must be mechanisms, policies and procedures in order to develop the effectiveness [of the reforms]. For example, if there are correct policies regarding the buyers and sellers living standards will be maintained and the people will work with peace of mind. And if the interests of the localities are given attention, this will help create sources of goods.

4. Looking to the masses is primarily a women's movement. The women need not be actually engaged in commerce to actually participate in the reform struggle, oppose speculation and smuggling and conduct inspections.

Concerning the food and beverage sector, the city, following the formula of coordinating reform with construction and the policy of cooperating with the private sector, has begun organizing joint [ownership] businesses from 40 of the 300 high-level stores with traditions or skills and used the material base, cooking skills and management experience. Under the private-collective ownership policy, the laborers receive less than 10 percent of the profits, which provides the private individuals who cooperate with us a suitable income. In reforming the small industries and handicrafts, the city does not advocate putting all these industries into cooperatives right away because of the current material imbalances and this will lead to losses on many fronts, especially in the volume of commodities. The policy of carrying on reform along with arranging things by economic and technical sector has proven to be effective. For example, in the textile sector, all the state enterprises, joint state-private enterprises and cooperatives have been placed in one sector, with the state controlling the yarn, starch and dye. In the bicycle sector, the state controls the polishing, plating, frame-making and assembly tasks. The result has been that, following the reforms, production strength has increased at the production installations, and from the technical and management aspect the effects of this have been noted and progress has been made in maintaining the quality of the goods.

One tradition remaining from the resistance that the party organization wants to exploit fully is showing concern from top to bottom for mobilizing, fostering and leading mass movements and quickly recognizing that the contents of the mass activities in the new period must be closely tied to the economy and daily life. Under the leadership of the party committee echelons, the mass organizations have carried out their tasks in order to fulfill the state plans and the front activities in the wards and subwards. They have concentrated on looking after life in the residential areas and on working as the activists in the major

movements, such as purchasing government bonds and supporting the fatherland front line. And recently, as in Binh Thanh Ward, they worked to rid the houses of rats.

Strengthening the mass movements cannot be separated from exploiting and strengthening the progressive models to affirm and multiply the new elements. From the most difficult years, along with promoting production, the city has given much attention to progressive models. In stimulating the active nature of the progressive elements and collectives, experience has shown the need for appropriate reinforcement both spiritual and material, the material encouragements deriving in part from the results produced by the laborers.

The close relationship between the mass movements and the party organization collective has generated enthusiasm and eagerness qualities which come from the masses. And this has come about regardless of the fact that Ho Chi Minh City is a more centralized industrial city. These roots from the workers and industry influence leadership and make it impossible for the party organization not to be enthusiastic and build an industrial style.

All the things that have been accomplished are naturally just the beginning. There is still great potential for further development. Along with making subjective efforts to overcome our weaknesses and shortcomings quickly, by placing our faith in the intelligence of the entire party, [we] will soon solve the problem of an appropriate mechanism and exploit the collective ownership power of all three echelons and of the working people in building the country's economy and opening up a path for a powerful spirit of productive labor to come into being by the time of the 10th anniversary of 30 April.

With this faith, the party organization and people of the city are making steady progress and making an effort to complete the tasks given them and score great achievements in celebration of the 10th anniversary of 30 April--the day that the entire country was liberated and the day that the life of the city changed.

The great directive of the general secretary is also a message from the heart:

"For the entire country and with the entire country, yesterday, Saigon was liberated.

"For the country and with the country, today, Ho Chi Minh City is successfully building socialism."

11943

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ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

ACHIEVEMENTS, SHORTCOMINGS IN EXPANSION OF RETAIL NETWORK ANALYZED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 11 May 84 p 2

[Article by Bang Chau: "Expansion of Retail Network in Ho Chi Minh City"]

[Text] The socialist commercial sector in Ho Chi Minh City has begun to realize the importance of the retailing task. Apart from the retail networks of the grain sector and others, there are 3,643 retail shops belonging to the commercial sector. On the average, each retail shop in the urban wards serves 1,085 people and each counterpart in the rural districts serves 1,342 people. Retail counters in department stores at the municipal, precinct, district, ward and village levels have tried to do business more actively on the occasion of holidays and lunar New Year. Selling goods at retail and delivering them into the consumers' hands and realistically promoting the laborers' life is one of the principal themes of the emulation movement within the commercial sector in Ho Chi Minh City. The sector is intensifying its activities around all the three tasks of purchasing goods, wholesaling and retailing them, and rendering services to customers by applying both the methods of doing business according and not according to plan in both markets--organized and unorganized. The sector has determined clearly that it is necessary to take hold of goods in order to be able to carry out the retailing task satisfactorily. In 1983, the sector purchased goods worth 14.94 billion dong--up 55.33 percent over 1982. Based on the sources of goods purchased, the sector has directed the raising of four merchandise funds to serve daily life, to carry out two-way exchange, to participate in taking control of the market and to export goods. The novelty in this move is the fact that though distinctively separated, these four merchandise funds are always interrelated in proper time and place and may sometimes be interchanged in conformity with requirements in order to promptly promote consumption, production and exportation.

The method of distributing goods and ensuring that they reach the consumers' hands quickly and conveniently has also been improved. Compared with 1982, the total value of goods sold came to 15.16 billion dong representing an increase of 50.56 percent; these goods included an additional amount of merchandise sold to cadres, manual and office workers and people's households (since the second quarter of 1983) which was worth 4.3 billion dong--a twofold increase over 1982; on the average, it was possible to meet 50 percent of the cash income of people working in the state sector. The retail ratio has risen obviously--from 57.3 percent of the total value of goods sold in 1982 to

67 percent of it in 1983. Attention has been paid to servicing activities and tasks have been assigned to serve many types of customers such as members of the armed forces, families of wounded soldiers and fallen heroes, retired cadres, persons deprived of physical strength, old persons whose families lack manpower, invalids, children, cadres and manual and office workers, and poor laboring people. Marketing cooperatives in wards and villages have assumed the task of serving retired cadres and have organized mobile teams using vehicles to carry and sell goods to various organs and enterprises. All wards and villages have unanimously considered retailing at the ward and village levels to be a contribution to the "who will vanquish whom" struggle on the distribution and circulation front. Therefore, the Municipal People's Committee and Commercial Service have periodically and promptly formulated a plan and measures to direct retail in the market by setting norms; for example, retailing by the municipal state commercial sector must attain 35 to 40 percent of the total amount of goods for sale, that by the precinct and district state commercial sector 70 to 80 percent and that by the ward and village state commercial sector 90 percent. To date, 24 state commercial units and 34 cooperative commercial units have carried out retail satisfactorily from one or several points of view. For instance, Department Store No 2 has extended its commercial activities to many kinds of goods which it did not deal in in the past and which included especially merchandise for everyday use and of low value. Goods have been singled out and packed very conveniently to consumers. The courteous and civilized attitude of salespersons has been praised by many agencies and enterprises. This department store is a unit which has kept up mobile sale teams and regularly sent time directly to various agencies, enterprises and hospitals to sell more than 100 kinds of merchandise at prices 10 to 40 percent cheaper than those in the market. By wisely directing the interchangeability of three merchandise funds, the Retail Department Store Corporation in the 1st Precinct has constantly created conditions for various agencies and enterprises to buy goods many times in case of need; this move has been welcomed by many people. The marketing cooperative in the 5th Ward of Phu Nhuan Precinct has opened many retail shops in each ward and has set up many stations to render service to the laboring people at cheap prices.

Ever since attention has been paid to retailing, the relationships between the state and cooperative commercial sectors have been strengthened continuously. Commercial tasks have been assigned ever more clearly: The municipal commercial sector has assumed the wholesale purchase and sale of goods and the creation of a stock of goods for retailing purposes while the precinct and district commercial sector has the duty to retail goods directly within the precinct and district scopes and simultaneously to organize wholesale or promote retailing. As for the cooperative commercial sector at the ward and village levels, its principal duty is to retail goods and to directly conduct the struggle to seize the market in the ward and village areas. In 1983, by removing obstacles to the relationships between purchase by proxy and sale agency, the cooperative commercial sector received from the state commercial sector an amount of goods worth over 1.4 billion dong for retailing purposes, thus creating a stock of goods which made the position of retail cooperatives relatively stable in the ward and village areas.

The management boards of various markets have also been further consolidated and improved. Throughout the city, 137 markets are being reorganized. Initial progress has been made in reforming and employing private traders. The use of 3,347 private traders and the reorganization of 35,890 small traders into 1,593 teams dealing in specific categories of goods in various markets have created favorable conditions for the commercial sector to move forward to take hold of wholesale and to control retail in each ward and village area, especially concerning such kinds of goods as pork, fish sauce, vegetables and fuel.

Though the socialist commercial sector in the city has stepped up the retail trade, the determination displayed and the measures applied have sometimes been neither high nor vigorous in some places. Many precincts, districts, corporations and shops have continued to run after profit and to neglect the duty to serve customers. Despite some limited results obtained recently by the commercial sector, the task of purchasing goods and grasping their sources has been carried out weakly; in fact, the sector has taken hold of only 40 percent of the total amount of small industry and handicrafts products, 30 percent of the total amount of vegetables of all kinds and 30 percent of the total herd of live-weight hogs and of the total sugar quantity. The ability to catch hold of only a small amount of goods has diminished its effect on the control of market prices and on the stabilization of the life of cadres and manual and office workers. The flow of goods through too many stages has increased expenditures and led to a rise in the retail prices of certain categories of goods.

The retail network has been expanded disproportionately, with efforts being concentrated mainly on the urban precincts, while it is still too thin and weak in rural districts such as Nha Be, Duyen Hai and Binh Chanh. The number of laborers employed to perform indirect tasks at retail shops still represents a high ratio. Since the discount rate fixed for some categories of goods has been too low and does not suffice to cover the goods circulation expenditures, many cooperatives dared not receive goods from the state commercial sector. The propagation of progressive models and the drawing of experiences from the retail stage have been carried out too slowly. The distribution of tasks and the decentralization among specialized commercial corporation at the precinct, district, ward and village are not yet appropriate and the function of each of them has not yet been clearly defined. Due attention has not yet been paid to servicing activities, etc..

In pursuance of the Municipal Party Organization Congress resolution and under the guidance of the Municipal Party Committee Standing Committee and the Municipal People's Committee, the commercial sector is urgently replanning its retail and service network with the aim of providing conveniences for consumers and stabilizing market prices. The network of ward and village marketing cooperatives acting as merchandise retailing agencies of the state commercial sector at all levels will be used intensively and properly. Private citizens will be selectively employed as retailing agents and strictly controlled in matters of selling prices and methods. The management of the retailing system and policy will be strengthened in order to prevent the loss of goods from warehouses. Market management boards and teams dealing in specific categories

of goods will be organized and consolidated and efforts will be exerted to help the retail network of the state and cooperative commercial sectors occupy about 30 percent of the total number of sale counters in markets.

A uniform change in the retail stage requires the municipal commercial sector to exert more dynamic efforts while the financial, banking, public security, tax and market management sectors must coordinate their activities more harmoniously and closely.

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ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

CAUSES OF LOW PRODUCT QUALITY PROBED, REMEDIAL MEASURES SUGGESTED

Hanoi DOC LAP in Vietnamese 2 May 84 p 3

[Article by Truong Son: "Product Quality"]

[Text] Scalding Situation

In a socialist society, consumption and production have a common demand: Great abundance and, at the same time, good quality of merchandise. It is regrettable, however, that the present situation of our merchandise cannot yet meet this dual requirement. Over the recent past, there has been an increase in the quantity of certain goods whose quality has also been maintained while more than 10 kinds of products have won the state quality seal and several hundred types of goods have been awarded different medals at many economic-technical achievements exhibitions. But, generally speaking, the quality of products--especially consumer goods and those made by the small industry and handicrafts sectors--is declining seriously. For several decades, no noteworthy progress has been made in the manufacture of ordinary and improved agricultural implements though it does not require a high technical level. To date, there have been numerous instances when peasants buying agricultural tools from state stores had to machine them again before using them. Since the quality of rice--the number 1 staple commodity for urban people--has not been ensured, many families who happened to buy bad quality rice from state stores had to exchange every 10 kgs of it for only 7 kgs of "countryside rice." A series of product quality inspections carried out at basic units have revealed that quality is either bad or unstable for many staple commodities such as bicycles and spare parts thereof; for certain categories of goods including rubber and plastic items, fabrics, clothing materials and stationery; and for some food products such as wine, sugar, cakes, candies, etc.. A number of raw materials such as coal, bricks and tiles also do not conform to patterns and regulations. Following an inspection at Ho Chi Minh City, it has been found that many types of goods produced by the small industry and handicrafts sectors have not come up to qualitative standard. Worth mentioning is the fact that because they are substandard, a number of export goods have been withheld for domestic consumption or have been returned by customers after being sent abroad. The ratio of small industry and handicrafts goods destined for export but requiring remanufacture is very high--sometimes between 20 and 30 percent. In short, merchandise quality is a heated problem of today.

The poor quality of goods has caused heavy losses to the economy and the people's life. This means that a certain amount of energy, raw materials and labor has been wasted without creating any noteworthy use value and that the impossibility of finding consumers for the manufactured goods has led to a stagnation of both merchandise and capital and has even caused an undesirable tension on the market.

What Are the Causes?

Why has the quality of our goods fallen off in such a manner?

There are many subjective and objective causes but the following ones are quite visible:

Many of our enterprises own too old equipment and machines which are already wornout but not yet replaced. For example, the shortage of standard winnows at rice mills has caused the mixture of rice with substandard products and foreign particles.

Another cause is the fact that raw materials are of bad quality or have not been treated: Because of the bad quality of cotton, weaving becomes difficult and the fabrics produced are not beautiful while wooden utensils are likely to crack because the wood used to make them has not been dried.

The unsteady supply and irregular cutoff of electricity has influenced the quality of products, especially those made by the chemical industry sector.

The professional standard of our workers is still low; on the average, they have only reached grade 2.6 or 2.7 out of 7 ones.

The quality of products has not been tightly controlled...

Prices and wages are also an important cause which has influenced product quality according to the sayings: "Like price, like product" and "Small income [cannot] yield large output." For instance, in the past, each time a farmer sold 1 kg of fresh tea buds, he could buy nearly 2 kgs of rice (0.76 to 0.80 dong); at present, he can buy only 0.7 kg of rice (4 to 6 dong); with so low an income, he will not feel enthusiastic about producing a large amount of good quality tea. Another example is that if more capital is invested in technical improvement, the durability of a gimlet can increase threefold (300 percent) but since the price subsidy is only 3 percent, no factory director can zealously raise the quality of this product. Many people engaged in the weaving profession in Bay Hien (Ho Chi Minh City) have frankly admitted that because of too low contractual wage paid for weaving, they have been forced to chisel off many teeth from the comblike device in the looms in order to reduce the number of vertically stretched yarns and sell them to make a living. The overall wage situation is the same. Because the basis wage is too low and because it takes them 2 or 3 years to earn a step increase with a raise of 5 to 6 dong, workers are not interested in improving their professional skills and in ensuring the quality of their products--not to speak of the fact that because workers cannot make a living out of their net salaries, this has given rise to many negative practices among them.

In addition, there is another underlying cause which needs to be carefully analyzed and which stems from an inadequate concept of quality. Some people hold that because we are still poor and because the amount of goods available is still insufficient, for the time being we need only a sufficient quantity of them for use and must not yet ask for a high quality.

The resolution of the Sixth Plenum (session IV) of the Central Committee of our leading party has stated clearly that in carrying out production, it is necessary "to pay attention to both the quantity and quality of products," "to try to achieve the largest quantity and highest quality possible within the limits allowed by the actual situation and to refrain from doing jobs in a slipshod manner, which will cause a waste of raw materials and create bad habits in the field of production and management." The recent plenums of the Central Committee (of our leading party) have also repeatedly stressed the need to attach importance to output, quality and effectiveness in carrying out production.

Concept--the Point at Issue

To implement the above-mentioned resolutions strictly and to stabilize and heighten the quality of products, it is necessary to provide a uniform solution for all problems--primarily that of concept.

It is necessary to understand clearly that product quantity and quality are two closely related aspects. If a product is of good quality, it can be used for a long time and will prove economical from many points of view. Though the weight of the amount of cotton used to weave a meter of spliced-strand fabric is equivalent to that of the quantity of cotton used to weave a meter of single-thread fabric, there is a difference of 20 to 30 percent between the two fabrics' durability. Four shirts made of good fabric may be used longer than five ones made of bad quality fabric and the user may also save several tens of dong of tailoring cost. Making a product of good quality is thus tantamount to increasing its quantity and it is precisely because we are still poor that we must "eat highly nutritious food and wear durable cloth" and must consider quality important because it enables us to make savings. While the quality of consumer goods is important, that of production means is all the more important because machines and equipment of good quality are an important condition to produce good quality merchandise and to raise labor productivity. With regard to export goods, product quality is a vital factor because bad quality goods are not only unsuitable for export but also exert an influence on our international trustworthiness. It can also be added that product quality is also a problem of social significance: We often felt happy and enthusiastic after buying some goods that suited our taste and we have also noticed that many family members who were living in peace and happiness suddenly disagreed and quarreled with each other just because one of them happened to buy some merchandise of bad quality.

A very fundamental point to be understood clearly is that the objective of socialist production is not only value but mainly use value and that production is performed not to make a profit--which is, of course important--but to serve consumption and use so that ensuring product quality must constantly be

a strict criterion for all producers. Quality is a yardstick to evaluate the level of political awareness, qualifications and virtues of cadres and workers.

It is, therefore, necessary to instill a concept, to formulate a policy and gradually to establish a tradition consisting in "making only good quality products and refraining from making bad quality merchandise" or "producing only a small quantity of good quality merchandise rather than producing a large amount of shoddy goods." In the production of bicycles, for example, efforts must be concentrated on making 100,000 good and nice ones for a selling price between 5,000 and 6,000 dong each because this method will prove more economical than producing 150,000 or 200,000 shoddy ones for a selling price of only 2,000 to 3,000 dong each as is the case at the present time. Such a policy does not imply an absolute demand for quality and a disregard for objective conditions but is mainly aimed at eliminating the bad habit of doing a slipshod job and unilaterally lowering the fixed qualitative standard although it may be attained under given subjective and objective conditions. The highest criterion to determine the relationships between quantity and quality is economic effectiveness. Every economic unit must take specific conditions into account in its effort to progress and in trying to fulfill the quantitative and qualitative requirements as much as possible.

Specific Measures

The above-mentioned concept and standpoint must serve as a basis for a specific and uniform solution to all economic and technical problems.

First, intensive investments must be increased to homogenize the production line and to raise the basic industrial level of factories. At the same time, it is necessary to step up the production of spare parts and strictly to implement the system of repairing equipment and machines periodically as scheduled. It is absolutely forbidden to run after quantity or to concentrate all efforts on fulfilling the plan, which will extend the timelimit for the use of equipment and machines and lead to a decline in product quality and may even cause labor accidents. Special attention must be paid to assure a good proportion between the two tasks of performing production and packing because packing has the effect of protecting quality and increasing the quality of goods, especially those destined for export.

Second, adequate preparations must be made for raw materials from purchase, transportation, preservation and categorization to processing and treatment in order to ensure the quality of raw materials and transform the unsuitable into the appropriate ones. For example, it is forbidden to use fresh wood in the production of wooden goods no matter how serious the shortage of this raw material may be.

Third, importance must be attached to the formation of technical workers, to the improvement of their professional skills and to the need to educate and control them to make sure that they fully apply industrial regulations. This application is a highly important factor since there have been numerous cases of bad product quality being caused by the failure of workers to exactly implement industrial regulations and by their tendency to curtail them.

Fourth, quality control means and instruments must be sufficiently provided and quality control intensified through various stages--control by workers and production units which must inspect semifinished products before handing them over to units in other manufacturing stages. Experience in many countries have demonstrated that teaching workers to control themselves and each other is the most important measure to ensure product quality.

Apart from the above-mentioned four regular measures, wages and prices are an urgent problem which requires a satisfactory solution if production quality is to be assured; this is because, as said above, peasants and workers will not care to produce and manufacture raw materials and goods of high quality at the present time when salaries do not simulate labor reproduction and when prices do not reflect true values.

Speaking of salaries, along with the current application of various forms of contractual wage with the objective of ensuring a realistic income for workers, it is simultaneously necessary to prepare actively to reform the basic wage system as soon as possible in order to really transform wages into the principal livelihood of the laboring people. Only by doing so can we inspire the workers' attachment to their factories and interest in producing merchandise of good quality.

As for prices, research must be conducted and adjustments made in the purchase prices of agricultural raw materials and in the purchase and contractual prices of industrial goods so as to defray the actual production cost and to make a profit, thereby encouraging producers to yield raw materials and merchandises of good quality. On the other hand, it is necessary to widen the differential prices between good and bad quality products to encourage production installations to improve technique and raise product quality, and also to enable producers of merchandise of bad quality to earn only a low income.

In short, stopping the decline in product quality while maintaining it and heightening it continuously is an important economic and political task of all production installations and producers.

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AGRICULTURE

HIGH OUTPUT OF WINTER-SPRING RICE CROP IN SOUTH VIETNAM REPORTED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 10 May 84 p 1

[Text] VNA--South Vietnam has basically completed the winter-spring rice harvest. The provinces having completed the harvest at an early date are Long An, Tieng Giang, Cuu Long, Kien Giang and Hau Giang. The rice crop has been evenly good in all areas. Almost all provinces have fulfilled or surpassed the plan norms for the winter-spring rice productivity and volume of production.

According to initial estimates, An Giang achieves the highest average output of 52 quintals per hectare. Hong Ngu District (Dong Thap Province) yields 65 quintals per hectare. Elsewhere, the [per hectare] output is 48 quintals in the provinces of Tien Giang and Dong Thap, 42 quintals in Hau Giang, 40 quintals in Kien Giang, 38.2 quintals in Cuu Long, 37 quintals in Long An, 32 quintals in Ben Tre, 30 quintals in Ho Chi Minh City and 26 quintals in Nghia Binh.

From the point of view of productivity, it is estimated that the former Nam Bo provinces fulfill 101 percent of the plan norm--up 22.8 percent over the productivity of the 1982-83 winter-spring crop. In particular, the Mekong delta achieves 103.4 percent of the plan norm--an increase of 23.6 percent over the productivity of the 1982-83 winter-spring crop.

Though floods receded slowly at the beginning of the cultivation season and though sowing and transplanting were carried out later than in the previous winter-spring season, all localities have achieved a fairly good output mainly because cooperatives, production collectives and farmers expanded the sowing and transplanting of new river varieties, because they carefully tended the riceplants and adequately prevented and controlled harmful insects and diseases and also because they considered it important to concentrate on intensive cultivation in high-yielding rice areas. In particular, the amount of chemical fertilizer applied was 50 percent larger than in the previous winter-spring season.

With an average output of 52 quintals per hectare (on an area of 90,089 hectares) representing an increase of 5 quintals per hectare over the previous winter-spring crop, An Giang Province obtains the highest winter-spring rice productivity ever since the liberation day. The high-yielding rice crops on

60,000 hectares have produced 55 to 60 quintals per hectare. After conducting many tests, An Giang Province has, for the first time, studied and classified fields and carried out a plan to invest materials, efforts and fertilizers according to the field categorization. In particular, the area destined for high-yielding rice varieties and representing nearly two-thirds of the total winter-spring rice area has been defined as class 1 fields so that efforts have been concentrated on applying 350 kgs of nitrate fertilizer to each hectare. Investments above and beyond the norm have been made according to the field categorization for the benefit of many collectives and cooperatives working on product contracts and thus receiving an extra 50 kgs of nitrate fertilizer per hectare, which has enabled them to exceed the contract norm by 5 to 10 quintals [of paddy] per hectare.

An Nhon District in Nghia Binh Province grew the winter-spring crop at a time when the rainfall was equivalent to only 70 percent of that in the previous cultivation season and when the cold spell and the presence of harmful insects and diseases were more serious. Nevertheless, the entire province has achieved an average per hectare output of 38.6 quintals (4 quintals more than the previous winter-spring crop); the total output of 25,360 tons--4,100 tons more than the previous crop--has been obtained because direct sowing without transplanting was neatly done throughout the district in December when the season was most favorable. Though the direct-sowing area is merely 10 percent of the total cultivated area, its output surpasses that of the normal-transplanting area by 2 to 4 quintals per hectare and has, at the same time, helped ease the tense situation of labor force during the height of the cultivation season, thus heralding a new trend in farming methods.

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AGRICULTURE

DROUGHT-INSECT CONTROL, SUBSIDIARY CROP INCREASE REPORTED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 11 May 84 p 1

[Text] In North Vietnam, after long periods of overcast sky, sunshine has created more favorable conditions for the growth of riceplants. Cooperatives are concentrating their work force on weeding while applying an additional amount of nitrate fertilizer to enable riceplants in the main fields to form boots. The area affected by drought and harmful insects and diseases is tending to expand. According to the Statistics General Department, as of 1 May, 108,683 hectares of rice have been suffering from drought and another 202,191 hectares from insects and diseases and these figures mean an increase over the corresponding period last year. All localities are urgently mobilizing means such as pumps to draw in water to protect riceplants from drought and enable them to form boots under favorable conditions.

Insecticides have been sprayed on 80 to 85 percent of the area affected by harmful insects and diseases. In addition to chemicals, all localities have also resorted to manual methods to pick out leaf rollers and stem borers' egg nests. Every installation is trying to satisfactorily carry out the remaining two tasks in the production season which are preventing and controlling harmful insects and diseases and fighting against drought in order to obtain the highest output possible.

To prepare for the 10th-month production season, all localities are seeking by all means to collect and exchange for early 10th-month rice seeds. The Ministry of Agriculture is trying to complete the supply of 3,000 tons of early 10th-month rice seeds to all localities in the current month of May to enable them to sow seeds on schedule. All installations have rapidly determined and calculated the winter-spring rice harvesting area and time and have planned to provide close guidance for the early 10th-month seed sowing season.

The summer-fall rice production season is urgent throughout the country. Rain has fallen on many regions and has provided enough water for the direct sowing of rice seeds. In the provinces of Tien Giang, Quang Nam-Da Nang, Nghia Binh, Cuu Long and Minh Hai, 80 percent of the area destined for the direct sowing of summer-fall rice seeds has been plowed and the soil therein has been turned up. Only the two provinces of Tien Giang and Nghia Binh have carried out direct sowing on 50 percent of the cultivated area. The provinces of An Giang, Kien Giang, Dong Thap and Hau Giang are actively preparing material conditions for the direct sowing of 10th-month floating-rice seeds.

As of 5 May, the entire country has also sown and grown vegetables and subsidiary food crops and industrial ones on 989,259 hectares, an increase of 6.2 percent over the same period last year. This increase includes that of 2.9 percent in the northern provinces and 18.2 percent in the southern ones. The whole country has sown and grown subsidiary food crops on 600,485 hectares representing an increase of 1.2 percent over the same period last year and including an increase of 11.1 percent in the southern provinces in particular.

Throughout the country, the area cultivated with short-term industrial crops shows an increase of 27.9 percent over the same period last year but has fulfilled only 31.7 percent of the plan norm. This increase in sowing and cultivation includes that of 19.1 percent in the northern provinces and 52.9 percent in the southern ones.

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AGRICULTURE

BRIEFS

COLLECTIVIZED PEASANTS CONGRESS--The Collectivized Peasants' Union in the city [of Ho Chi Minh] recently held its third congress. Attending the congress were more than 500 delegates representing 20,000 cadres and 111,000 members. Representatives of the Collectivized Peasants' Union in the capital city and many other provinces were also present. In 1985, the urban areas of the city will be required to attain the production of 280,000 tons of grain and a herd of 270,000 hogs. The target set for 1984 is to gather peasants still working individually into production collectives to make it possible in 1985 to basically complete the introduction of peasants living in the urban areas of the city into production collectives and cooperatives. During the last quarter, the union chapters in districts and precincts adjoining the urban areas of the city accepted 542 more new members and set up 4 more new chapters, raising the total membership throughout the city to 111,574 together with a total of 726 chapters at the basic level. [Text] [Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 20 May 84 p 2] 9332

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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

MOSCOW MEETING MARKS USSR-SRV SCIENTIFIC TIES

OW171041 Moscow in Vietnamese to Vietnam 1000 GMT 15 May 84

[Text] A grand meeting was held on 14 May at Moscow's House of Friendship with the People of Foreign Countries to mark the 25th anniversary of the establishment of Soviet-Vietnamese scientific and technological cooperation. Following is our station correspondent's report:

Attending this grand meeting were famous scientists, factory workers, civil servants, Soviet and Vietnamese students in Moscow, and key members of the USSR-Vietnam Friendship Society.

Among the presiding officials at the meeting were academician Marchuk, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the Soviet State Committee for Science and Technology; Soviet cosmonaut Gorbato, twice awarded the title of Soviet Hero and a recipient of the Labor Hero of Vietnam title; head of the Vietnamese delegation visiting the Soviet Union for the ceremony Le Quy An, vice chairman of the Vietnamese State Commission for Science and Technology, and SRV Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Soviet Union Kinh Nho Liem.

Academician Marchuk addressed the meeting. He said:

[Begin Marchuk recording in Russian fading into Vietnamese translation] True to the principles of proletarian internationalism, the Soviet Union for many years has constantly provided all-round fraternal assistance to socialist Vietnam. Twenty-five years have elapsed since the memorable event, the signing by our two countries of the intergovernmental agreement on scientific and technological cooperation. It can now be said with confidence that probably in no scientific and technological sector has the cooperation between our two countries' scientific cadres and specialists not yielded significant results. Over the past 25 years, more than 60,000 Vietnamese specialist cadres and skilled workers, including some 20,000 college graduates and more than 2,000 graduates with a master's degree, have been trained in the Soviet Union. Seventy Vietnamese scientific cadres have become doctors of science.

The Soviet Union has sent over 6,000 specialists, including engineers, geologists, doctors, agronomists, and teachers, to work in Vietnam where they have exchanged experience with their Vietnamese counterparts. The Soviet Union

has also provided important assistance in building the material-technical bases for Vietnam's science, including the building and equipping of the Hanoi Polytechnic College, the Hanoi Agriculture College, and the Vietnam Scientific Research Center.

The joint Soviet-Vietnamese spaceflight, manned by Comrades Corbatko and Phạm Tuan, has become the symbol of the strongly developing cooperation between our two countries in the scientific field.

On this occasion, I express my confidence that the Soviet-Vietnamese scientific relations and cooperation will continue to develop fruitfully in the interests of our two countries and the socialist community as a whole.

Comrade Kudinov, deputy chairman of the Soviet State Committee for Science and Technology, then addressed the participants. He said:

[Begin Kudinov recording in Russian fading into Vietnamese translation] In my recent visit to Vietnam as head of a Soviet scientific-technological delegation, I had the opportunity to see with my own eyes the great Vietnamese scientific achievements and the great, creative potential resulting from the Vietnamese scientists' work and experience. An encouraging fact is that extensive contacts between Soviet and Vietnamese scientists are being increasingly consolidated and developed. The signing of the USSR-Vietnam Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation has ushered in a new, qualitative stage in science and technology.

The special trait in today's cooperation is that it is constantly and closely linked to the discharge of scientific tasks and pressing, realistic requirements facing our two countries. Our two countries have cooperated in carrying out research projects in agriculture, oceanography, geology, and meteorology under tropical conditions. The cooperation between Soviet and Vietnamese socialists continues to be consolidated. In effect, there has been increasingly greater cooperation in compiling specialized study documents. Our cooperation will be further deepened, broadened, and perfected on a broad basis and according to plan.

On this occasion, on behalf of the Soviet scientific cadres, I wish to convey my warm greetings to the Vietnamese scientific cadres and wish them good health, happiness, and new achievements in their work in the interests of their fatherland.

Also attending Moscow's grand meeting was Comrade Le Quy An, vice chairman of the Vietnam State Commission for Science and Technology. Comrade Le Quy An stressed:

[Begin Le Quy An recording] First of all, on behalf of the SRV delegation allow me to express my sincere thanks to the Soviet State Committee for Science and Technology for its kindness in inviting our delegation to visit the Soviet Union on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the establishment of Vietnamese-Soviet scientific and technological cooperation.

It is with very great happiness and honor that we are attending this grand meeting where we have the chance to meet members of the Soviet scientific and technological circles, representatives of the most advanced science and technology, a developed one with people vigorously carrying out activities and striving untiringly for the happiness of the Soviet people, for lasting world peace, for friendship and cooperation among the peoples, and for the victory of socialism and communism.

Esteemed comrades, Soviet cooperation with and assistance to our country has existed for a long time, since the time when Comrade Ho Chi Minh, an eminent son of our nation saw in the October Revolution led by the great Lenin a path for national liberation. That cooperation and assistance has been comprehensive. The Soviet Union has constantly supported and assisted the Vietnamese people in their revolutionary undertaking and their struggle for national liberation in the past as well as in their socialist construction and struggle for the defense of their socialist fatherland at present.

There now exists between our two countries an all-round cooperation in which scientific and technological cooperation plays an extremely important role. Within the framework of today's meeting, please allow me to emphasize the cooperation in that field.

Dear comrades, we wish to draw your attention to the fact that the scientific and technological cooperation between the Vietnam State Commission for Science and Technology [VSCST] and the Soviet State Committee for Science and Technology [SSCST] is being increasingly consolidated and developed. Specialists and advisors of the SSCST have assisted the VSCST on methodology, have given it experience, and have made concrete suggestions on scientific and technological management. Between the two countries' scientific and technological committees there have been regular exchanges of specialists and experience in formulating scientific and technological policies, perfecting managerial systems, and working out scientific and technological plans. Soviet experience in devising long-term scientific and technological strategies is very useful to the VSCST's work in this field. The SSCST's assistance is one of the many important factors in improving Vietnam's scientific and technological organization and management. Scientific and technological cooperation with the Soviet Union has made significant contributions to developing the SRV's economy, culture, science, and technology. With Soviet assistance, Vietnam's scientific and technological potential is developing rapidly and is having increasingly greater capabilities to solve great scientific and technological issues born of realities; it is speeding the application in production of the latest scientific and technological advances as well as developing modern industries and techniques with high economic efficiency.

It should also be stressed that in the recent past, in the two countries' scientific and technological cooperation, there has been a noted qualitative improvement in implementing key issues and other forms of cooperation in a more effective manner.

On behalf of the VSCST and Vietnamese scientific and technical cadres, I wish to express my deep gratitude to the CPSU, the Soviet Government, the Soviet

people, and the Soviet scientists for their selfless assistance and cooperation in the scientific and technological domain in promoting Vietnam's science and technology and for the Soviet Union's sincere support in the struggle against the hostile actions of the Chinese expansionists and hegemons.

On the Vietnamese part, we have always adhered to the CPV's policy of all-round cooperation with the Soviet Union in foreign policy in general and in scientific and technological cooperation in particular.

May the fruitful Vietnamese-Soviet scientific and technological cooperation be increasingly developed and stable.

May the solidarity, friendship, and all-round cooperation between the communist parties, governments, and peoples of our two countries be increasingly stable and developed.

My sincere thanks to you, comrades and friends. [Applause] Le Quy An [End recording]

On the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the establishment of Soviet-Vietnamese scientific and technological cooperations, many Soviet and Vietnamese scientists and specialists as well as many scientific organs and collectives of the two countries have been awarded certificates of honor for their great contributions to promoting Soviet-Vietnamese scientific and technological cooperation.

At Moscow's grand meeting, certificates of honor were awarded to the computer center under the USSR Academy of Sciences, the National Economy Institute, the Navigation Scientific Research Institute, and Moscow's Economic Management College.

CSO: 4209/339

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

OFFICIAL ON SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION WITH USSR

OW200659 Moscow in Vietnamese to Vietnam 1000 GMT 16 May 84

[Excerpts] Dear listeners: These days, celebrations have been held in the Soviet Union to mark the 25th anniversary of Soviet-Vietnamese scientific-technological cooperation. Le Quy An, vice chairman of the Vietnam State Commission for Science and Technology, is now in Moscow for this occasion. He has made the following statement during an interview [date not given] with our station correspondent. He said:

[Begin Le Quy An recording] Vietnamese-Soviet scientific-technological cooperation has existed for a long time, not just for 25 years. However, if the signing of the agreement on scientific-technological cooperation between the two countries is used as the landmark, 25 years have elapsed since that event. Particularly, since 1975 when southern Vietnam was totally liberated and our entire people started building socialism countrywide, Vietnamese-Soviet scientific-technological cooperation has developed more vigorously than ever before. We have gone through the period of cooperation on minor subjects. The two countries have determined long-term scientific subjects for joint research for 5 or 6 years. Within the framework of the standing subcommittee on Vietnamese-Soviet scientific-technological cooperation, more than 80 subjects have been developing for long-term cooperation, from 1981 through 1985, between many ministries and sectors of the two countries. These subjects mainly concern the solving of topical issues in 23 major sectors of our national economy, such as agriculture, forestry, energy, communications, transportation, public health, engineering, metallurgy, geology, marine products, and so forth. [Passage omitted on cooperation in developing new strains for agriculture.]

One of the greatest scientific-technological achievement registered by our country is closely linked to the Soviet Union's great and selfless assistance: The present potential of Vietnam's science and technology. Of the nearly 300,000 Vietnamese with college educations, 18,000 were trained in the Soviet Union. Of the more than 4,000 graduates with a master's degree or a doctorate countrywide, over 2,000 with a master's degree and 70 doctors of science graduated in the Soviet Union. Recently, the Soviet Union has also helped in training economic management cadres for us, and since 1984, it started its assistance in training scientific-technological management cadres and in gradually putting in order our scientific-technological management.

In addition to cadre training, the Soviet Union has helped Vietnam build and equip many important scientific organs, with the Vietnam Science Institute, the Hanoi polytechnic College, and so forth.

Recently, our country inaugurated the first nuclear reactor [words indistinct] which the Soviet Union has assisted in overhauling and perfecting. This is a very valuable scientific research center for Vietnamese scientists to use in their research for solving basic issues and for application in the fields of agriculture, public health, biology, and so forth. [Passage omitted on joint Soviet-Vietnamese spaceflight]

In short, it can be said that Soviet cooperation and assistance to our country in science and technology is of great significance in solving problems born of realities and in building up and developing Vietnam's scientific-technological potential.

Our Vietnamese scientific-technological delegation expresses its very sincere gratitude to the CPSU, the Soviet Government, and the Soviet people headed by esteemed Comrade Chernenko. Our delegation expresses its thanks to the Soviet State Committee for Science and Technology, the USSR Academy of Sciences, scientific-technological organs of various Soviet sectors and ministries, and Soviet scientists for their wholehearted cooperation with and assistance to us in the field of science and technology which has helped make efficient contributions to the building up and defense of our socialist fatherland.

May the Vietnamese-Soviet traditional friendship and scientific-technological cooperation be increasingly consolidated and developed. [End recording]

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